Fighting Foreign Influence: Beijing Exploits Gaps in Canadian Law; David Matas Proposes Remedies

Canadian international human rights lawyer David Matas in a file photo. Matthew Little/The Epoch Times

Beijing and other tyrannical regimes exploit gaps in Canadian law to advance their transnational repression in Canada, and a prominent international human rights lawyer says this is a problem that calls for comprehensive legislation to combat their foreign interference.

Winnipeg-based lawyer David Matas, senior legal counsel for B'nai Brith Canada, said repressive states like China, Russia, and Iran have been exploiting organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to harass and intimidate their own nationals even after they’ve fled abroad to escape persecution back home. He said malign state actors are also abusing conventional mechanisms for international cooperation on criminal matters.

To address these and related growing concerns, he said Canada needs a comprehensive law that incorporates a requirement for persons acting for foreign entities to register with the Canadian government, a code of conduct to set out what foreign actors can and can’t do, and strong prevention and enforcement mechanisms to deter, expel, or punish perpetrators.

Mutual Legal Assistance

“Canada should not be cooperating with tyrannical regimes on criminal matters,” Mr. Matas said.

He gave the example of such regimes’ abuse of Interpol’s international fugitive wanted notices—commonly known as Red Notices—which are issued to locate and arrest people “wanted for prosecution or to serve a sentence.”

A Red Notice must meet certain legal criteria and must comply with the Interpol Constitution, whose Article 3 forbids Interpol from undertaking “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character.” Despite this measure, tyrannical regimes are becoming “sophisticated enough to know not to accuse their targets of offences which are based on internationally prohibited grounds,” Mr. Matas said.

“These regimes often shift blame for their own wrongdoing to powerless scapegoats, accusing them of ordinary law crimes,” he said. “The accusations are politically motivated but the allegations are that crimes were committed which are not, in themselves, political.”

An Interpol logo seen at Interpol's Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore on Sept. 30, 2014. Edgar Su/Reuters

A recent example occurred when Hong Kong police issued arrest warrants for eight self-exiled pro-democracy activists on July 3, with a HK$1 million reward each for their current whereabouts. They were accused of “incitement to secession,” “subversion,” “incitement to subversion,” and “collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security.”

The Hong Kong government on July 4 published the transcript of an interview with Hong Kong Security Bureau chief Chris Tang in which reporters asked whether Hong Kong police will seek assistance from Interpol or local Chinese communities in countries where the wanted individuals reside. Mr. Tang said, “We are using all available means to apprehend these wanted persons.”

Apart from Interpol, Mr. Matas also raised concerns about tyrannical regimes abusing conventional mutual legal assistance agreements, such as the Ljubljana-Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes, adopted in May.

Mr. Matas recommended that, when considering signing such treaties, Canada make what’s called a “reservation” to limit its obligations only to those states it has operative extradition treaties with—states that are presumed to conduct fair trials—and to withdraw if this is unacceptable to other states.

Mr. Matas noted in particular that Canada should not cooperate “in efforts to remove from Canada someone a tyrannical regime claims has committed a crime.”

Targeting Family Members

China has also been exploiting legal loopholes in other countries directly through its consulates, and targeting foreign officials such as Conservative MP Michael Chong. In early May, Ottawa declared Chinese consul officer Zhao Wei persona non grata after The Globe and Mail reported, citing an unnamed national-security source, that Mr. Zhao had helped to seek information about Mr. Chong’s family members living in Hong Kong in order to target them with sanctions.

Mr. Chong was reportedly targeted for sponsoring a motion in the House of Commons in 2021 to declare China’s mistreatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities a genocide.

“If such behaviour could be directed to someone as high profile and publicly outspoken as Michael Chong, one can easily understand how widespread that behaviour would be against targets who are not well known and are too afraid to speak out,” Mr. Matas said.

“In a perverse sense, Zhao Wei did us a favour by giving a glimpse of the pervasive abuse for which he provided a dramatic example. We need to take advantage of the awareness his misbehaviour has generated to act.”

Conservative MP Michael Chong appears as a witness before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs regarding foreign election interference, on Parliament Hill in Ottawa on May 16, 2023. The Canadian Press/Spencer Colby

Election Meddling

A series of media reports published since late 2022 have highlighted Beijing’s meddling in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections, citing leaked intelligence documents pointing to 11 federal candidates allegedly having received campaign funding from Beijing in the 2019 election. According to various media reports, the Chinese regime also allegedly interfered in the 2022 Vancouver municipal election.

China’s operation of at least seven covert police stations on Canadian soil also calls for vigilance about foreign interference. Existence of these overseas police “service stations” in dozens of countries was first reported in September 2022 by Spain-based NGO Safeguard Defenders, which described them as tools of the regime’s long-arm policing and transnational repression.

Reports of Beijing’s pervasive foreign interference have prompted increased calls for creating a foreign agent registry to boost transparency around activities of those working in Canada to advance a foreign entity’s interests.

In response to the public outcry, the Liberal government in March appointed former governor general David Johnston as special rapporteur to assess the impact of foreign interference in the last two federal elections and to determine whether Canada should launch a public inquiry.

Mr. Johnston decided against holding a public inquiry, citing security concerns if classified documents were made public. In his first report—published in May—he also highlighted various mechanisms already existing to address foreign influence. However, his report made no mention of China’s operation of covert police stations in Canada. He also said he had not reviewed all intelligence before drawing his conclusion.

Existing Laws

Mr. Matas pointed to three existing laws in Canada that each lack certain features to be able to fully combat foreign interference.

The Lobbying Act requires a person paid to communicate with federal public office holders to be registered with the government. But it doesn’t regulate other forms of foreign influence, such as activities done without payment or that don’t involve contacting officials.

The Canada Elections Act prohibits “undue influence” by foreigners in Canadian federal elections during an election period, but it has no registration requirement.

“These two laws are insufficient to address the problem of attempts at influence by foreign actors operating in Canada. Foreign agents sometimes engage in activity in Canada without communicating with federal public office holders and without attempting to influence Canadian elections,” Mr. Matas said.

In terms of punishing those involved in foreign influence, such as in the case of Mr. Zhao, the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (FMIOA) allows Canada to declare any member of a consular or diplomatic staff persona non grata for any reason or without giving a reason.

While the FMIOA requires foreign states to submit the names of their consular staff to the federal government, it doesn’t require public registration or provide a code of conduct for foreign representatives. And as a remedy for foreign influence, expelling foreign diplomats from Canada “can only go so far,” Mr. Matas said.

Proposals

To make up for the inadequacies in Canadian laws, Mr. Matas said Canada needs more thorough legislation that addresses all aspects of foreign influence. The legislation should include but not be limited to a registration system. Rather, it should also set out activities prohibited to foreign actors.

Those subject to prohibitions should not only be those paid for their work, but also those working as volunteers or spending no money on the work, depending on the activities they are engaged in.

Mr. Matas pointed to the example of American citizen Litang Liang, who was charged in May in the United States under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act. Mr. Liang was indicted for acting as an illegal agent for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Among other activities, Mr. Liang allegedly provided to the New York Chinese Consulate in 2018 the name of a former student activist, saying the former activist was responsible for destroying PRC flags in Boston’s Chinatown.

Mr. Matas also said the legislation should not be directed only against foreigners but also cover Canadian citizens who engage in the prohibited activities.

Pointing to Mr. Chong’s case, he said, “Making, planning, facilitating, or organizing those threats should be a prohibited activity, whether the activity is conducted by foreigners or locals.”

Canada also needs a commissioner of foreign influence, akin to the commissioner of lobbying, said Mr. Matas. The foreign influence commissioner should be able to both publicly and privately receive complaints of violations of the code of conduct committed by any person or entity, including violations by foreign embassies and consulates.

The foreign influence commissioner should also be obliged to report annually to Parliament, while also having the power to report at any time on matters of such urgency or importance that they should not await annual reporting.