Johnston Report Notes Systemic Obstacles in Getting Intel to Policy-Makers

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau thumbs through the “First Report” by David Johnston, special rapporteur on foreign Interference, during a press conference on Parliament Hill in Ottawa on May 23, 2023. The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick

Special Rapporteur David Johnston says the Liberal government didn’t negligently fail to act on intelligence regarding the threat of foreign interference, but he highlighted problems surrounding the dissemination of intelligence within the state machinery.

“There are serious shortcomings in the way intelligence is communicated and processed from security agencies through to government,” he wrote in one of the five conclusions of his first report on May 23.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed the former governor general as special rapporteur in March amid calls for a public inquiry into Chinese interference on Canadian soil, giving him the mandate to determine whether an inquiry was needed.

Johnston’s most consequential conclusion from his report was to recommend against that option, citing the need to protect classified information.

Although Johnston found that the government had not been negligent in tackling the threat of foreign interference, he says it could have acted more quickly to counter it. One of his main points of criticism was about the way crucial classified information is passed from security agencies to government departments and ministers.

He notes that reports produced by the country’s two main intelligence collection agencies, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), are sent to departments at large with no clear recipient.

“It is rare for specific names to be mentioned, so specifically who at these departments received these memos cannot be determined from the documentary sources,” the report says.

Johnston says that even after conducting numerous interviews with stakeholders, the “picture remains cloudy” as to the dissemination process, with no accountability on who specifically received or consumed the intelligence product.

He also looked at the consumption of intelligence at the political level and found serious problems that could presumably lead to policy-makers not being informed of key developments, whether locally or internationally.

He says staffers in the Prime Minister’s Office are provided a larger binder full of intelligence products in a secure room with only a short time to review it and no context or prioritization of the material provided.

“The binder may have a significant mix of topics from around the world, and no one says, ‘you should pay attention to this issue in particular.’ If staffers are away, they may not see the binder that day,” says the report.

Public Scandal

The lack of accountability in the dissemination of potentially high-impact classified information turned into a public scandal in early May when The Globe and Mail reported on a leaked CSIS assessment from 2021 noting that the Chinese regime sought to retaliate against MPs who had taken critical stances against Beijing.

A source told the Globe one of the MPs was Conservative Michael Chong.

When Trudeau was asked whether he was briefed on that information, he initially said he wasn’t and that the information never left CSIS, noting that the agency decided it wasn’t a “significant enough concern” to raise to higher levels.

This was incorrect on both counts, and it was only part of the failure of the system to bring the intelligence to the political level.

The CSIS assessment was shared with other departments, including the National Security and Intelligence Adviser (NSIA), who advises the prime minister on security and intelligence matters.

But the NSIA role was in flux at the time due to a changeover from one adviser to the next, and none of the individuals who held the position during the relevant time frame said they recalled seeing the CSIS assessment.

Johnston’s report also notes that along with the CSIS assessment having been shared with relevant stakeholders, the agency had sent an “issues management note” in May 2021 to then-minister of public safety Bill Blair, his chief of staff, and his deputy minister.

The note said there was “intelligence that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] intended to target Mr. Chong, another MP, and their family in China (if any),” according to the report, and added that CSIS would provide a “defensive briefing” (without specific details on the threat) to Chong and the other MP.

The note never made it to the minister or his chief of staff, who both told Johnston they didn’t have access to the Top Secret Network email through which it was sent.

“It is certainly the most prominent, but not the only, example of poor information flow and processing between agencies, the public service and Ministers,” Johnston wrote in relation to the Chong case.

Blair reportedly told Johnston that normally when CSIS wanted to transmit sensitive information, the agency would request a briefing and provide the information in a secure facility, and not by email.

When testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on May 16, Chong described the fact that he wasn’t briefed on the possible threat to his family as a “systemic breakdown in the machinery of government.”

‘Looking for Information’

Johnston addressed the details of Chong’s case as first reported by the Globe, after having reviewed the intelligence files.

“There are indications that PRC officials contemplated action directed at both Chinese-Canadian MPs and their family members in China, and sought to build profiles on others,” he wrote.

“This includes Mr. Chong in both cases. There is no intelligence indicating that the PRC took steps to threaten his family. There is intelligence indicating they were looking for information.”

The Globe reported that a Chinese spy service and a Chinese diplomat in Canada were working on Chong’s case. The diplomat, consular officer Zhao Wei in Toronto, was declared persona non grata on May 8.

After the revelation came to light about crucial security information not being briefed up to higher levels of government, Minister of Public Safety Marco Mendicino issued a directive to CSIS on May 16 to increase its focus on threats to parliamentarians.

This followed Trudeau saying on May 3 that he had advised the agency to brief up such threats even if the information collected doesn’t meet the usual threshold.

Johnston’s report also notes that other measures are being taken to improve communication between CSIS and Public Safety, with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviewing the process.