As is the case with G-7 communiqués (or any from such international consortiums), this one lacked specifics on what members might do to parry unwanted Chinese policies. Some at the meeting held up as a model a recent European Union (EU) agreement to impose special tariffs on any nation practicing intimidation or otherwise violating standard trade practice. If the G-7 communiqué stopped short of leveling such threats, it did importantly make clear that any unacceptable action—by Beijing or any other nation—would meet a coordinated G-7 response.
If Kishida knew that he had Washington’s support for his agenda, the European members of the G-7 were an open question. Germany has a great deal of trade with China, and German leadership had visited Beijing to secure more trade. What is more, officials in Berlin had only recently complained that Washington had taken too “confrontational an approach to Beijing.” Also, French President Emmanuel Macron had only recently visited Beijing, where he stressed France’s desire for “strategic autonomy” from the United States and China. Italy had actually joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Though Italian officials had recently suggested that their country might leave those arrangements, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni emphasized that Italy could leave the BRI and nonetheless have good relations with Beijing, as do Paris and Berlin. Nonetheless, in the end, Tokyo got all these nations and Canada to join with Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States and sign the joint G-7 statement.
Needless to say, Beijing was not happy. China’s foreign ministry condemned the G-7 communiqué for “smearing and attacking China.” He accused the G-7 of “grossly interfering with China’s internal affairs” and that its actions would “hinder international peace.” Shu Jueting, the spokeswoman for China’s Commerce Ministry, said that China, unlike the G-7, “brings cooperation and opportunity to the world, not confrontation and risk.” She called out the United States and especially Japan for export controls on 23 types of chipmaking equipment.
The G-7 agreement, including Beijing’s predictably extreme response, must have greatly pleased Kishida. He clearly had this as his goal. Now comes the hard part: getting these nations to follow the outline of the communiqué and coordinate responses to China. France and Germany remain suspects in this regard. Many times in the past, they have tried to triangulate between Beijing and Washington. Still, there is some reason to expect a united front aimed at reform in China, which could serve France’s and Germany’s trade interests, even if narrowly conceived. There is also the EU’s retaliatory agreement. Guarantees never exist in the world of trade and diplomacy, but there is still reason to expect some progress because of this G-7 agreement.