Beijing is targeting Canadian political aides in the hope of covertly influencing their bosses by controlling event schedules, shaping talking points, and handling requests from community groups, according to newly released documents.
“Staffers control schedules and often act as ‘gatekeepers’ for their employers; these staff are thereby placed in positions where they can clandestinely and deceptively control and influence the activities of elected and appointed officials in ways that support PRC or CCP [Chinese Communist Party] interests,” said the report, which was first covered by Blacklock’s Reporter.
The potential for staffers to influence officials manifests in several ways, such as preventing certain community groups’ requests from being seen, framing talking points to align with Beijing’s narratives, or organizing public events at locations favourable to PRC interests, such as businesses owned by a Chinese proxy or culturally significant sites like city halls or legislative buildings, CSIS said.
CSIS noted that political aides do not need to be known China supporters to become targets; rather, “the CCP will also seek to co-opt those who do not openly oppose or speak out against the PRC or the Party.” CSIS said aides are then persuaded to adopt Beijing-friendly positions and speak out against a broad range of what the regime perceives as “anti-PRC” actions, such as raising human rights concerns or travelling to Taiwan in an official capacity.
“Local community networks are a key vector for facilitating FI [foreign interference] activities. For example, PRC officials often conduct FI activities through local networks that are tied to—but not necessarily directed by—[PRC officials] on a regular basis,” said the March 25 briefing.
The key components of the Beijing-led foreign influence networks include “staff of targeted candidates [and] elected officials,” as well as Chinese officials in Canada, leaders of local Chinese-Canadian community groups, and Canadian political candidates or officials themselves, according to the SITE task force.
“This network structure—used for interference at all levels of government—enables an adaptable, resilient approach to extending and enabling PRC covert influence,” CSIS said in the assessment.
The summary said that prior to the 2019 election, a group 11 federal candidates and at least 13 aides were “assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by” China-linked threat actors in Canada, including PRC officials. The summary noted that some of these targeted individuals “appeared willing to cooperate in FI-related activity while others appeared to be unaware of potential FI-related activity due to its clandestine nature.”
“In one example, intelligence reports indicate that officials from the PRC met with political staffers and specifically conveyed their expectation that the staffers screen their candidate’s attendance at certain events, such as those hosted by Taiwanese officials,” the summary said.
“Political staffers are important points of contact because they are part of the information flow process to elected officials and often influence the schedule of events that a candidate attends.”
