According to a report released by independent security and intelligence publication DEBKAfile on July 21, the Stuxnet computer worm which attacked the Siemens Industrial computer systems operating the centrifuges responsible for Iran’s uranium enrichment program last year had not been purged and had actively affected operations for the past 11 months.
DEBKAfile’s “intelligence sources” confirmed to the publication that Iran was forced into “scrapping all the tainted machines and replacing them with new ones.” This comes in accordance with Iran’s official announcement on July 19 that it had undertaken upgrading and replacing its centrifuges with newer ones in order to expedite enrichment.
“Iran would clearly not have undertaken the major and costly project of replacing all its 5,000-6,000 centrifuges with new ones if they were indeed functioning smoothly,” the report states.
News of the Stuxnet worm emerged in July 2010 after it was discovered in June by a web security company. Security researchers who broke the virus down discovered that it had incredibly complex and sophisticated programming and operational capabilities.
The worm was designed to spread rapidly and silently by accessing an unprecedented twenty unknown holes and vulnerabilities in windows operating systems and Siemens software, called 0days, until it reached a specifically designated target.
The worm would then be able to change functions or settings in industrial machinery, potentially damaging or destroying them, whilst telling system operators that everything was operating normally.
The complexity of the programming was exhibited even further when it was discovered that the worm was only designed to specifically track down and attack the centrifuges in Iranian enrichment facilities. The worm remained dormant in all other computers and systems it had infected and did not activate in any of them.
This sophistication has led many experts to speculate that its origin is rooted in state-backed sponsors or by a government itself, although these predictions have not been confirmed.
In November of last year, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad officially announced that the worm had in fact caused damage to “a limited number of [Iranian] centrifuges” after the state had originally denied suffering any damage, claiming to have isolated the worm and prevented it from infecting facility systems.
Iran officially made their statement in response to diplomats having told the Associated Press in Vienna that Iran’s nuclear program was forced to temporarily shut down thousands of centrifuges after suffering major technical problems.
DEBKAfile’s “intelligence sources” confirmed to the publication that Iran was forced into “scrapping all the tainted machines and replacing them with new ones.” This comes in accordance with Iran’s official announcement on July 19 that it had undertaken upgrading and replacing its centrifuges with newer ones in order to expedite enrichment.
“Iran would clearly not have undertaken the major and costly project of replacing all its 5,000-6,000 centrifuges with new ones if they were indeed functioning smoothly,” the report states.
News of the Stuxnet worm emerged in July 2010 after it was discovered in June by a web security company. Security researchers who broke the virus down discovered that it had incredibly complex and sophisticated programming and operational capabilities.
The worm was designed to spread rapidly and silently by accessing an unprecedented twenty unknown holes and vulnerabilities in windows operating systems and Siemens software, called 0days, until it reached a specifically designated target.
The worm would then be able to change functions or settings in industrial machinery, potentially damaging or destroying them, whilst telling system operators that everything was operating normally.
The complexity of the programming was exhibited even further when it was discovered that the worm was only designed to specifically track down and attack the centrifuges in Iranian enrichment facilities. The worm remained dormant in all other computers and systems it had infected and did not activate in any of them.
This sophistication has led many experts to speculate that its origin is rooted in state-backed sponsors or by a government itself, although these predictions have not been confirmed.
In November of last year, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad officially announced that the worm had in fact caused damage to “a limited number of [Iranian] centrifuges” after the state had originally denied suffering any damage, claiming to have isolated the worm and prevented it from infecting facility systems.
Iran officially made their statement in response to diplomats having told the Associated Press in Vienna that Iran’s nuclear program was forced to temporarily shut down thousands of centrifuges after suffering major technical problems.
