Debate Over Russian Air Base in Indonesia Distracts From Real Regional Shift: Analyst

‘It’s unlikely Indonesia would agree to a Russian base, but it’s very likely they’d allow Russian aircraft to use facilities,' said Michael Shoebridge.

A crew member stands onboard the Russian Navy corvette "Gromkiy" docked at North Jamrud pier of Tanjung Perak port for a 5-day joint military exercise between Indonesia and Russia, in Surabaya on Nov. 4, 2024. Juni Kriswanto/AFP via Getty Images

Australian Labor ministers should not be too quick to dismiss rumblings of Russian aircraft being based in the Pacific region, cautions one defence analyst.

In mid-April, well-known defence and intelligence publication Janes alleged that Russia had contacted the Indonesian government to seek permission to house long-range aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base, around 1,300 kilometres north of Australia’s Darwin.

The report prompted the Labor government to contact Indonesia for confirmation due to the relative proximity of the Indonesian defence facility to Australia.

On April 15, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles said he had spoken with his Indonesian counterpart, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who denied any Russian aircraft being present locally.

“He [Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin] said to me in the clearest possible terms, reports of the prospect of Russian aircraft operating from Indonesia are simply not true,” Marles told reporters.

Nevertheless, the defence minister did not comment on whether the Kremlin had made the request.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese voiced his objection to a Russian military presence in the immediate region.

“We have a position, which is we stand with Ukraine. We regard Vladimir Putin as an authoritarian leader who has broken international law, who is attacking the sovereignty of the nation of Ukraine,” he said.

Albanese also noted that Australia is currently having a “never been better” relationship with Indonesia.

Opposition Leader Peter Dutton, who initially raised the alarm, also said Australia did not welcome Putin’s presence in the region, while demanding the Labor government explain the situation.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese speaks to the media during a visit to Flinders Medical Centre on Day 4 of the 2025 federal election campaign, in Adelaide, Australia on April 1, 2025. AAP Image/Lukas Coch

Australian Government Is Missing the Big Picture: Expert

Michael Shoebridge, founder and director of Strategic Analysis Australia, said the focus on a military base was missing the bigger picture of how Indonesian-Russian ties were growing.

“[Defence Minister] Marles’ cast iron assurances that nothing is happening hide the bigger problem. And what we’re hearing from Mr. Marles is based on a hurried phone call arranged after the government found out about things through the media,” said Shoebridge, a former deputy at two Australian intelligence agencies.

“His furious denials only make you look at the broader issues he’s just not addressing. As Shakespeare said: ‘Methinks he doth protest too much,’” Shoebridge told The Epoch Times.

Shoebridge also said the reports should be taken seriously given the credibility of the Janes publication.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has moved to strengthen ties between Jakarta and Moscow after being elected in 2024.

“It’s unlikely Indonesia would agree to a Russian base, but it’s very likely they'd allow Russian aircraft to use facilities, particularly if there was some joint training benefit to Indonesia as part of that,” he said.

“Indonesia’s military already has Russian military systems like Sukhoi jet fighters, and Prabowo’s history in the Indonesian military probably means he likes this and wants more.”

Shoebridge said the issue of a “base” should not be given too much focus.

“The 2,500 U.S. marines that are in Darwin on permanent rotation have no U.S. base, nor do the rotations of U.S. fighters and bombers using RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] Darwin and RAAF Tindal,” he said.

Russia-Indonesia Growing Cooperation

In July 2024, Prabowo, who was the president-elect at the time, travelled to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin.

At the meeting, Prabowo called Russia a “great friend” of Indonesia and said his future administration hoped to enhance cooperation with on defence, energy, and education.

This followed Prabowo’s visit to China a few months earlier to affirm the “friendship” between the countries.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (L) shakes hands with Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto (R) in Moscow, Russia, on July 31, 2024. Maxim Shemetov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

After the Indonesian president officially took office in late October 2024, Jakarta held the first joint navy drill with Moscow in the Java Sea a few weeks later.

Most recently, Russian Security Council Chief General Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu visited Indonesia in February 2025 to discuss security with Prabowo and his defence minister.

“There is an obvious and real pattern here which has Indonesia’s new leader working actively and quickly to deepen military cooperation with Russia, and of Putin welcoming this and working to the same end,” Shoebridge said.

“Of course, there are limits to how much priority and attention Putin can give to this because of the overwhelming priority of his war in Ukraine, but Putin has been consistent in growing Russian military activities in our part of the world despite this.”

“So, despite Mr. Marles telling us that the security agreement he signed with Prabowo back in August last year was a historic deepening of the Australia-Indonesia defence relationship, Russia and Indonesia are getting closer and working together more. And Jakarta doesn’t see any need to give us details or consult about that.”

As such, Shoebridge said he was concerned about the implications of a stronger Russia-Indonesia relationship in the region.

“Both Mr. Albanese and Mr. Dutton have said Russia is not welcome in our part of the world, but the unfortunate fact is Russia is very welcome in Jakarta,” he said.

Moscow and Beijing are also tied up in a “no limits” partnership suggesting support for each others military ambitions.

Ukraine finally took action against Beijing by sanctioning three Chinese companies for supplying weapons to the Russian military. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long backed Russia clandestinely with supplies and trade.

Russian Ambassador Pushes Back Against Australia

In a letter to the chief editor of the Jakarta Post newspaper, Russia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, did not confirm whether Moscow was seeking to house Russian aircraft in Indonesia.

However, he said what happened at the Manuhua Air Force Base had “nothing to do” with Australia.

“It is hard to imagine that any ordinary Australians should be concerned about what is happening 1,300 kilometres from their territory, about matters that concern relations between other sovereign states and have nothing to do with Australia,” the letter read.

An Indonesian soldier stands guard near a fighter jet at an air force base in Blang Bintang, Indonesia, on May 19, 2019. Chaideer Mahyuddin/AFP via Getty Images

Moreover, Tolchenov claimed that any challenges to stability in the Pacific region would likely come from the rotational deployment of large military forces from “non-regional states” on Australia’s soil.

“Particularly alarming are the plans to deploy the United States’ intermediate-range missiles in Australia, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership,” he wrote.

The ambassador also noted that military cooperation is an “integral part” of the relationship between Russia and Indonesia.

“Such cooperation is aimed at strengthening the defensive capabilities of both sides, is not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region,” he said.

“Canberra’s national interests cannot extend to the territory of neighbouring sovereign states that pursue active and independent policies.”

However, Shoebridge warned that there was a “real whiff of the Solomons-China security agreement” from current engagement.

“When it first came to light from media reports and not by our government knowing anything first, all the focus was on denials and on whether or not there would be a Chinese military base there,” he said.

“But that missed the point too—the agreement got signed and there is continued deepening of Chinese-Solomons security cooperation happening as a result. The path to the Chinese military visiting and operating out of the Solomons is real as this trajectory continues.”