Intelligence released by the federal government aligns with previously leaked information that Chinese regime actors meddled with 11 candidates in the 2019 federal elections, and some appeared willing.
“Reporting indicated that 11 political candidates and 13 political staff members were assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by, this group of threat actors,” says an intelligence summary presented at the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference on April 4.
It adds that some of these candidates “appeared willing” to cooperate in foreign interference activity, “while others appeared to be unaware of potential FI [foreign interference]-related activity due to its clandestine nature.”
The summary, mostly created by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), describes the threat actors as being known or suspected to be linked to Beijing, and includes some officials.
“[They] worked in loose coordination with one another to covertly advance PRC [People’s Republic of China] interests through Canadian democratic institutions,” the summary said.
The public inquiry is currently in its hearing phase focused on foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. Summaries of sensitive intelligence have been prepared for public release.
The CSIS intelligence summary says that seven of the candidates were from the Liberal Party and four were from the Conservative Party.
The document specifies that “implicated” means the individual had at least one direct connection to a “person of interest” involved in Chinese interference, but not that he was knowingly involved or complicit. “Impacted” means the individual was “directly affected” by foreign interference.
Global reported that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had been briefed about a Chinese interference network during the 2019 election.
“Chief among the allegations is that CSIS reported that China’s Toronto consulate directed a large clandestine transfer of funds to a network of at least eleven federal election candidates and numerous Beijing operatives who worked as their campaign staffers,” says the report.
The CSIS information released at the inquiry says “intelligence assessments suggest” that some of the PRC threat actors had received financial support from Beijing. “There likely were at least two transfer of funds approximating $250,000 from PRC officials in Canada, possibly for FI-related purposes, though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates,” it said.
The funds were transferred via multiple individuals, it adds, to mask their origins. The conduits are identified as an “influential community leader,” a staff member of a 2019 federal candidate, and then an Ontario MPP.
This information tracks with what had been reported in the media, with the difference that CSIS says in its summary that it assesses the funds were probably not destined for candidates.
‘Slush Fund’
When testifying at the inquiry on April 4, CSIS Director David Vigneault was asked to comment on the information about the 11 federal candidates and the clandestine Chinese funds.Sujit Choudhry, counsel for NDP MP Jenny Kwan, questioned Mr. Vigneault as to whether the CSIS information relates to the “slush fund, allegedly operated by the Chinese Consulate in Toronto,” which was covered in media reports.
Mr. Vigneault said he could not comment on classified information and spoke of the negative impacts of the leaks that occurred in the press. He also cautioned to “not overinterpret or not draw conclusions that are not drawn here.”
CSE conducts spying via the interception and hacking of communications, highly protected techniques, and no other details were offered about the funds other than that this was the “most significant piece of intelligence CSE collected in relation to the 2019 and 2021 elections.”
Directing Media
The CSIS intelligence summary about interference from Beijing threat actors in 2019 mentioned two types of activities they were involved in. It says intelligence reports indicate they would “direct certain Chinese language media outlets to support specific candidates.”Chinese officials were also meeting with political staffers and would tell them to prevent their federal candidates from attending certain events, like those organized by Taiwanese officials. CSIS notes that staffers play an important role because they can often influence the schedule of candidates.
Excluding politicians critical of Beijing from community events in Vancouver has been orchestrated by Chinese officials through “proxy agents,” according to another CSIS intelligence summary.
The public inquiry hearings will continue until April 10 and will see Mr. Trudeau and cabinet ministers testify.
Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue must file her initial report by May 3.
