“Foreign interference is not done by just one country. However, China currently stands out as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada,” reads the report released on May 3.
The report also notes that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) views China as “the biggest threat to the Canadian electoral space by a significant margin.”
It adds that although the interference didn’t change which party formed government after the 2019 and 2021 elections, it may have impacted results in a small number of ridings.
It noted, however, that the interference undermined public trust in elections.
“Foreign interference in 2019 and 2021 undermined the right of voters to have an electoral ecosystem free from coercion or covert influence,” wrote Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who is heading the inquiry as commissioner.
Foreign Interference
The report identifies China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) as a key tool used by Beijing to interfere and influence politicians in favour of the regime.“The UFWD blurs the lines between foreign influence and foreign interference. It engages in clandestine, deceptive, and threatening activity around the world, often by leveraging influence and exerting control over some diaspora communities,” the report says.
Besides attempting to influence the diaspora community, Beijing also target groups in Canada that are persecuted or targeted by China, such as Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and supporters of Taiwanese independence, the report says.
“Globally, China is recognized as using foreign interference as a common tool to advance its own interests and has been assessed by Canadian authorities as the most active foreign state actor engaged in interference directed at government officials, political organizations, candidates for political office, and diaspora communities.”
China uses a variety of tools in its quest to interfere in Canada to its advantage, the report notes, including Canada-based proxies.
“These tools include the monitoring of diaspora communities and transnational repression; activities meant to impact the outcome of Canadian democratic processes (including providing financial support to preferred candidates); and clandestinely shaping narratives in support of PRC strategic interests,” it says.
“The PRC also uses a range of actors. These include PRC officials in Canada, Canadian-based proxies, and bodies of both the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) and the PRC.”
Additionally, the report says China does not have a preference for any Canadian political party, but rather supports positions that it views as pro-China, “regardless of the political affiliation of a particular candidate.”
“The PRC [People’s Republic of China] takes a long-term approach to influence operations. It invests in developing relationships through both overt and covert means, in order to build cooperation over time,” it says.
“It uses incentives given to individuals or persons who are close to them, such as paid trips, business opportunities, prestigious invitations, or political support (including financial support). It also uses disincentives, such as visa denials, harassment and intimidation both of individuals as well as PRC-based family members, economic coercion and community isolation.”
In addition, the report says, Beijing controls Chinese-language media and social-media applications and uses them to influence the diaspora community.
“This influence extends beyond China-based media that may be read in Canada, and extends to influence over some Canada-based Chinese-language media. The PRC uses this influence to promote pro-PRC narratives, spread disinformation, and suppress anti-China content,” it says
Despite Russia being identified as another country carrying out foreign interference against Western countries, the report says Russia does not see Canada as a priority target. “While Russia had the means to engage in foreign interference in Canadian elections, it appears to lack the intent to do so,” it says.
The report also says India may have attempted to provide financial support to preferred candidates in the 2021 election, particularly those aligned with the Indian government’s position on the Khalistan independence movement. Iran and Pakistan are also identified in the report as playing lesser roles in foreign interference in Canada.
Commissioner Hogue said when it came to determining involvement of certain individuals in acts of foreign interference or their knowledge of them, she avoided making findings based on intelligence alone, as the individuals may not have had a “meaningful opportunity” to respond to the allegations.
2019 Election
The report notes there is intelligence that 11 political candidates in the 2019 election—seven Liberals and four Conservatives—as well as 13 political staff members, had a “connection (witting or unwitting)” with threat actors, and that some of them may have received financial support from China.The report cites intelligence that there were two transfers of funds totalling around $250,000 from Chinese officials in Canada “possibly for foreign interference-related purposes.” It says the transfers were done via an influential community leader, who was a staff member of one of the candidates, to an Ontario MPP.
The commission examined reported irregularities during the September 2019 Don Valley North Liberal nomination contest. The inquiry was shown intelligence documents that said international students were bused to the riding to take part in the nomination vote, given fake documents by a known PRC proxy agent, and coerced into supporting Han Dong’s nomination. Mr. Dong went on to win the contest and become the Liberal MP in that riding, and winning the election again in 2021.
“Available intelligence respecting the 2019 Liberal nomination contest [in Don Valley North] reflects a well-grounded suspicion that the busing of international students was tied to the PRC,” the report says. It adds that Mr. Dong denies any involvement in these incidents.
“Given that DVN was considered a ‘safe’ Liberal seat, this would likely not have impacted which party won the seat. It could, however, have impacted who was elected to Parliament. This is significant.”
The report notes that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was informed of this intelligence, but that he didn’t feel the reports were “sufficiently credible” to remove Mr. Dong, and decided to review the matter after the election.
Commissioner Hogue wrote that given the information she was provided with at the inquiry, the eligibility criteria for voting in Liberal nomination contests did “not seem very stringent, and the control measures in place do not seem very robust.”
Under Liberal Party rules, those aged 14 and older can vote for nomination candidates, even if they are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
2021 Election
The report says that then-Conservative Leader Erin O'Toole, whose campaign included a comprehensive plan to counter Beijing’s threat, was a target of disinformation attacks in the 2021 election, as was Conservative MP Kenny Chiu who was running for re-election in his B.C. riding, and had been outspoken against Beijing’s rights violations. Mr. Chiu lost the 2021 election.The report says Mr. Chiu attempted to counter the false narratives against him, “but his messaging was not picked up or circulated by Chinese-language outlets.”
Confronting the Threat
Commissioner Hogue said that there is a need to take a closer look at foreign interference threats in Canada to prevent “hostile state actors from achieving their goals.”“To achieve this, we need better communication and collaboration between various players,” she wrote.
She also said the government must re-establish trust in Canada’s democratic processes by “informing the public of the threat of foreign interference, and by taking real and concrete steps to detect, deter and counter it.”
Commissioner Hogue said the next phase of the commission’s work involves examining how the public can be kept informed of foreign interference threats, how intelligence and information about foreign interference should be communicated to the government and those who could be vulnerable, and “rules, or lack of rules” governing nomination contests.
“Our inquiry has shown that these contests are particularly vulnerable to foreign interference,” the report says.
The inquiry’s final report is due before Dec. 31, 2024.
