“It is critical that Canada takes concrete steps to curb the growing threat of foreign interference into our affairs & democracy. That is why, today, I introduced a motion calling for the establishment of a registry that identifies agents of foreign influence in Canada,” Housakos said on Twitter.
These individuals could be fined or jailed should they fail to “file a return as required“ or if they ”knowingly make any false statements in any return filed under the Act.”
The bill also seeks to increase sentencing for intimidation if an offender, acting on behalf of a foreign government, attempts to stop someone from doing anything they have a legal right to do, or to make them do anything unlawful.
Housakos’s bill echoes the sentiment of Bill C-282, a motion introduced by former Conservative MP Kenny Chiu who lost his seat in the B.C. riding of Steveston–Richmond East in the 2021 federal election.
“We are all aware of the instances of foreign interference in Canada and the threat of further intimidation and corruption. For years, we have heard the dangers of such foreign interference, cautioned by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and Canadian Security Intelligence Service,” Chiu said upon introducing the bill in the House of Commons.
“Beyond calls for action and attention, the government has suggested no other plan to counter interference operations.”
In August 2021, Public Safety Canada updated its threat assessment, saying that China and Russia, among other countries, routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
“These states may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil,” the department said on its website.
Their applications were rejected after an officer from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada deemed them inadmissible due to their ties to the Chinese agency.
“Given the evidence in the record that links OCAO to the activities described by the Officer, it was reasonable for the Officer to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe that OCAO had infiltrated overseas Chinese communities in Canada and other countries and engaged in covert action and intelligence gathering,” Rochester said during the ruling.
“Consequently, I conclude that the Officer reasonably determined that such acts by OCAO fall within the definition of espionage.”