With geopolitical competition intensifying in the Arctic, particularly with China now facing more obstacles in its multipronged efforts to secure resources and to gain further influence in the region, it compels Canada to comprehensively step up its Arctic engagement, according to expert testimony.
Guy Saint-Jacques, Canadian ambassador to China from 2012 to 2016, said China is acutely interested in the Arctic as a source of minerals and seafood.
“I would like to underline how systematic China has been in acquiring supplies of critical minerals. This is one of the main objectives of the Polar Silk Road Initiative, which has been tagged with the Belt and Road Initiative,” Saint-Jacques said.
And Beijing’s concerns are growing over environmental change—rising sea levels and heat waves—with its impact on food production and infrastructure, he noted. The former ambassador pointed to a region in the centre of the Arctic that’s not under any state’s jurisdiction and said he expects to see Chinese fishing vessels there very soon.
Saint-Jacques and other China and Arctic specialists were testifying before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence on May 2 to provide senators with a better understanding of geopolitical competition in the Arctic, with a specific focus on the non-Arctic states—namely China.
“China is on the side of China,” said Marc Lanteigne, associate professor of political science at the University of Tromsø in Norway, regarding China’s “neutrality” stance regarding the conflict in Ukraine.
“China is interested in any outcome which benefits its own situation economically, politically, strategically.”
Lanteigne explained that China is facing serious economic and societal headwinds domestically with its zero-COVID policy and with many of its imports having been disrupted due to the Ukraine crisis.
Saint-Jacques also recounted that when he became ambassador to China in 2012, Beijing was keen on getting Canada’s support to secure observer status at the Arctic Council (AC)—the eight-member leading intergovernmental body promoting cooperation in the region—and then to attend Canadian military exercises in the north as part of a military exchange.
“I always urged National Defence to be very cautious about this. The strategic value of such a participation on the part of China would allow China to better understand the extent of our activities in the north,” he said.
China secured observer status at the AC in 2013.
China’s Changing Calculus
China is still a “newcomer” in the Arctic and is dependent on other governments for their goodwill and know-how, Lanteigne said.
“Many of its [Beijing’s] Arctic policies are dependent on an open region, one where trade and economic cooperation, as well as science, diplomacy are very much in place. And at the moment, we do not seem to be heading in that direction,” Lanteigne said.
The AC, on hiatus following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now faces an uncertain future.
Lanteigne added that a long-term pause in AC activities is not in China’s interest, as much of its work as an observer runs through working groups and task forces.
“That avenue is currently closed and we don’t know for how long. This means that China will be much more dependent on bilateral diplomacy with Arctic states,” Lanteigne said.
Lanteigne pointed to signs that China is starting to pull back from deeper ties with Russia in the arenas of scientific research, as a form of mitigating reputational risk.
Quoting a Chinese expression that translates as “Don’t look for trouble and it won’t find you,” he said that’s how China is currently managing its relationship with Russia.
“There is a concern that China has expressed that by getting too close to Russia economically—by beginning new projects in the Arctic or elsewhere, bilateral cooperation—that China would run the risk of being subjected to the same sanctions that Russia is currently experiencing,” Lanteigne said.
NATO and the Arctic
In addition, there now exists the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would give the multilateral military alliance a greater presence in the Arctic.
“If you were to ask them [Beijing] what they think about Finland and Sweden joining NATO, they would say that this is not conducive to world peace, and that NATO should refrain to expand further. In fact, this is their mantra,” Saint-Jacques said.
It does not work in China’s favour that NATO had taken a stronger interest in the Arctic even before the issue of Sweden and Finland joining, Lanteigne said.
Arctic geopolitics are increasingly getting tied to NATO geopolitics, said Jessica Shadian, Arctic 360 president and CEO. Arctic 360 works to attract investment in the North American Arctic.
“It has been argued that bringing NATO’s activities into the Arctic realm would jeopardize the achieved peaceful cooperation that the Arctic Council has created for the region,” she said, adding that Canada has become increasingly “out of step” with changing Arctic geopolitics.
Some of this trend is due to Canada putting most of its foreign policy focus on the AC, she added. The AC does not have a military component to its mandate and primarily focuses on environmental issues.
“Canada’s Arctic diplomacy—again, it cannot only be about the Arctic Council around the Arctic and even beyond. Diplomatic cooperation exists outside the Arctic Council,” Shadian said.
‘Two Birds With One Stone’
“There’s no better way to assert sovereignty and economic control than by demonstrating that you’re active in a search and rescue capacity,” Ron Wallace, Canadian Global Affairs Institute fellow, said.
Canada also needs to develop ice-breaking capacity and port facilities, he added. “Canada’s got to step up [its] diplomatic and its foreign affairs game in the Arctic in a big way.”
Canada’s military spending is falling far short of the NATO target of 2 percent of gross domestic product, and experts have said that investing in NORAD modernization would make notable strides toward attaining the goal.
“We could kill two birds with one stone in this case, because also, it would satisfy our need to invest more in the military. And that could be our contribution to NATO as well,” Saint-Jacques said.
Shadian recommends Canada form closer diplomatic ties with Greenland, which also has a plethora of critical minerals that China wants. In addition, she advises the government to put greater emphasis on the Arctic in its nascent critical minerals strategy, and to create a policy-focused Arctic think tank.
Canada’s 2022 federal budget put forth the country’s first critical minerals strategy, with up to $3.8 billion in support over eight years.
