Several news outlets announced on June 13 that Chinese leader Xi Jinping had signed an order to implement rules on military operations other than war (MOOTW), consisting of 59 articles in six chapters.
Xi is also the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
No Preparatory Announcement
What was the significance of the announcement’s timing?As reported by the Global Times, the rules will provide “a legal basis” for Chinese troops to carry out operations like “disaster relief, humanitarian aid, escort, and peacekeeping“ and to ”safeguard China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests.”
Three Warfares
In June 1989, toward the end of the demonstrations for more freedoms in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, the CCP tasked the PLA and police to clear the square and disperse the crowds. In doing so, the PLA murdered thousands of unarmed protesters. Other protesters across China were also murdered and injured.The CCP does not want a repeat of the Tiananmen Square disaster that it denies happened. It wants to control any future “narrative,” as it does today with the Tiananmen Square massacre. The PLA’s Three Warfares guide the MOOTW rules for controlling the media (media warfare), perceptions (psychological warfare), and legal challenges to its actions (legal warfare—lawfare).
Connection to Tiananmen Square Massacre
The announcement of the new MOOTW rules, close to the 33rd anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre on June 4, was certainly on the minds of many who read about the new regulations when they were published, almost a week after the anniversary.The CCP would not have published the MOOTW rules before the Tiananmen Square massacre anniversary; even Chinese netizens would have made the connection to Tiananmen Square. By announcing the MOOTW rules a week after the anniversary, the CCP diminished criticism that these rules apply to the Tiananmen Square anniversary.
Free speech and free thought are restricted in CCP-controlled China. For example, in 2017, the CCP’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) announced 45 directives for all media in China. Thirteen of those directives “cover terminology restrictions for territory and sovereignty issues, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Xinjiang, as well as the disputed Spratly and Senkaku Islands,” according to an article in The News Lens.
- Taiwan should never be referred to as a country.
- If references to Taiwan’s governmental system and other such institutions cannot be avoided, then quotation marks should be used, such as Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan,” “Executive Yuan,” Taiwan’s “National Tsing Hua University,” “Palace Museum,” and other such names should be put in quotation marks.
- Never use “President (or Vice-President) of the Republic of China” to refer to the leaders of Taiwan, even if the titles are put in quotation marks.
- Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and China cannot be used together; for example, “China–Hong Kong,” “China–Macau,” and “China–Taiwan.” Use instead “the inland and Hong Kong,” “Mainland and Taiwan,” or “Beijing–Hong Kong,” “Shanghai–Hong Kong,” and “Minnan–Taiwan.”
- “Taiwan Independence” should be put in quotation marks.
- Do not refer to Taiwan as “Formosa.” If paraphrasing or quoting in a report, put it in quotations.
- The “Nansha Islands” should not be referred to as the “Spratly Islands.”
- Diaoyu Island should not be referred to as the “Senkaku Islands.”
- It is forbidden to refer to Xinjiang as “East Turkestan.”
Use of Lethal Force
The new MOOTW regulations guide the PLA, police, and other security forces on using lethal force. The CCP has political officers in every PLA echelon. PLA squads and platoons (Party Small Group Leaders), companies (Political Instructors), battalions (Political Directors), brigades (Political Commissars), bases (Political Commissars), and above are co-commanded by CCP political officers.Taiwan and South China Sea Implications
Many Taiwan observers compared Xi’s use of “military operation” to Putin’s “special military operation.” They warned that the MOOTW guidelines apply to Taiwan and how the PLA would operate. These comparisons are accurate, but there is more to the story.The phrase in the reported new rules (legal warfare) safeguarding “China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests” relates to Taiwan and its associated islands. It also applies to all regions the PLA has conquered or may conquer. More specifically, the South China Sea (SCS) is being conquered, and these new MOOTW rules will apply to foreign citizens and soldiers captured on the islands and in the SCS sea. The MOOTW rules will set procedures for military prisoners and the use of detention with Chinese communist characteristics.
According to the U.S. Army’s analysis of the PLA’s legal warfare (lawfare), the following summarizes how the PLA uses lawfare in the context of its operations:
The new MOOTW regulations will not follow the long legal tradition of the Geneva Conventions that protect military personnel captured during wartime by using the excuse that Chinese forces are conducting MOOTW and liberating their own territory. This stance enables the CCP to use legal warfare to enhance its operational capabilities while restricting its adversaries’ freedom of movement.
Taiwanese citizens and military personnel will be categorized differently than citizens and military personnel of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia since the CCP does not recognize Taiwanese citizenship.
Another area of interest is the treatment of property rights of people who live on the captured islands, as well as their rights at sea. Will civilian property in Taiwan be respected or appropriated, as the CCP has done to China’s wealthy and political elite? Will the CCP return civilian ships to their owners, or will the ships be expropriated based on the new MOOTW regulations?
The CCP and the PLA intend to ignore the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as they did in 2016 in response to The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that the CCP had no right or claim to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone or any other part of the CCP’s SCS sovereignty claim, including the so-called nine-dash line.
Conclusion
In addition to affecting Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, the CCP’s new MOOTW regulations apply to territories taken by the CCP, such as Tibet, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), Hong Kong, and Macau. The MOOTW regulations also apply to internal actions in support of security operations, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and COVID-19 demonstrations when PLA personnel were deployed to cities to enforce lockdowns.Every effort should be taken to expose the MOOTW regulations so that the people affected, especially the Taiwanese and the SCS countries’ populations, understand how they will be treated. Those countries that oppose totalitarian states expanding their borders and their oppression should also be prepared to counter the CCP’s use of psychological, media, and legal warfares.