The prime minister’s top security adviser prevented the distribution of intelligence reports related to Chinese interference on several occasions, according to the agency in charge of reviewing federal intelligence activities.
A disagreement on what constitutes foreign interference between intelligence analysis bodies and the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) “played a role in those intelligence products not reaching the political executive, including the prime minister,” says a report from the security watchdog National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA).
NSIRA found multiple shortcomings in the government machinery, highlighting tensions between the collectors and disseminators of information within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
“If we’re not going to inform and share what we know, why are we collecting it?” a CSIS employee is quoted as saying in an internal email.
NSIRA, which reviewed approximately 17,000 documents and conducted 14 interviews for its study, says CSIS appeared to be making “arbitrary” decisions about which foreign interference information it should share.
The watchdog says this confusion stemmed from foreign interference being a priority for the government, while disseminating information on the issue “could itself be construed as a form of election interference.”
“The specific criteria or considerations by which CSIS might balance these potentially competing imperatives are opaque,” wrote NSIRA.
If the dilemma existed within CSIS, it was also present within other arms of the security apparatus, the review agency found.
The NSIRA report notes three instances where interventions, or lack thereof, from the prime minister’s NSIA prevented the sharing of intelligence material with senior decision-makers.
One case pertains to acting NSIA David Morrison commissioning a “Special Report” on Beijing’s interference activities in Canada and abroad with the Privy Council Office’s (PCO) Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) in the fall of 2021.
A draft was shared with CSIS, with a senior executive responding “positively,” and the IAS requested the product be shared with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the Deputy Clerk. At this point, NSIRA says a senior employee within IAS intervened and said to not share the product as instructed because additional input from Mr. Morrison was required.
In mid-December, feedback from Mr. Morrison was incorporated into a second draft, with NSIRA suggesting there was a disagreement between IAS and Mr. Morrison on what constitutes foreign interference.
“This feedback concerned the tone of the paper, and in particular clarifying whether what the paper described included standard diplomatic activity,” wrote NSIRA.
Mr. Morrison, who was occupying the role on an interim basis, was replaced by Jody Thomas in January 2022. NSIRA says she was briefed about the Special Report by IAS and a covering note accompanying the report “explicitly recommended that the report be approved and ‘provided to select Deputy Ministers and Cabinet Ministers.’”
The report remains in draft form and was “never approved, finalized, or disseminated,” says NSIRA.
“While several senior public servants at CSIS and PCO read draft versions of the product, it never reached Cabinet Ministers or the PMO.”
In explaining to NSIRA why the report was never published, PCO cited various reasons, such as the report having accomplished its objective of informing Mr. Morrison. PCO also says the document was drafted immediately before the Freedom Convoy and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hence it was focused on these “pressing priorities.”
Mr. Morrison had also cited other priorities, such as the Afghanistan withdrawal, when explaining why he had not briefed the prime minister on a CSIS intelligence assessment distributed to government departments in the summer of 2021. The assessment touched on Beijing targeting sitting MPs.
Shelving CSIS’s ‘Most Complete’ Report
Another wide-ranging report, this time produced by CSIS, was quashed by the NSIA.The NSIRA review says a CSIS analyst had produced in 2021 what CSIS described as the “most complete and detailed analysis of PRC foreign interference directed against political actors produced to date.”
A final draft of what is called the “Targeting Paper” was completed in June 2021, yet it sat on a shelf for a year and a half. NSIRA says the author of the paper pressed his management in October 2022 to have it published due to interest generated by the media leaks.
The report was eventually published on Feb. 13, 2023, on a web portal operated by the Communications Security Establishment called Slingshot, suggesting it was too sensitive to be sent via other means.
Nine days later the report was pulled from Slingshot at the request of NSIA Jody Thomas, says NSIRA.
According to CSIS Director David Vigneault’s recollection, “‘it was decided [to pause the report] because the information was extremely sensitive and there needed to be further discussions regarding its distribution,’” wrote NSIRA about the response it received from CSIS on the issue. “‘The request was not to limit or censor the report but to ensure proper readership.’”
PCO provided a similar rationale but NSIRA notes, however, that as of November 2023, the report remained unavailable.
After the report was pulled in February 2023, security officials held a meeting about the issue and, according to CSIS, Ms. Thomas requested a shorter version with names anonymized be provided to the prime minister.
NSIRA says the version was completed on in March 2023. “As of November 2023, the prime minister has not seen, read, or had access to this product. The CSIS director was unaware of this fact.”
NSIRA concluded based on those events that the NSIA carries “considerable weight” within the intelligence community given its proximity with the prime minister, yet the bounds of the role are not formally outlined.
The review agency says there are “interesting parallels” between how the IAS Special Report and the CSIS Targeting Paper were treated.
“Both products were meant to serve as synthesizing overviews of available intelligence on PRC political foreign interference. In the end, neither report was disseminated to the political executive, for similar reasons.”
As a related recommendation, NSIRA says the extent to which the NSIA can intervene in intelligence sharing should be described in a legal instrument.
Mr. LeBlanc also said the recommendations will be reviewed “as part of the government’s commitment to safeguarding the integrity of Canada’s democratic process.”
Inquiry
NSIRA’s report also mentions a topic that was raised during the public hearings of the foreign interference commission in April.The commission heard testimony of CSIS disseminating an intelligence product related to Chinese regime interference in the Liberal nomination contest in the Don Valley North riding in favour of Han Dong prior to the 2021 election.
The National Security Brief was recalled 10 days later at the request of NSIA Greta Bossenmaier.
“When asked by NSIRA to explain the rationale behind recalling the product, CSIS indicated that neither the Director nor the Director’s office could remember the specifics of the decision, other than that it was by request of the NSIA,” wrote the intelligence watchdog.
Mr. Dong, who now sits as an Independent, testified he was unaware of potential meddling by Beijing, adding he “would be the first one condemning it.”
