Implications of Russia’s Experimental Missile Strike for Allied Strategy

Russia’s use of an experimental missile in Ukraine has allied strategists wondering if its all bluster or a grim new chapter in the war.
Implications of Russia’s Experimental Missile Strike for Allied Strategy
Firefighters work at the site of a Russian missile strike in Dnipro, Ukraine, on Nov. 21, 2024. Press service of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk region/Handout via Reuters
Andrew Thornebrooke
Updated:
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News Analysis

Russia launched an attack on Ukraine this week, using a new prototype weapon the likes of which has never before been used in combat.

The intermediate-range ballistic missile launched as many as 36 separate munitions as it struck targets in the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Nov. 21.
The new weapon has sparked concern throughout Ukraine and allied leadership but what it means for the future of allied Ukraine strategy and nuclear deterrence remain open questions.

What Exactly Did Russia Launch?

A key question not yet completely answered is the exact nature of Russia’s new experimental weapon.
Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a televised address in the aftermath of the attack, in which he described the missile as a non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile named “Oreshnik,” which means “hazel” in English, that was designed to penetrate air defense systems.

The Biden administration and Pentagon have further characterized the weapon as an intermediate-range system based on Russia’s RS-26 ballistic missile, a nuclear-capable weapon that can operate either as an intercontinental or intermediate-range missile depending on its payload.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence ministry, meanwhile, has issued a statement saying that the missile fired six warheads, each with its own six submunitions that struck targets in Dnipro alongside a barrage of other ballistic and cruise missiles.
Some analysts have suggested that this means the missile carried multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), in which one payload carries multiple warheads that can aim at multiple targets independently of one another.

It is also possible, however, that the multiple warheads were part of a multiple reentry vehicle system (MRV), which is similar to a MIRV insofar as it fires multiple warheads, but differs insofar as the warheads cannot be independently aimed, and instead provide a cluster bomb effect.

Similarly, though Russia has described the weapon as a hypersonic system, it is unclear what the meaning of the term “hypersonic” is in this context.

The payloads of most ballistic missiles technically reach hypersonic speeds when entering the atmosphere from orbit but that phenomenon is generally not what is referred to by the term hypersonic weapon.

Rather, the term is most often used to refer to weapons that either can break such speeds while operating within the atmosphere (hypersonic cruise missiles) or when the payloads of ballistic missiles can be manually navigated during their descent to the target (hypersonic glide vehicles).

That definition is complicated by the fact that the experimental weapon was based on the RS-26, which can be fired on a standard ballistic trajectory or in a depressed mode which allows it to stay within the atmosphere at the cost of greatly increased fuel consumption.

It is further complicated by the fact that Russia has on occasion used the term “hypersonic” to refer to missiles that merely break Mach 5, such as the Kinzhal system, which is neither a cruise missile nor boasts a glide vehicle.

The Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, and National Reconnaissance Office declined to provide further comment on the issue when asked whether the missile had entered orbit.

If this week’s attack did employ a MIRV system, it would mark the first recorded use of such in combat. Thus, while Russia has used nuclear-capable missiles such as the Iskander against Ukraine in the past, this week’s barrage would be no less escalatory.

Aiming to Deter NATO

Matthew Costlow, a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy think tank, said that the attack was likely focused primarily on swaying NATO away from supplying additional long-range missiles to Ukraine.

“Russia’s use of this ‘experimental’ missile against Ukraine is likely an attempt to deter the United States and Europe from continuing their military support of Ukraine,” Costlow told The Epoch Times.

President Joe Biden lowered restrictions on Ukraine’s use of American-made long-range missiles against targets in Russian territory earlier in the month. Thus far, Ukraine has only made one such attack, against an ammunition depot in Russia’s Bryansk region.
Putin said that this was the reason for the attack using the experimental weapon; though the United States says Biden was only responding to Russia’s alleged use of North Korean troops to attack Ukrainian positions in occupied Kursk.
Costlow said that the launch is also meant to reinforce Putin’s decision to move forward with a change to Russian strategic doctrine this month, which will allow Moscow to use nuclear weapons against any nuclear power engaged in supplying arms used in major attacks against the Russian homeland.

Though that policy shift was an unambiguous threat to the United States for its continued support of Ukraine, Costlow said that the credibility of the threat was undermined by the frequency with which Moscow promised nuclear devastation.

“This attack … is unlikely to change the perceptions of governments in Europe or the United States in part because Russia has issued innumerable nuclear threats over the past two years—so many and over such small issues that it has degraded the efficacy of its own threats,” Costlow said.

Costlow added that American and allied strategists could still learn from the episode, including how vital the coercive use of nuclear and conventional missile strikes are to Russia’s defense strategy.

Paul Crespo, president of the Center for American Defense Studies think tank, described the launch as largely a tit-for-tat escalation after Ukraine’s use of the U.S. ATACMS system in Bryansk.

Nuclear Capable

Crespo said that the possible inclusion of a MIRV system would be a clear warning sign to NATO, however, that Russia was ramping up the intensity of its responses to what it perceived as Western escalations.

“These warheads are extremely difficult to intercept,” Crespo said.

Crespo, who previously served as a Marine officer for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, also said that the risk of deploying a nuclear-capable missile was compounded by Putin’s newly changed nuclear doctrine.

“Lowering the threshold for using nukes while expanding the use of nuclear-capable weapons in a war is never a good combination,” he added.

Risk reduction systems such as the U.S.–Russia notification system could fail in a time of crisis or confusion, and it is the continued possibility of a prolonged crisis that makes the situation so volatile and dangerous for all involved, Crespo said.

Simply put, with nuclear-capable weapons being launched at increasing rates and communication between adversaries being maintained only minimally, it would be all too easy to mistake a conventional missile for a nuclear one, or vice versa.

“In a crisis, things might not be so clear cut,” Crespo said.

“Using long-range ballistic missiles with MIRVs creates the possibility that NATO countries might confuse a conventional attack with a nuclear one.”

Symbolic Display

Russia’s attack presents something of a symbol of defiance against NATO’s continued support for Ukraine.

It is not lost on allied decision-makers that the RS-26 and its derivatives would be among the weapons used by Russia to strike NATO nations in the event of a war.

The spread of nuclear-capable weapons across the battlefield could also complicate allied decision-making, as the United States relies on Russia to provide advance notification of the use of such weapons in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

To that end, Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters on Nov. 21 that Russia notified the United States of the attack in advance.

Putin also said that Russia will continue to deliver advance notice to foreign nationals in Ukraine before such strikes are conducted.

As such, Singh said that the United States is not adjusting its nuclear posture and has seen no indication that Russia is adjusting its nuclear posture either.

The Pentagon declined to provide further comment on whether it was considering further adjustments to its strategic posture in response to the launch, however. The White House has not issued a comment on the matter.

For now, Putin has said that Russia would decide whether to conduct more combat tests of the experimental system based on the deployment of NATO nations’ missiles to the region, responding in a “mirror-like manner.”

A U.S. official told The Epoch Times that the ultimate goal of the barrage was likely more symbolic than tactical in nature.

Another U.S. official, familiar with the matter, similarly said that the Biden administration was taking the attack very seriously but considered the threat posed by the new weapon to be limited.

“Russia likely possesses only a handful of these experimental missiles,” the official said. “[I] really want to note: this was an experimental weapon which Russia has a limited number of and that this is not a capability that Russia is able to regularly deploy on the battlefield.”

To that end, the official suggested that Russia may have used the capability to intimidate Ukraine and its international partners, but that the weapon system itself was unlikely to have continued ramifications for the Ukrainian battlespace or allied deterrence efforts.

Likewise, the official said, the United States had briefed Ukraine and its allies about the possible use of the weapon prior to the attack, thus mitigating some potential damage.

“Ukraine has withstood countless attacks from Russia, including from missiles with significantly larger warheads than this weapon,” the official said.

The Biden administration is currently surging security assistance to Ukraine as it prepares to hand the reins of power in Washington over to President-elect Donald Trump, who has vowed to bring the war in Ukraine to an end early in his term, though he has declined to elaborate how he intends to do so.

Ukraine’s other partners in Europe appear equally undeterred for the time being and are working to keep the flow of humanitarian and security assistance flowing to embattled Kyiv.

“Deploying this capability will neither change the course of the conflict nor deter NATO Allies from supporting Ukraine,” NATO spokesperson Farah Dakhlallah said in a statement shared with The Epoch Times.

One NATO official told The Epoch Times, however, that Ukraine had requested an emergency meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council in response to the attack. The council, which is responsible for coordinating Ukraine’s pathway to NATO membership, will hold an ambassador-level meeting in Brussels on Nov. 26.

Andrew Thornebrooke
Andrew Thornebrooke
National Security Correspondent
Andrew Thornebrooke is a national security correspondent for The Epoch Times covering China-related issues with a focus on defense, military affairs, and national security. He holds a master's in military history from Norwich University.
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