Diaspora Groups Targeted by Beijing Warn Inquiry of Disinformation’s Impact

Diaspora Groups Targeted by Beijing Warn Inquiry of Disinformation’s Impact
A man enters the hearing room as the Public Inquiry into Foreign Election Interference resumes in Ottawa, on Sept. 16, 2024. The Canadian Press/Adrian Wyld
Noé Chartier
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The Foreign Interference Commission heard about the impact of disinformation on diaspora communities in Canada targeted by Beijing as it probes the federal government’s ability to counter foreign meddling.

Representatives from various diaspora groups and organizations testified before the inquiry on Oct. 2, providing examples of foreign-directed activities aimed at undermining human rights advocacy or the democratic process.

Pixing Zhang, an advocate for Canadian Falun Gong practitioners, said Chinese people have been the main victims of interference efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that it’s incorrect to believe they support the CCP by default.

He suggested to the commission that Canadians need to “find ways to better understand and engage with mainland Chinese people.”

“They are the victims, not the accomplices,” he said. “While some individuals act as agents for the CCP due to greed or fear, the silent majority are not CCP followers.”

Zhang described how CCP disinformation targeting Falun Gong, a meditation practice persecuted in China since 1999, has created an environment where some politicians fear engaging with the group.

He noted an instance in 2013 where a provincial cabinet minister told him a fellow politician close to the Chinese Consulate gave his colleagues a pamphlet from the consulate defaming Falun Gong.

“Because of his high position and strong fundraising abilities for politicians, many followed his lead,” Zhang said.

Zhang said part of the CCP’s disinformation campaign has also been to propagate in political circles the notion that supporting Falun Gong can alienate Chinese voters and harm business ties. He called this a “groundless, false claim” and pointed to the years of Stephen Harper’s government when a strong stance on China had not impacted voting or bilateral trade.

Government intelligence reports released to the commission identify the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the main foreign interference threat. Along with interfering in the democratic process, the Chinese regime also conducts transnational repression against groups like Falun Gong and others, the reports say.

Other groups targeted by Beijing include the Uyghurs, supporters of Taiwan independence and the democracy movement, and Tibetans.

“The PRC attempts to intimidate and silence members of these communities through a variety of coercive means that can include the threatening of family members in the PRC and/or the denial of visas to those wishing to travel back to visit,” says a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessment on Chinese interference entered as evidence at the commission.

Executive director of the Canada-Tibet Committee, Sherap Therchin, told the inquiry that the fear of being spied on by Beijing while in Canada is damaging his community, which is afraid to take part in public events or speak out publicly.

Regarding the impact of Chinese disinformation, Therchin mentioned the distribution of a document by a Chinese “proxy organization” in recent years that said Tibet enjoys freedom of religion and has benefited from economic development in the region.

“This claim fit very well with the PRC’s narrative on Tibet, and it whitewashes the actual situation,” he said. This includes “situations of Tibetans not being allowed to keep any photos of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.” The PRC took over Tibet in 1959, and its spiritual and political leader the Dalai Lama went into exile in India.

Foreign Interference Legislation

Other panellists from Canada’s Chinese diaspora addressed recent efforts to tackle foreign interference by the introduction of Bill C-70, which creates new foreign interference offences and establishes a foreign influence registry.

Gloria Fung, former president of Canada-Hong Kong Link and an advocate of the foreign influence registry, called the passing of Bill C-70 a good first step and suggested to the inquiry that the legislation should be reviewed and updated within two years after the planned 2025 federal election to address any gaps.

Fung also told the inquiry that new regulations need to be drafted to tackle foreign interference as it pertains to issues like to misinformation and disinformation, elite capture, and transnational repression.

Katherine Leung, a policy adviser with Hong Kong Watch, also called C-70 a first step and told the inquiry that legislation to specifically counter transnational repression should be adopted.

“We don’t know for a fact right now that individuals involved in activities that suppress activism or political engagement are the same ones as those who would be required to register” with the foreign influence registry, she said.

Kayum Masimov, a project coordinator with the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, said his community would benefit from increased engagement from security agencies involved in countering foreign interference.

“CSIS and RCMP should establish dedicated channels to share information and provide timely alerts to Uyghur Canadian organizations and leaders about any emerging threats from foreign actors, particularly Chinese government proxies,” he said.

The Foreign Interference Commission is hearing from different stakeholders during the current phase of public hearings. Officials from CSIS testified last week, and RCMP leaders will appear on Oct. 3. The prime minister is slated to appear on the last of day of hearings on Oct. 16.

Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue is required to submit a final report before the end of the year. Her interim report was released in May and focused on foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The report says foreign meddling didn’t impact the overall results of those elections but that it could have potentially impacted individual ridings.