Commission Into Foreign Election Interference Looking for Public Submissions

Commissioner Justice Marie-Josee Hogue speaks at the Foreign Interference Commission in Ottawa on Feb. 2, 2024. The Canadian Press/Adrian Wyld

Canada’s foreign interference commission has announced it is taking submissions from the public.

The window is open until July 31.

“An important part of the Commission’s mandate is to examine and report on the experiences of members of ethnic and cultural communities who may be especially vulnerable to foreign interference,” said Commissioner Marie-Josee Hogue in a May 22 statement. “Members of diaspora communities are encouraged to engage with the Commission by providing written submissions in English or French, or in a select number of third languages.”

The statement adds submissions can be made in confidence. “The Commission will not release any identifying information about those who make submissions without their express written consent,” it says.

The commission says submissions can be made by email, by the Signal encrypted messaging app, or by regular mail.

The Foreign Interference Commission’s initial report on May 3 said that China is the most serious threat when it comes to foreign interference.

“Foreign interference is not done by just one country. However, China currently stands out as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada,” the report said.

It added that although the interference didn’t change which party formed government after the 2019 and 2021 elections, it may have impacted results in a small number of ridings.

The report also noted the interference undermined public trust in elections.

Besides attempting to influence diaspora communities, Beijing also targets groups in Canada that are persecuted or targeted by China, such as Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and supporters of Taiwanese independence, the report said.

It also found China uses a variety of tools in its efforts to interfere in Canada, including Canada-based proxies.

“These tools include the monitoring of diaspora communities and transnational repression; activities meant to impact the outcome of Canadian democratic processes (including providing financial support to preferred candidates); and clandestinely shaping narratives in support of PRC strategic interests,” it said.

“The PRC [People’s Republic of China] takes a long-term approach to influence operations. It invests in developing relationships through both overt and covert means, in order to build cooperation over time,” it said.

“It uses incentives given to individuals or persons who are close to them, such as paid trips, business opportunities, prestigious invitations, or political support (including financial support). It also uses disincentives, such as visa denials, harassment and intimidation both of individuals as well as PRC-based family members, economic coercion and community isolation.”

In addition, the report said, Beijing controls Chinese-language media and social media applications and uses them to influence the diaspora community.

In a posting on its website, the commission suggested submission guidelines for the public, including being specific about their experience and making the submission concise.

The public is asked to include any connection with diaspora communities or any election involvement they’ve had, whether they’ve been affected by foreign interference in a Canadian election, and any suggestions for detecting or deterring foreign interference.

The commission held its first hearings in Ottawa over 15 days between January and April. The next public hearings will be held this fall, in part to hear recommendations for the final report to the federal government, which is due by Dec. 31. The commission says the hearings will have a broader focus on Canada’s democratic institutions and experiences of the country’s diaspora communities.

Dates for the fall sittings have yet to be announced.

Matthew Horwood contributed to this report.