U.S. and Western influence over the critical Red Sea and Suez Canal sea lines of communication is now estimated to be at its lowest ebb in more than a century, even when the USSR had a period of presence during the Cold War.
Russia and China, although suffering from their own strategic constraints, have made major inroads into and presence in the Suez region at the expense of the U.S. and European powers in 2022–23. The United States has had a declining ability to influence or prevent conflicts currently underway in Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia.
Eritrea and Ethiopia have now effectively ended their brief rapprochement of the past five years, and both states are increasing their links with Moscow, Beijing, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Tehran, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arabs Emirate (UAE) are themselves shifting some of their priorities from Washington to Moscow and Beijing. And Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also improving ties with Iran, which is now an entrenched part of the new Eurasian strategic bloc with Russia and China.
Even during the Soviet era of influence in Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the (then) two Yemens in some of the Cold War years, the West could still count on ensuring free trade through the Suez and Red Sea because the USSR was unable to build a secure foundation in the region for its own power projection. Now, the United States has seen a profound decline in its ability to influence any of the states in the region, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, belatedly, the U.S. Biden administration’s attempt to embrace the 2020 Abraham Accords and “forget” its insults of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have fallen flat. Israel doesn’t need U.S. sponsorship for its quiet construction of meaningful ties with Saudi Arabia. It’s possible that Jerusalem may even find Washington’s belated “support” a hindrance to Israeli links with Riyadh.
In this new transformation of the Red Sea and Suez region, even apart from the rapid Saudi and UAE accommodation of China and Russia, the potential for Washington to reclaim old allies has been limited by events in the United States and in the region. Civil and regional confrontations involving Ethiopia and Eritrea, coupled with the civil war in Sudan, are significant dynamic factors apart from the normal strategic evolution of the region and the growing presence of China and Russia.
Eritrea and Ethiopia now face a growing rift, so soon after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for having achieved an end to the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerke became Abiy’s greatest supporter, and bilateral relations revived and prospered, particularly when Abiy was crushing the revolt of the Marxist extremist group, the Tigray Popular Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF had been, when it was in power in Ethiopia until 2018, the driver of the conflict with Eritrea.
During this period, Isaias repeatedly hinted at the prospect of restoring a complete union between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Still, Abiy came to see that it was difficult for him to match the strength of Isaias. Now Isaias has indicated his strong support for Ethiopia’s Amhara people as they face growing opposition from the Ethiopian Oromo extremist (Marxist) groups. Abiy, who’s half Oromo, identifies now as fully Oromo and rose to power as the head of the Oromo faction of what’s now the nationalist Prosperity Party. He has stepped up military action lately, using the Ethiopian National Defense Force against the Amhara Region’s formal militia (state guard) and its informal Fano militia.
So what, if anything, is the United States doing to regain influence in the region?
Some of the United States’ traditional European allies, such as Italy and, to an extent, the UK, have begun acting independently of Washington in the region. The United States retains much of its expensive military commitment to the region, particularly with basing in Bahrain and Qatar and bearing a lot of the overhead of the multinational naval task forces (particularly Combined Task Forces 150, 151, and 152 in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf) to counter regional piracy and weapons smuggling.
That, like the U.S. military presence in Qatar, hasn’t helped rebuild U.S. influence in the Red Sea, and even the regular military exercises with the Egyptian Armed Forces haven’t resulted in a return to Egyptian dependence on the United States for defense technology.
At the same time, while expanding links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, China and Russia have also begun serious commitments of funds and military support to regional states, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea. Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and other key Chinese officials gave Isaias a major public welcome during his visit to Beijing on May 14 to May 19. Beijing promised a reported $10 billion additional investment in the Red Sea state. China’s naval base in neighboring Djibouti, at Obock, on the Gulf of Tadjoura, should be expected to gain greater latitude of action in the Red Sea by having access to Eritrean ports.
Whether China can afford a $10 billion investment in Eritrea (on top of existing programs there) is debatable. Still, it shows that Beijing is fully committed to its Red Sea strategy even though tensions are now high between Isaias and Abiy.
Then, on May 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia and Eritrea planned to sign “a number” of cooperation agreements. These, as with the Chinese deal, will involve weapons transfers. Isaias had followed his Beijing meetings with a visit to Moscow on May 31, celebrating—as was the case with China—30 years of diplomatic relations. This was Isaias’s first official visit to Moscow. Ethiopian sources said Russia had committed some $900 million in new aid to Eritrea.
Earlier, Eritrea had refused to join U.S.-led sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine war. Still, sources in Asmara said this reflected the reality that the United States had consistently isolated Eritrea and that Asmara had, more or less, “given up” on Washington. Significantly, Israel maintains good relations with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.
The United States has long maintained a hostile position toward Eritrea, bypassing opportunities to achieve good relations, despite the strategic importance of Eritrea to Red Sea security. Isaias, although retaining a strong autocratic grip on Eritrea, had indicated that he could reintegrate his country into a revived confederation with Ethiopia and develop a new confederal naval capacity in the Red Sea. Isaias, although painted as a radical (he received military training in the 1970s in China), has also expressed his support for the Ethiopian monarchy.
So have Beijing and Moscow—each competing strategically in Africa—chosen sides between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or are they hoping that they can broker a restored regional peace?
The United States has no leverage in Asmara, the Eritrean capital, and is treated with grave suspicion in Addis Ababa, given that the Biden administration actively sponsored the Tigrean Marxist rebellion against the Abiy government. Nearby, Washington’s attempts to broker peace in the Sudanese civil war have gained little traction.
Will Egypt, seeing this situation, be forced to rely more on security arrangements with Beijing and Moscow, given that Washington seems unable to respond? Will other Western states, sensing the loss of the great seaway, pursue independent agendas?
