When considering Japan’s defense policy, particularly the speed at which it changes, it’s good to keep your wits about you.
The following apocryphal exchange between a skeptical U.S. observer and a Japanese government official following some newly announced defense initiative is instructive:
U.S. observer: “I suppose you’re going to get it done, ‘mañana’?”
Japanese official: “Oh no … not THAT fast.”
What Is ‘Joint’?
“Joint” or “jointness” refers to the three JSDF services (Air, Sea, and Ground Self Defense Forces) operating as a unified whole and under the command of a single “joint” commander. They currently lack such capability, except at the most rudimentary level—despite the existence of a Joint Staff Office (JSO).Think of your arms and legs operating under orders from the brain—and each appendage doing what the brain directs.
That’s the JSDF with “jointness.”
Now imagine the brain is absent, and each appendage does whatever it imagines the body ought to be doing.
That’s the JSDF “without jointness.” And it is no way to conduct military operations.
Absent a joint capability; the Japan Self-Defense Force isn’t even the sum of its parts—no matter how impressive each service looks individually or on paper.
However, with “jointness,” the JSDF becomes far more capable of defending Japan and conducting operations with its ally—the United States—and other partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan’s adversaries—China, Russia, and North Korea—will also take notice of a JSDF that can fight better, by itself or alongside friends.
But they also may not wait around for the JSDF to get its act together, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, in particular, seems like a man in a hurry.
Thus, the announced 2024 start date for the JSDF joint capability suggests no real urgency on the part of Japan’s civilian leadership. Also, it’s unclear how the transformation will actually occur.
Changing a military’s “ethos” and customary ways of operating is often difficult. It could easily take another three to five years for real improvements to manifest themselves.
One hopes things might come about quicker—and maybe forward-thinking JSDF officers have quietly developed a “plan” to implement now that they’ve received the “go-order.”
The requirement for a JSDF with joint capability has been obvious for years—and many Japanese military officers and civilian officials recognized the shortcoming.
This was, in fact, a principal reason behind the development of Japan’s amphibious capability starting around 2011. The idea is that amphibious operations require “sea, ground, and air” cooperation—and JSDF services would be forced to cooperate.
This effort has had some success, manifested in the formation of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, which operates well with the Japanese navy and U.S. forces. It shows what’s doable, but the concept has not taken root in the broader JSDF.
There are reasons Japan has taken so long to develop this commonsensical capability for its military. The big one was the World War Two experience when the Japanese military dragged Japan into a catastrophe that killed millions of citizens (military and civilians) and nearly destroyed the nation. Fair enough, and one suspects most nations would be similarly leery of their military for many years afterward.
But that was a long time ago. It has been 20 years since Japan needed to move and make the JSDF an effective force while getting over its pathologic and too comfortable dependence on the U.S. military to defend Japan.
This requires the efficient direction, command, control, and synergies that come with joint capabilities.
Importantly, jointness is not just a matter for the JSDF. The Americans need a more capable and potent Japanese military to augment overstretched U.S. forces.
And American forces and the Japan Self-Defense Force need to operate together far more effectively than is currently the case, except for the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
The U.S. and Japanese militaries—notably the U.S. Navy and Marines and the Japanese army and navy—are trying to move things forward by conducting more complex and more realistic training together. But this only goes so far and is not the same as a JSDF that is “joint” from the ground up.
One Easy Move
The Japanese say they will establish a joint operational headquarters for the JSDF. So will the Americans finally push for a joint U.S.-Japan operational headquarters in Japan? That would be a start. It also isn’t hard.Time will tell.
Unfortunately, optimism does not come easy if you’ve been around Japan for a while.
An American observer of Japan’s defense policies for the last four decades noted:
“Now, let’s see if the joint command really comes to fruition—I envision lots of opposition and obstruction from Asahi (newspaper), the pacifists, and PRC [People’s Republic of China] trolls. Efforts to water down the terms use vague and almost meaningless language. Threats from Beijing which will energize the aforenamed entities.”
So while it’s always good to hear talk of a JSDF that can operate together—jointly—one wonders if Japan moves faster with its plan than Xi Jinping moves with his.
These days he does not appear familiar with the word “mañana.”
