Paul Bracken

So far in 2016, North Korea has tested an atomic weapon and long-range missile. The U.N. Security Council responded with sanctions amid hope that China might contain a belligerent ally. The world expects the U.S. to monitor international developments, and those not posing immediate danger or causing global media alarm are often put to the side with a cursory response. “Yet these important but not necessarily urgent problems contain the seeds of a potentially larger disaster and can grow into a deadly menace that is ultimately impossible to ignore,” explains Paul Bracken, author and Yale professor of political science and management. “One danger of being the sole superpower is getting overwhelmed by immediate, urgent issues while other important issues are repeatedly kicked down the road.“ Bracken describes a game theory strategy by which a player distracts a strong opponent with multiple pressure points. The U.S. errs by treating aggression, whether in the South China Sea or from North Korea, as isolated incidents rather than “connecting individual strategies across the fronts creates an altogether more effective approach.”

So far in 2016, North Korea has tested an atomic weapon and long-range missile. The U.N. Security Council responded with sanctions amid hope that China might contain a belligerent ally. The world expects the U.S. to monitor international developments, and those not posing immediate danger or causing global media alarm are often put to the side with a cursory response. “Yet these important but not necessarily urgent problems contain the seeds of a potentially larger disaster and can grow into a deadly menace that is ultimately impossible to ignore,” explains Paul Bracken, author and Yale professor of political science and management. “One danger of being the sole superpower is getting overwhelmed by immediate, urgent issues while other important issues are repeatedly kicked down the road.“ Bracken describes a game theory strategy by which a player distracts a strong opponent with multiple pressure points. The U.S. errs by treating aggression, whether in the South China Sea or from North Korea, as isolated incidents rather than “connecting individual strategies across the fronts creates an altogether more effective approach.”