Security Minister Issues Caution as Report Says Chinese Spy Targeted ‘Thousands’ of UK Officials on LinkedIn

The LinkedIn app is seen on a mobile phone in London, UK, on Jan. 11, 2021. Edward Smith/Getty Images

Security minister Tom Tugendhat issued a fresh warning over Chinese spies after a report said a single agent has targeted “thousands” of officials from the UK and the West on LinkedIn “for at least five years.”

Writing on X, previously known as Twitter, Mr. Tugendhat reminded people to use tools provided by an official campaign to identify hostile state actors targeting state secrets or intellectual property (IP).

“Think Before You Link is MI5’s warning because hostile states like China are using social media to get information that can be exploited. This isn’t just state secrets, companies are losing IP costing millions,” he wrote.

The minister was commenting on a report by The Times of London, which said one agent from China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), who uses Robin Zhang among a string of aliases, targeted a range of professions with access to classified information or commercially sensitive technology, such as security officials, civil servants, scientists, think tanks and academics by using fake LinkedIn profiles and fake companies, and offered thousands of pounds for intelligence.

According to the report, Western security services believe Mr. Zhang is “the most prolific spy for a hostile state working against British interests in a generation.”

Sophisticated Approach

One of Mr. Zhang’s targets, a former British Army intelligence officer who now runs his own media company, told The Epoch Times how he was approached by the Chinese agent.

In 2017, Philip Ingram got what seemed to be “a legitimate approach from an individual who was representing a Chinese security company,” the former colonel said, later adding that he used the alias Robin Zhang at the time.

Mr. Zhang claimed he was organising an“international conference in China” and wanted Mr. Ingram to produce a report and present it at the conference.

“This is something that I did regularly, and it was just after the horrific incidents, the terrorist incidents that have happened in London, so a lot of people were interested in it,” Mr. Ingram said.

However, a few red flags emerged after the intelligence expert carried out due diligence checks.

Mr. Ingram then “started to play with him a little bit to test his story” and eventually became “100 percent certain” that Mr. Zhang was part of Chinese state intelligence.

“If I had set foot in China, what would almost certainly have happened is the Chinese would have tried to compromise me in China ... recruit me and turn me into a spy for China,” he said.

The security expert said Chinese agents could have planted drugs or other things in his hotel room before arresting him and pressure him into revealing sensitive information he may have or getting information via his old contacts.

In a case study published in 2021 by the National Protective Security Authority, Jason, an Engineer at UK Defence Contractor with security clearance was invited to travel to a foreign country for meetings before being asked for “detailed technical information on military aircraft.”

Mr. Ingram said while he’s “fairly” regularly approached by those who wanted to solicit intelligence, Mr. Zhang’s approach was “quite a sophisticated” one in comparison because he had a “well rehearsed well put together script” and was able to answer questions about his background “from a superficial perspective.”

Mr. Zhang also appeared to be holding a senior position because he had the ability to make decisions and get information “very, very quickly.”

“People who are not experienced in counterintelligence activities like I am, will easily fall for the approaches that are being made, not just by the Chinese—the Chinese are doing it on an industrial scale—but also by Russians and other intelligence services,” Mr. Ingram said.

Multiple Aliases

According to The Times of London, Mr. Zhang claimed on his main LinkedIn account, which has been deleted, that he worked for Hujie Security Services, a real company in Shanghai, but he has also listed fake companies on his other LinkedIn profiles and used stock photos or photos of innocent people as his profile pictures.

“Zhang’s real identity cannot be published because it would place the identities of western spies at risk. However, The Times has been told that his main pseudonyms are Zhang, Eric Chen Yixi, Robin Cao, Lincoln Lam, John Lee, and Eric Kim,” the report said.

The report said Mr. Zhang has offered £8,000 to a recruitment consultant for details of each candidate from the intelligence services, and “large sums” to a former military intelligence official for information on Britain’s counterterrorism work.

The Epoch Times couldn’t independently verify the information.

The report also said that another MSS agent who goes by the name Ken, one of the alleged handlers of Australian businessman Alexander Csergo who was charged with selling intelligence to the Chinese regime, also claimed to work for Hujie Security on LinkedIn.

The Epoch Times has reached out to Hujie Security for comment.

A spokesperson for LinkedIn said in a statement by email to The Epoch Times, “Creating a fake account is a clear violation of our terms of service. Our Threat Prevention & Defense team actively seeks out signs of state-sponsored activity and removes fake accounts using information we uncover and intelligence from a variety of sources, including government agencies. Our Transparency Report details the actions that we take to keep LinkedIn a safe place where real people can connect with professionals they know and trust.”

The Home Office didn’t respond to The Epoch Times’ request for comment.

Editor’s note: This article has been updated with additional details.