Chinese Warship Drill Prompts Call for Australia to Build Its Own ‘Iron Dome’ Missile Shield

Recent live fire exercises by PLA Navy warships in the Tasman Sea have exposed an ‘obvious’ problem, says Michael Shoebridge.
Chinese Warship Drill Prompts Call for Australia to Build Its Own ‘Iron Dome’ Missile Shield
The Iron Dome air-defense system fires to intercept a rocket over the city of Ashdod, Israel, on July 8, 2014. Ilia Yefimovich/Getty Images
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Australia must develop its own land-based missile defence systems similar to those protecting Israel and Ukraine as it can no longer rely on distance to avoid attack, according to defence expert Michael Shoebridge of Strategic Analysis Australia (SAA).

“Australia’s geography no longer protects our population or key infrastructure from military threats,” says the co-author of a new paper, The Defence of Australia: A Blueprint for the Next Government (pdf).
Recent live fire exercises conducted by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand exposed an “obvious and urgent homeland defence problem.”

The trio of vessels named Task Group 107, include the heavily armed Renhai-class cruiser (named Zunyi), a Jiangkai-class frigate (Hengyang), and the Fuchi-class replenishment vessel Weishanhu.

Shoebridge says these ships have long-range anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles that pose risks to ships and aircraft. But they also have the capability to attack targets on land.

Added to that is the threat of drones, and long-range missiles that can be launched from Asia to hit Australia.

‘Iron Dome’ Australian Version

SAA recommends that Australia adopt “a greatly expanded, layered air and missile defence program to protect bases and key civilian infrastructure and to have some capacity to be sited at key population centres.”

The government must go beyond protecting military bases and assets “because it will be simply unacceptable ... for the Australian population and broader economic infrastructure to be defenceless while our citizens watch our military remaining safe and secure,” he warns.

While successive governments have already spent billions of dollars on upgrading defence sites across Australia, they are focused on replacing “degraded and aged-out buildings, services, and facilities and accommodating the next generation of ships, aircraft, and vehicles.”

Nothing has been done to ensure they can withstand missile and drone strikes that could disable them and destroy hugely expensive weapon systems.

“Orders must be placed for Australian counter-drone systems and longer-lead systems like the U.S. Patriot missile defence system.  Rapid negotiations are needed to bring successful Israeli systems like Iron Dome and Arrow to Australia, where they can address real protection needs.”

Dual-Use Facilities Across Australia’s North

Shoebridge also calls for military forces to be able to disperse quickly across civilian ports, airfields, and facilities, and to have the means to turn existing facilities—that support mining and resource sectors—into dual-use sites.

“Our view is that the growing risk of regional conflict later this decade means that Australia no longer has the luxury to plan ‘green fields’ developments of airfields and naval ports as the solution to increasing ADF and allied challenges in northern Australia,” Shoebridge wrote.

Australian Army Fuel specialists from the 1st Combat Service Support Battalion work alongside Petroleum Operators from UK's Commando Logistics Regiment to refuel Battle Group Tiger vehicles at Timber Creek, Northern Territory, during Exercise Predator's Run 2024. Courtesy ADF.
Australian Army Fuel specialists from the 1st Combat Service Support Battalion work alongside Petroleum Operators from UK's Commando Logistics Regiment to refuel Battle Group Tiger vehicles at Timber Creek, Northern Territory, during Exercise Predator's Run 2024. Courtesy ADF.

Fuel Supplies Still An Issue

Since the ADF will remain powered by fossil fuels until at least 2050, SAA recommends that all the sites from which the military would operate during a conflict—both ADF bases and private facilities—have expanded diesel and aviation gas storage.

Australia currently has only enough liquid fuels onshore to last approximately one month.

Addressing that vulnerability “involves new spending on fuel storage as well as investments in road and rail transport networks, particularly for Australia’s northern bases, ports, and airfields,” it says, warning that “if Australia’s tiny liquid fuel reserves and limited refining capacity are not addressed, [its military operations] will be able to be brought to a standstill weeks into any major war or crisis.”

Lift Defence Budget to 3 Percent

But even that will not be enough.

The government also needs to invest in onshore refining of the two key fuels for transport and military use—diesel and aviation gas—at levels that would ensure the nation and its Defence Force could remain operational during a prolonged conflict.

Strategic Analysis Australia says achieving the goals outlined in the report would require lifting the defence budget from the current 2 percent, not to 2.4 percent over time as is currently planned, but to 3percent over a much shorter timeframe.

Rex Widerstrom
Rex Widerstrom
Author
Rex Widerstrom is a New Zealand-based reporter with over 40 years of experience in media, including radio and print. He is currently a presenter for Hutt Radio.