There are countless ways to view the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the years-long war that succeeded it. But what we often view are the consequences and foreign policy interactions post Sept. 11, 2001. Steve Coll, who is one of the leading scholars on CIA involvement within the Middle East, ventures further than 21st century history. Indeed, in his new book “The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq,” he goes much further back into the rise of the Baath Party in Iraq and the eventual interactions between Saddam Hussein and the Ronald Reagan Administration.
Multi-Decade Insight
Mr. Coll presents an insightful view of our country’s foreign policy relationship with Iraq, and specifically with Hussein. From Reagan to George W. Bush, we are given a clear view into this unstable multi-decade relationship, the spasmodically violent Hussein regime, the misunderstandings and miscalculations by both American and Iraqi intelligence, and how this chaotic and distrustful relationship led to war. Just as important, the author provides insight into the mindset of Hussein―his political and military scheming and how he viewed America, Israel, the West, Iran, and his Arab neighbors.“The Achilles Trap” is an honest assessment of how our executive administrations, with guidance from United States and international intelligence agencies, handled the unpredictable Iraq. Beginning with the seven-year Iran-Iraq War, Mr. Coll discusses how the Reagan administration worked to help Iraq keep the Islamic revolutionary movement maintained within the Iranian borders. Nonetheless, Hussein proved hard to convince that the United States was not using the opportunity as a ploy to undermine Hussein or overturn his government. When it was discovered that the Reagan administration had been playing both sides, though more in favor of Iraq, the seeds of distrust began to sprout deep roots. Coll suggests that the administration had chosen to make a deal with the devil, but he also acknowledges, more or less, that it was the devil the United States knew—or, at least, it was the one they would rather know.
‘The Liar’s Truths’
The difficulty in knowing Hussein was part and parcel of the problem with the decades-long relationship between the United States and Iraq. Hussein was elusive. He was also incredibly protective of his inner circle, and violently so, which made it impossible for U.S. intelligence to make true inroads within the Hussein regime. This lack of direct intelligence created communication obstacles of various kinds. It also kept the United States in the dark about Iraq’s weapons capabilities, specifically nuclear, which was America’s greatest concern. Most importantly, this lack of intelligence formed an inability for either side to believe each other.“The Achilles Trap” is broken up into three parts. Part Two is labeled “The Liar’s Truths,” which Mr. Coll derives from an old Arabic proverb: “You overlook many truths from a liar.” It is this proverb that, from beginning to end, plays a central theme in the context of the U.S.–Iraq history.
The U.S. administrations and intelligence agencies always felt that Hussein, along with his political and scientific leaders, was lying or hiding something (that something was always chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons―the former which had been used before by Hussein), while Hussein and his leaders looked upon America with the greatest suspicion. To each other, they were liars; and sadly, both parties were often right about the other.
Another World
Along with these “liar’s truths” (and, more predominantly, liar’s lies), Mr. Coll also introduces the reader into a world that feels more like fictionalized hyperbolic violence. He provides several anecdotes to prove this case. Hussein and his (literal) family of political leaders used violence so indiscriminately, blatantly, and mindlessly that the events seem unreal. Mr. Coll establishes that the world inhabited by the Baath Party power players was not simply about a different culture, but rather a completely different reality. This hyper contrast of political and social methods between Iraq and the United States (and the West in general) exemplifies the chasm that separated the understanding between the two parties.Mr. Coll demonstrates clearly the communication divide between the United States and Iraq, the extreme lack of mutual trust, America’s missed opportunities to bring down Hussein, and the built-up mutual animosity, all led to an avoidable war that nonetheless seemed destined to happen.
There are countless sobering parts in “The Achilles Trap,” a prominent example is when the liars tell the truth but are not believed. The most sobering, however, comes when the truth-tellers become the liars in order to achieve a desired goal―a goal in which they believed they were most certainly right: that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Coll’s “The Achilles Trap” is an absolute must-read for anyone wishing for a better grasp of exactly how America got lured into arguably the most consequential decision of the 21st century. The author researched extensively, utilizing sources from the United States, Iraq, United Nations, Western allies, and Arab nations in order to capture the scale of the full story behind the struggle between America and Hussein and the eventual invasion that plunged the Middle East into further chaos and has left many Americans perplexed.
