India’s power in the Indian Ocean region, relative to Beijing’s, is “on the cusp of eroding rapidly,” and it is up to Australia and the United States to focus on military cooperation to bolster the Modi government’s military capacity in the Indian Ocean, according to a new report from the United States Studies Centre.
The report highlights that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is rapidly growing its navy, which is commissioning more large ships with greater range. This includes three aircraft carriers, eight new cruisers, and dozens of destroyers and frigates fitted with guided missiles. More ships of each type are planned.
In addition to its current military base in the Republic of Djibouti (a country in the Horn of Africa), the CCP has access to ports in Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Ream in Cambodia, and is developing additional ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The CCP’s presence in Djibouti has given the Chinese Navy experience in expeditionary operations and a reason to continually patrol in, and build familiarity with, the Indian Ocean.
“Authoritative Chinese military texts consider the Pacific and Indian Oceans to be a unified ’two oceans region' where China should seek to build political influence and a lasting military presence ... in peacetime or war, China’s naval presence generates greater strategic risk for India and its partners,” the report warns.
The Chinese navy has also deployed an increasing number of forays by dual-use survey ships to map the Indian Ocean, including ventures into India’s exclusive economic zone.
Of particular concern are indications that the CCP intends to expand its subsurface capabilities—submarines and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs)—in the Indian Ocean.
Between 2000 and 2020, the Indian Navy acquired many new naval assets, including six diesel attack submarines, four ballistic missile submarines, the landing platform dock INS Jalashwa, seven guided-missile destroyers, and 14 frigates.
It also added 18 long-range maritime patrol aircraft to significantly improve its anti-submarine warfare capability.
However, in 2020, the China-India border crisis shifted India’s focus.
Multiple near-simultaneous incursions by CCP troops across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh left 20 Indian soldiers dead—the first loss of life on the LAC in 45 years.
While the potential threat in the Indian Ocean seemed distant, the immediate threat from Beijing to India’s northern borders suddenly crystallised, and military spending shifted accordingly.
Both countries have deployed significant military reinforcements and built new military infrastructure near the border since 2020.
Growing Strategic Risk for India and its Allies
The Centre says the Indian Navy is not keeping pace with earlier expansion rates, “let alone accelerating to keep pace with the impending growth of China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean.”It warns that “India will find it near impossible to correct this impending shift in naval power.”
This poses risks to Australian, U.S. and Indian security interests. However, the U.S. and Australia consider the Indian Ocean a secondary priority compared to the South China Sea, where Beijing has taken a more aggressive stance.
Nonetheless, the report urges Australia and the U.S. to bolster India’s naval presence in its ocean.
“The only viable option to offset China is international cooperation,” the report concludes.
“More specifically ... the most urgent priority for naval cooperation between Australia, the United States and India should be anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and undersea warfare (USW).
“These partners already have technological advantages and greater tactical experience in ASW than China ... They can amass [a] potent ASW and USW force. But to realise their combined advantage, they must improve their ability to operate seamlessly together.”
That starts with more sharing of data collected by the three navies on what is happening under the sea. While that happens sporadically at present, it needs to be formalised and become automatic, similar to the agreement, under AUKUS Pillar Two, that Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom will share data from their respective sonobuoys.
“The United States and Australia, as close Five Eyes allies, will always share more sensitive data with each other than with India,” the report said.
“Over time, all of these partners could share more data as they develop greater trust in each other’s strategic intentions and in their data handling systems and practices.”
Japan, as one of the most important U.S. allies in Asia, a member of the Quad, and provisionally also AUKUS Pillar Two, could also be brought into the arrangement.
Joint technology could also happen relatively easily. While acknowledging that “recapitalisation of India’s attack submarine fleet is a torturous process,” the report suggests the partner nations could work together on “UUVs, sensors, or artificial intelligence algorithms to process collected data” and could “co-develop ASW sensors, which could be deployed on UUVs, airborne drones, satellites, or at fixed sites on the seabed [and] allow the collected data to be more easily shared among participating partner navies.”
The Centre advocates for establishing a Combined Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Centre (CASWOC), perhaps at HMAS Stirling in Perth, as an “aspirational goal.” It would facilitate coordination of anti-submarine warfare operations among participating nations.
It admits these suggestions are “not without risk” as anti-submarine and undersea warfare are especially sensitive, even among the closest of allies, because their effectiveness depends critically on secrecy.
“Washington will be concerned for example, that sensitive data shared with India may inadvertently wind up in the hands of adversarial third parties, especially Russia,” it said.
“But just as technology transfer concerns can be allayed through technical and procedural assurances ... data sharing risks can be similarly mitigated through technical and procedural means and managed as the partners build trust over time.”
However, the Centre warns that “these partners cannot build enough naval capacity to compete directly with China. Their only option is to offset their mass disadvantage with technology and international cooperation.”
