Finnish Authorities Board Ship Suspected in Undersea Power Cable Sabotage

The oil tanker Eagle S, background, and the Finnish Border Guard ship Turva at sea outside Porkkalanniemi, Finland, on Dec. 26, 2024. Rajavartiosto via AP

Finnish authorities boarded a Russian-linked crude oil tanker on Dec. 26 to investigate the suspected sabotage of the Estlink-2 undersea power cable.

In a statement, the Finnish national police service announced that a multiagency task force including Finnish military and border security personnel boarded the Cook Islands-flagged Eagle S and diverted the tanker’s course for further investigations.

Investigating authorities shared further details about the boarding action in statements to the Finnish state-owned Yle news agency.

Finnish Border Guard Deputy Director Markku Hassinen said that as investigating authorities boarded the ship, they asked the crew to raise its anchor.

Hassinen said the crew retracted the anchor chain, but no anchor was attached.

While the Eagle S is flagged to the Cook Islands, Yle reported that Finnish customs officials suspect the tanker may be part of a so-called “shadow fleet” helping Russia evade international sanctions.

Vessel tracking data published by MarineTraffic indicates the Eagle S departed from St. Petersburg, Russia, on Dec. 25 and was en route to Port Said, Egypt.

Finnish authorities are coordinating with their Estonian counterparts as the investigation continues.

Undersea Infrastructure At Risk

The damage to the Estlink-2 power cable followed similar incidents impacting undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

An undersea telecommunications cable linking Lithuania and Sweden was damaged on Nov. 17.

Another telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany was damaged less than a day later, on Nov. 18.

Multiple gas lines serving the Nord Stream natural gas connection from Russia to Germany were also destroyed in explosions in September 2022.

International authorities have increasingly suspected commercial vessels of joining in clandestine efforts to sabotage undersea infrastructure.

Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said in a Dec. 26 statement that he had a hard time believing ships could be dragging their anchors around the undersea cables by accident.

“We must understand that damage to submarine infrastructure has become more systematic and thus must be regarded as attacks against our vital structures,” he said.

Beyond simply assisting in Russian efforts to evade sanctions, Tsahkna said shadow fleet ships now pose an increasing security threat to the Baltic Sea region.

Following the damage to the telecommunications last month, Swedish and Danish coast guard and naval forces quickly closed in on a Chinese-flagged bulk cargo carrier, the Yi Peng 3.

Chinese authorities eventually permitted German, Swedish, Finnish, and Danish authorities to board the vessel, but those authorities were only allowed to observe while Chinese officials inspected the ship.

Separately, Danish and Swedish broadcasters partnered with an undersea drone company, Blueye Robotics, to conduct their own investigation into the November damage to the two undersea cables.

Last week, the privately organized investigation published findings indicating the potential drag marks of an anchor along the Yi Peng 3’s course over the damaged cables.

The Yi Peng 3 has since left the Baltic Sea region, though authorities continue to investigate its alleged involvement in damaging the cables.

Baltic States Seek to Decouple From Russian Energy

The Estlink-2 cable supplied power from Finland to Estonia through a partnership managed by the Finnish national power grid operator Fingrid and the Estonian national grid operator Elering.

Elering announced in a Dec. 26 statement, that Estonia has sufficient energy production even with the Estlink-2 cable being offline. Still, Elering warned energy prices may increase.

The Estonian power grid operator estimated it would take until August 2025 for repairs to the Estlink-2 cable to be completed.

For years, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined their power grids with those of Belarus and Russia as part of the BRELL agreement. Their shared grid, known as the IPS/UPS, is centrally located in Russia.

This summer, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced their plans to decouple from the IPS/UPS grid and instead connect with the Continental Europe Synchronous Area by February 2025.

They said this move will help improve reliability and improve energy security.

Elering said the Estlink-2 outage shouldn’t hinder Estonia’s plans to drop out of the BRELL agreement and integrate with the European power grid.