Colluding MPs, Delayed Warrant, Internal Tensions: Key Takeaways of the Foreign Interference Inquiry

Colluding MPs, Delayed Warrant, Internal Tensions: Key Takeaways of the Foreign Interference Inquiry
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appears as a witness at the Foreign Interference Commission in Ottawa, on Oct. 16, 2024. Justin Tang/The Canadian Press
Noé Chartier
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The latest phase of public hearings at the Foreign Interference Commission concluded this week, leaving several stones unturned about specific issues such as a delayed surveillance warrant and around broader issues such as what actually constitutes foreign interference.

Tensions within the federal government were on display during the hearings, as diplomats and top officials pushed back against Canada’s spy agency on what can be considered a threat to national security.

Top officials also questioned the conclusions of lawmakers serving as national security watchdogs, who previously raised the alarm about some of their colleagues’ collusion with foreign states.

The clash of views was topped off by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau testifying on the last hearing day, Oct. 16, as the commission wrapped up this phase, which focused on Ottawa’s capacity to counter foreign interference.

Trudeau commented on the tensions and controversies and on a wide range of national security matters.

“I am fully aware and indeed regularly apprised of tension between—of constructive, creative tension, of disagreements of perspective—between diplomats and spies, or between our Global Affairs Canada and CSIS,” Trudeau said when being questioned by Gib van Ert, counsel for Tory MP Michael Chong.

Van Ert sought to find out during the hearings why senior decision-makers were never apprised of Beijing’s efforts to collect information on Chong and his family in China, even though the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had sent a note and reports to relevant departments and officials.

CSIS wanted to alert Chong about what it saw as a threat involving a Chinese spy service. Meanwhile, Trudeau and his officials, such as two of his former national security and intelligence advisers (NSIA), have expressed the view that collecting information on foreign legislators is a normal diplomatic practice.
Van Ert said the lack of consensus around what is foreign interference in Ottawa is not a “healthy debate,” as it impacted his client MP Chong, and that someone should have asked the prime minister to provide guidance on the matter. “But no one ever did that, and so you were left in the dark,” van Ert said to Trudeau.

Foreign Collusion of Lawmakers

The public inquiry also displayed tensions between top officials and MPs and senators around what constitutes foreign interference and who in Parliament could be involved.
The 11 MPs and senators who sit on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) released a bombshell report in June concluding that some lawmakers and party candidates have been “semi-witting or witting participants in the efforts of foreign states to interfere in our politics.” The report is based on approximately 4,000 documents from various organizations including CSIS.

Top security officials told the inquiry they disagreed with aspects of the report, including its conclusion about some lawmakers being wittingly involved in foreign interference.

“The information we have, and that you have as well—and that was used by NSICOP—does not allow me to come to the conclusion there are traitors in Parliament,” NSIA Nathalie Drouin told Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue on Oct. 9.

“I’ve seen inappropriate behaviours, I saw lack of judgment, I saw individuals I would maybe trust less,” said Drouin. “But I haven’t seen any MP in our Parliament who did espionage, sabotage, or really put Canada’s security at risk.”

Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc, who has pushed back on calls to release the names of lawmakers allegedly involved in foreign collusion after NSICOP released its report, echoed Drouin’s perspective when he testified on Oct. 15.

“I share the view shared by other senior public servants here, that people serve in Parliament honourably,” he said. “Some may have lacked judgment in certain contexts, but I think we need to be careful not to also continue to fuel an impression that has been grossly exaggerated since this report of NSICOP was made public.”

Following the testimonies of the two top security officials, Drouin and LeBlanc, that downplayed the NSICOP report and the potential for lawmakers to be involved in foreign interference, Trudeau testified he knew the names of implicated Conservatives.

“I have the names of a number of parliamentarians, former parliamentarians, and/or candidates in the Conservative Party of Canada who are engaged or at high risk of, or for whom there is clear intelligence around foreign interference,” he said.

The prime minister made the remark while being asked by a commission counsel to discuss how he reacts when provided information about foreign interference involving opposition parties.

During subsequent cross-examination, Trudeau was asked by the Conservative Party’s lawyer whether he also knew the names of any Liberal parliamentarians or candidates “at risk of being compromised” by foreign interference.

“Yes. And for other parties as well, because I have access to large amounts of information,” answered Trudeau, who added he had not mentioned it earlier because the last round of public hearings at the commission had focused on issues within the Liberal Party.

Stalled Memos and Reports

The large amounts of information the prime minister has access to, and what has actually been provided to him, was a key focus of the inquiry in the latest phase as it evaluated the flow of information within government.

Trudeau confirmed that three memos from 2019, 2020, and 2022 suggesting unclassified briefings be provided to parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference had never reached him. The initiative to provide briefings eventually happened in June 2024, after a string of intelligence leaks in the media and the launch of the public inquiry.

“Should this have happened earlier? And are you troubled that it didn’t?” asked commission counsel Shantona Chaudhury.

“These decision points didn’t get to me, but I made it very clear throughout conversations that I would have approved of or encouraged briefings of parliamentarians,” said Trudeau.

“Nobody—neither CSIS through their minister to me, or directly to the Clerk [of the Privy Council], or to the NSIA—flagged that this was something that was of importance to them that was stalled, and therefore, as you pointed out, they were not acted on in my office.”

The prime minister was also asked about comprehensive reports on Beijing interference produced by CSIS and the Privy Council Office (PCO) that never reached him, with the NSIA at the time deciding the prime minister didn’t need to see them.

Trudeau said he trusted the NSIA’s judgment on the matter and that he had not learned anything new from the reports after subsequently reading them.

“None of them significantly altered, or altered at all my perception of China’s behaviour, China’s focus, China’s engagement, influence, and in some cases, interference in Canada, to any significant degree,” he said.
Former CSIS director David Vigneault told the inquiry on Sept. 27 his agency’s report contained “exquisite intelligence” on Beijing interference and that he expected it would have been briefed to the prime minister.

Delayed Warrant

Trudeau was also asked a question about a controversial surveillance warrant application which had been delayed in the spring of 2021, but counsel for the attorney general raised an objection on national security grounds.

The warrant filed by CSIS has been discussed at length during the proceedings as the commission sought to understand why it took 54 days for then-Public Safety Minister Bill Blair to approve it.

CSIS sent the warrant application to public safety sometime in March 2021. Four days later it was approved by then-deputy minister Rob Stewart, who subsequently sent it to the minister’s office. Blair’s then-chief of staff Zita Astravas did not present the warrant to Blair for signature for 50 days.

Blair, Stewart, and Astravas testified to the inquiry and neither could fully explain the delay. It usually takes between four to 10 days for the minister to approve a warrant, which is then sent to a Federal Court judge for review. The commission heard that Blair had approve two separate warrants during the same time period.
CSIS officials told the inquiry the delay was unusual and had left operational staff “very frustrated.” One unidentified CSIS official expressed a concern the warrant was in “danger” of not being approved after the agency had met with Astravas, according to an internal email summarized by the commission.
The subject of the warrant has not been disclosed in the latest round of public hearings at the commission due to national security considerations, but past intelligence leaks and related comments by Blair to the inquiry in April identify the subject as current Markham deputy mayor and former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister Michael Chan.

Previous media coverage based on intelligence leaks suggested Chan was a subject of CSIS interest because of his links to Chinese officials. He has not returned requests for comment.

Chan previously told The Globe and Mail that CSIS has “never discussed their concerns with me but continues to unjustifiably harass, intimidate, threaten, and frighten my friends and acquaintances.”

The Foreign Interference Commission is required to submit its final report before the end of the year.