Some MPs Knowingly Engage in Foreign Interference: Former CSIS Head

Some MPs Knowingly Engage in Foreign Interference: Former CSIS Head
David Vigneault, then-director of CSIS, prepares to appear before a parliamentary committee on Parliament Hill in Ottawa on June 13, 2023. The Canadian Press/Justin Tang
Omid Ghoreishi
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Some Canadian MPs knowingly engage in actions that can be considered foreign interference, the former head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) says.

David Vigneault’s assertion is similar to a conclusion reached by a group of lawmakers with security clearance on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) who said in June that some parliamentarians have been “wittingly” working with foreign actors.

Vigneault’s remarks were made during a private hearing (in camera) held by the Foreign Interference Commission conducted in August. His comments, along with those made by the current CSIS leadership team at the hearing, were captured in an unclassified summary report made public by the commission on Sept. 27.

Vigneault divided MPs into three different categories when evaluating their activities in relation to potential foreign interference. His responses are outlined under the heading “wittingness.”

“Clearly, some MPs have no awareness of the FI [foreign interference] threat and are surprised when CSIS speaks with them or they read some piece of information,” he is paraphrased as saying about the first category of MPs.

The second category involves those who “know what FI is and that there is a line, but are unsure of its precise boundaries,” according to Vigneault, who left CSIS in July.
And then there is the third category, as described by Vigneault: “A smaller subset of elected officials are plainly aware that their actions cross the line into FI.”

‘Wittingly Assisting’

The June 3 NSICOP report based on the review of intelligence documents stated that some parliamentarians “began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.”

The report said these activities included communicating with foreign missions to get election support from community groups or businesses, which the diplomatic missions pledged to discreetly mobilize in favour of a candidate, as well as “knowingly or through willful blindness” accepting funds from foreign diplomatic posts.

The activities also involved providing foreign actors with confidential information on fellow parliamentarians, “knowing that such information will be used by those officials to inappropriately pressure Parliamentarians to change their positions,” as well as responding to the direction of foreign officials to “improperly influence” other elected officials or parliamentary proceedings, NSICOP said.

The report said China is the most active foreign state interfering in Canada, followed by India.

The Conservatives have asked for the name of the MPs involved to be released publicly, with Conservative MP Frank Caputo saying the situation “places a cloud of suspicion over every single” MP, but the government has rejected those calls. Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc has said intelligence reports are in some cases “uncorroborated” and releasing the names would be “simply irresponsible.”
The RCMP hasn’t confirmed or denied whether it’s investigating any parliamentarians, but has sad it’s conducting investigations into a “broad range of foreign interference in Canada.”

CSIS Not Focused on MPs

In their own private hearings before the commission, current CSIS leadership said there remains an “intelligence gap” on how much an MP is aware that the activity they undertake constitutes foreign interference.

Bo Basler, counter-foreign interference coordinator with CSIS, said when it comes to the agency’s initiatives to curb threats, the focus was on the foreign actors instead of the elected officials.

“The Service [CSIS] was not looking at MPs as having crossed lines, necessarily,” Basler is paraphrased as saying during the August hearings.

CSIS interim director Vanessa Lloyd also emphasized in the hearings that CSIS’s focus is on foreign actors, not on the extent of the “wittingness” of elected officials.

“Ms. Lloyd emphasized that, when CSIS collects information on threat actors, it does not necessarily assess individuals engaging with the threat actors, unless it is part of a determination of investigative steps and so CSIS would not necessarily have made an assessment of the MP’s wittingness,” the summary report says.

On some specific parts of the NSICOP report, CSIS leadership said some of the language used was stronger than that of the original intelligence document the report is based on.

For example, regarding a redacted part in the NSICOP report about a specific incident described at a high level to be “a textbook example of foreign interference that saw a foreign state support a witting politician,” Basler said the original intelligence document only said the incident was a “textbook example of foreign interference,” and doesn’t describe the MP involved as a “witting politician.”

Basler said that while the NSICOP report may be using stronger wording than CSIS, it is generally accurate.

“Mr. Basler added that he sees the NSICOP Report as a ground-breaking report with reference to FI,” the summary report says.

“Mr. Basler stated that the big picture in outlining the nature of the threat and the efforts undertaken by foreign states to influence parliamentarians is largely accurate; the details or wording may be stronger than what CSIS would have chosen, but [NSICOP] is looking at things through a different lens.”

CSIS interim head Lloyd said the NSICOP report helps to “amplify” the seriousness of the threat of foreign interference.

“MPs have recognized that there is a need to have a public dialogue about both the threat actors’ activities and what responses are possible,” Lloyd is paraphrased as saying in the summary report.

Michelle Tessier, who before retirement was the deputy director of operations at CSIS, said she was “pleasantly surprised” by the amount of information that was contained in the publicly released NSICOP report.

“She thinks it is important to have this conversation,” the summary report says, adding that she thinks, “There is not enough discussion about this in Canada; in fact there is astoundingly little understanding of national security issues in Canada.”

The Foreign Interference Commission was launched after extensive media reports containing intelligence leaks on China’s attempts to interfere in Canadian elections and the broader society.

The commission will release its final report by the end of the year.

Noé Chartier and Matthew Horwood contributed to this report.