Is Time on China’s Side?

This aerial photo taken shows an empty road as the area is closed off and restricted due to an outbreak of COVID-19 in Sanya in southern China's Hainan Province on Aug. 7, 2022. CNS/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

The issue of time is critical for the evolving international system, in which regional and global powers jostle for advantage and the ability to determine the future global order. Nowhere is this more true than in contemporary U.S.-China relations, through which Washington tries to dampen Beijing’s attempts to overturn the existing Pax Americana.

If time is on China’s side in its drive for global hegemony, then the United States, and all who support the current system’s rule of law, have an incentive to militarily and economically contain or even preempt China’s rise.

On the other hand, if time is not on China’s side, then those who oppose Beijing’s totalitarian vision of world politics may have the benefit of a slower and more deliberate approach to what would then be the containment of Beijing’s floundering attempts against America and our allies’ superior strategic position.

I recently had the luck to consider this topic more deeply in discussion with Mr. David Stilwell over dim sum brunch.

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell, in Washington on June 21, 2022. Matthew Pearson/CPI Studios

Stilwell’s leadership experience in Asia extends back to at least 2008 when he commanded an F-16 fighter wing in northern Japan. He was then our defense attaché in Beijing and held senior positions on Asia in the Joint Chiefs and at USINDOPACOM. Former President Donald Trump appointed Stilwell to assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, which he held from 2019 to 2021.

Taiwan

Stilwell started by illustrating his point on time with the all-important case of Taiwan.

“The longer Taiwan remains effectively independent of the PRC [People’s Republic of China], the harder it will become to incorporate into the Orwellian CCP [Chinese Communist Party] system,” he said.

While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has consistently taken a tough stand against Beijing, her opposition in the Kuomintang (KMT) party attempted to increase engagement with the mainland for years.

After 2018, however, the KMT’s “fortunes crashed,” according to Stilwell.

Kuomintang party's presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu admits defeat in the presidential election in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, on Jan. 11, 2020. Reuters/Ann Wang

That loss of soft power was a major blow to Beijing’s global ambitions.

The CCP’s decreased popularity in Taiwan was partly explained by its clumsy treatment of Hong Kong, a “very foolish move” on the part of Beijing, according to Stilwell.

Beijing broke the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, meant to protect the city’s political autonomy until 2047.

After that rupture, “no sane [Taiwan] politician would ever suggest cooperating with the Mainland again,” Stilwell wrote in an email after the brunch meeting.

“As we’re seeing with Beijing’s empty threats on the Pelosi trip, they’re reluctant to pull the trigger given how bad things are going domestically.”

Stilwell points out that if the People’s Liberation Army attempted an invasion of Taiwan, it would be tough going if U.S. experiences in Somalia and Iraq are any indication.

“In 2003 we all but eliminated all of Iraq’s offensive and defensive capabilities, but after 15 years we were unable to ‘pacify the population’ (to use CCP terms).”

China-Russia Alliance

But does Taiwan really matter that much, given Xi Jinping’s improved relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia? The two recently upgraded in February to a “no limits” partnership.

Russia is a powerful ally as it has the world’s biggest stock of nuclear weapons, more land than any other country, the sixth-largest oil reserves, and a commanding position in Eurasia’s natural gas extraction and pipeline network.

Increased Russian export reliance on Beijing, due to Western sanctions, arguably draws the two countries closer than ever and gives Beijing leadership of this new “axis of evil.”

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (C) reviews a military honor guard with Chinese leader Xi Jinping during a welcoming ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 8, 2018. Greg Baker/Pool/AFP via Getty Images

But Stilwell characterized the “Beijing-Moscow entente” as “an inch deep and narrowly issue-based.”

One risk to the alliance is Beijing’s multi-directional avarice for more territory, including that to its northeast.

Stilwell wrote that China’s netizens are “eager to recover territory lost to Russia in the 1860 Treaty of Peking, in which the weak Qing dynasty ceded a huge chunk of NE China to the Russians, to include the port of Vladivostok.” This deprived China of access to the Sea of Japan.

Russia has long been aware of its relatively unpopulated and undefended eastern flank. This should be all the more apparent to Moscow after having moved so much military strength west to fight in Ukraine.

While Russia is clearly allied with China, it knows that in the long run, Beijing will be a competitor for its territory and global influence. Thus, the alliance is transactional compared to the stronger value-based bonds of democratic alliances.

China’s Economy

Most analysts take China’s self-reported economic figures at face value. These show China’s GDP growth far outstripping—in every year but three since 1963—that of the United States. In some years, the difference in growth rates, reported in World Bank data, exceeded 10 percent. China’s GDP (when considering purchasing power) of $18.71 trillion in 2016 exceeded that of the United States and has done so every year since.

However, Stilwell noted that Beijing exaggerates its economic power, pointing to the Chinese communists’ recent economic challenges.

“As the external and domestic pressures from COVID build, the incentive to create positive numbers grows,” he wrote, citing the shutdown of “entire cities over a handful of infections and the incredibly tone deaf response to legitimate concern of the people.”

Stilwell said that Beijing cannot dodge the negative impact of its bad economic policy on outputs. This year, the “growth numbers the CCP produces look even better because they’re carefully curated and compared to last year’s when they were negative.”

China’s Science and Technology

Stilwell has an optimistic view of a newfound drive in the United States to restrict China’s access to science and technology innovation. This, he argues, is impeding China’s technological advancement.

He agrees that China is catching up with the United States but notes that “the rate of advance is slowing as their legitimate (and otherwise) access to our R&D [research and development] outcomes slows.”

More stringent screening of Chinese investment by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), for example, has increased downward pressure on China’s ability to procure platforms in the United States for technological design, innovation, and theft.

Stilwell volunteered that China could innovate on its own. But, he wrote in an email, “authoritarianism is the antidote to innovation and creative thinking. Now that our Universities have been forced to stop giving away our crown jewels (trading national security for selfish economic benefit) Beijing is in a tough spot.”

China’s Military

Nevertheless, the continued speed of China’s naval building, anti-ship missile development, artificial intelligence (AI) research, nuclear weapon and missile production, and supercomputing—all of which strengthen China’s military—is alarming many analysts.

General view of the launching ceremony of China's third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, named after Fujian Province, at Jiangnan Shipyard, a subsidiary of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), in Shanghai, China, on June 17, 2022. Li Tang/VCG via Getty Images

Stilwell points out that China’s “ability to take a good idea (from whatever source) and turn it into military hardware is much greater than ours.”

However, he believes that the U.S. system has preferable economic and managerial processes that advantage U.S. military development in the long term.

Stilwell asks us to recall “why our system has developed the way it has—our POM [production and operations management] and acquisition processes are as cumbersome as they are because 1) there are strong oversight and anti-corruption measures built in, and 2) funding is considered for the next 5-10 years, which keeps us from starting a project like the F-22 and then having to abandon it due to lack of funds.”

Stilwell argues that American industry “won’t invest large sums into a major weapons system, using unproven (but necessary) new technology without some guarantee of long-term funding.”

China does, however, absorb advantage from our superior military procurement processes.

“By copying what we’ve already done, Beijing avoids all that risk” of investing in the wrong technology, Stilwell notes.

The Bottom Line

If time is on China’s side, America needs to act quickly, which will entail greater risk. Every day we wait to effectively contain China, the regime in Beijing grows stronger.

If time is on America’s side, as Stilwell argues so convincingly, we can be more deliberate in our strategy.

Let’s hope he is correct. More thought must be devoted to his arguments and the question more generally. The future of America, and democracy globally, will depend on the correct answer.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.