Full Access Should Have Been Revoked for Winnipeg Lab Scientists After Red Flags: Former CSIS Chief Fadden

Former CSIS Director Richard Fadden speaks at the Foreign Interference Commission in Ottawa on Jan. 31, 2024. The Canadian Press/Adrian Wyld

The former head of Canada’s intelligence agency says the Winnipeg lab scientists who were eventually fired for undisclosed ties to the Chinese regime should not have been allowed continued full access to Canada’s highest-security lab after they were flagged for security concerns.

“Their unfettered access to until almost the very end was too long,” Richard Fadden, former head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and former national security adviser to the prime minister, said at a House of Commons Canada-China relations committee meeting on May 3.

“They should have had, if they were to remain on the job, their physical access restricted and had perhaps electronic access restricted.”

Security concerns about scientists and married couple Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg were first discussed between CSIS and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the agency in charge of the NML, in August 2018, according to declassified documents released earlier this year.

While they were under investigation by both PHAC and CSIS, their full access to the lab remained intact until they were escorted out of the lab in July 2019 and fired in January 2021.

Among the initial incidents raising concern was Ms. Qiu’s filing of a patent in China in October 2017 that involved her field of research at the Winnipeg lab.

In the almost one-year span of time between when the two were flagged until they were escorted out of the lab, Ms. Qiu facilitated the shipment of deadly virus strands to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China with the approval of the Winnipeg lab management, visited and provided training at the WIV and signed on to secret projects involving risky gain-of-function research, and filed another patent in China.

As well, during this period, restricted visitors under the supervision of Mr. Cheng were left unescorted at the NML, while he once entered a code belonging to another employee to access one of the lab’s facilities. A senior WIV technician whom Ms. Qiu had brought to work at the lab was also caught by security removing vials from the NML.

Among the concerns raised by CSIS was the participation of Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng in China’s talent programs, which the agency says are focused on economic espionage and intellectual property theft, and their collaboration with Chinese military leaders involved in biosafety and bioterrorism research.

‘Entitled to Due Process’

Both the health minister and PHAC management have defended the time it took to take action, saying personnel issues require due process.

“These individuals worked with the Public Health Agency. One was hired in 2003 and one was hired in 2006. They were published and renowned across North America for their work in vaccines, virology, and therapy. They were seen as leaders in helping to save lives,” Health Minister Mark Holland told MPs on the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship on April 8.

“Before you destroy somebody’s career, they are entitled to due process.”

Current CSIS Director David Vigneault told MPs on the committee that he saw the process as being very “expeditious” since August 2018 when the agency first engaged PHAC on the issue.

“You could see that in that short period of time, we had a very extensive investigation carried out that led PHAC to be able to take quick administrative measures to protect the lab,” Mr. Vigneault said on April 15.

Deputy Privy Council clerk Nathalie Drouin, who appeared before the committee on April 29, said while it’s easy to make a judgment in hindsight, the timeline can be reviewed.

“It’s always easy to look at what happened in the past with our retrospective lens and see how easy it was,” Ms. Drouin said. “But from the first signal to the moment the two scientists were put on leave, yes, there is a timeline that needs to be looked at.”

Mr. Fadden said the scientists didn’t need to be put in handcuffs and removed from the lab immediately but could have had their access restricted while the investigation was ongoing.

“There were a range of measures that departmental security and deputy head could have taken to restrict their access,” he said.

As previously reported by The Epoch Times, since their removal from the NML, Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng have been involved in research work in China with various organizations, some of which have close links to the Chinese military. They are using aliases in some instances, and Ms. Qiu has been filing more patents.

Virus Shipment

Mr. Fadden said the NML should not have approved the shipment of deadly viruses to WIV.

“I would argue it’s not just a question of hindsight. If it was looked at at the time, where it was going, the way it was transmitted, the authority that was obtained to do that, I think they violated a rule,” he said. “I don’t think it should have happened if they understand the rule correctly.”

CSIS documents released by the government earlier this year suggest that some of the virus samples were meant to be used by Ms. Qiu for one of her projects at the WIV, which she had kept hidden from the Winnipeg lab management.

PHAC has said that the shipments were done according to proper procedures and protocols.

Culture Change

Mr. Fadden told MPs that there should be a culture change within governmental departments to understand and effectively deal with national security threats posed by hostile regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party.

But he said this culture change must be driven from the very top.

“Unless the prime minister and senior ministers signal clearly ‘country x or issue y is a problem’ that deputies can build on to send down to their departments, it’s very hard to get medium-ranking and junior people to all of a sudden accept that they have an issue,” he said.

“It requires a whole-of-government effort.”

Mr. Fadden added that cabinet ministers and senior public servants shouldn’t shy away from upholding security concerns for fear of being criticized for not prioritizing scientific collaboration.

“We cannot, on the one hand, say that China, for example, is a strategic adversary, and on the other hand say to scientists, ‘well, as long as you report to your boss that you’re talking to them, you can share virtually anything.’ And the problem is [that] in science, you can’t partially share. I’ve been told it doesn’t work.”

Mr. Fadden said the government should find a way to share more security and intelligence findings with different organizations so there’s more awareness of national security risks.

“We have to find a way—and I say we as a country—to share more information that’s concrete and real if the universities, civil society, and the economy are going to play a part in promoting our national security.”