Beijing Likely Targeted MP Chong With ‘Coordinated’ Disinformation Campaign, Says Global Affairs

Conservative MP for Wellington-Halton Hills Michael Chong votes against a motion of privilege on the Intimidation campaign against members of Parliament in the House of Commons, in Ottawa, on May 9, 2023. The Canadian Press/Adrian Wyld

A “coordinated network” of disinformation was launched against Conservative MP Michael Chong on a Chinese social media platform just days after the Canadian media reported a warning from Canada’s intelligence agency that the MP and his family had been targeted by the Chinese regime.

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) identified an “information operation targeting Michael Chong” on the widely-used social media platform WeChat in May. The observation came about as the department was monitoring the digital information ecosystem for the June 19 by-election.

“Between May 4 and 13, 2023, a coordinated network of WeChat’s news accounts featured, shared and amplified a large volume of false or misleading narratives about Mr. Chong," GAC stated in a press release issued on Aug. 9.

“Most of the activity was targeted at spreading false narratives about his identity, including commentary and claims about his background, political stances and family’s heritage.”

GAC noted that it did not observe anything that posed a threat to the safety of Mr. Chong or his family. After working with other departments over the ensuing months to review and assess the information, a briefing was offered to Mr. Chong on Aug. 9.

The threat against the MP came days after the Globe and Mail published an article on May 1, that cited a top-secret assessment from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The agency revealed that the Chinese regime had targeted the MP over his sponsorship of a motion in 2021 in the House of Commons to declare the treatment of Uyghurs in China as genocide.

CSIS Director David Vigneault, subsequently confirmed to Mr. Chong that his family members living in Hong Kong had been targeted by Beijing in 2021.

“This is another serious example of the communist government in Beijing attempting to interfere in our democracy by targeting elected officials,” Mr. Chong told The Epoch Times in an emailed statement on Aug. 9.

Mr. Chong, who is his party’s foreign affairs critic, said while he appreciated the government’s prompt response in informing him of the disinformation campaign against him, more needs to be done to address the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) interference in Canada.

“This situation also again proves that we need an open, independent public inquiry into foreign interference and we need it now.”

The MP, who represents Ontario’s Wellington—Halton Hills riding, has made repeated calls for Ottawa to launch a public inquiry into Chinese interference in the country.

Media reports over the past year have highlighted Beijing’s numerous influence activities in Canada, including meddling in two federal elections, operating local secret police stations, and intimidating and harassing dissidents.

‘Foreign Information Manipulation’

GAC detected the disinformation network through Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which monitors the digital information environment for threats against Canadian democracy.

The network had displayed several instances of “foreign information manipulation and interference,” such as coordinated content and timing, highly suspicious and abnormal shifts in the volume and scope of engagement, and the concealment of state involvement, according to GAC.

GAC said that a third of the network was comprised of recognizable state-media outlets and accounts that are likely linked to China’s state apparatus, while two-thirds were anonymous, with no prior Canadian political news posts. The department acknowledged that connections between state media and Chinese authorities “may be opaque.”

An RRM analysis suggested a high likelihood of Chinese state involvement, the GAC said. It added that it is “not possible” to determine unequivocally that China ordered and directed the operation due to the covert nature of how social media networks are leveraged in this type of information campaign.

Furthermore, the accounts responsible for disseminating articles against Mr. Chong showed a pattern of “engaging with content simultaneously on specific occasions.” This would increase the chances of WeChat users seeing the false narratives.

RRM Canada also found that those narratives about Mr. Chong had violated WeChat’s user code of conduct, with there being no signs of the platform applying its content moderation standards to these posts.

Condemning Canada

Among the state-backed media that published articles against Mr. Chong on their WeChat accounts is zhonghongwang.com, a media outlet supervised by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission under the State Council.

Apart from targeting Mr. Chong, the series of articles that emerged on WeChat throughout May, also blasted Canada for expelling Zhao Wei, a Chinese diplomat reportedly involved in threatening Mr. Chong’s family in Hong Kong. Mr. Wei, who previously worked in China’s Toronto consulate, was declared persona non grata on May 8 after the Globe report was published.

Some articles on WeChat applauded Chinese authorities for their immediate retaliation against Canada following Mr. Wei’s expulsion. Beijing expelled Jennifer Lynn Lalonde, consul in the Canadian consulate in Shanghai, on May 9. These articles repeated a statement from the Chinese embassy that refuted allegations of its involvement in foreign interference and accused Canada of “smearing.”

Noé Chartier and Peter Wilson contributed to this report