Beijing Disinformation Campaign Against MP Was Caught Inadvertently, Commission Hears

Conservative MP Michael Chong leaves the Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions after appearing as a witness, in Ottawa on April 3, 2024. The Canadian Press/Adrian Wyld

A probable Beijing-directed disinformation campaign targeting Tory MP Michael Chong was inadvertently detected by Global Affairs Canada as the department was temporarily turning its sights inward to protect byelections against foreign meddling.

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) official Robin Wettlaufer told the Foreign Interference Commission on Oct. 4 that it’s “possible” the disinformation campaign wouldn’t have been detected outside an electoral period.

Wettlaufer is the director of the Centre for International Digital Policy within GAC, which houses the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) tasked with monitoring state-sponsored disinformation. The RRM is normally focused on the foreign online space but directs its resources domestically when a general election or a byelection takes place.

GAC had disclosed in August 2023 the existence of a disinformation campaign against MP Chong on Chinese social media app WeChat, which took place in early May 2023. The department assessed it was “highly probable” that Beijing was behind the campaign, which spread false narratives against Chong.

At the time, the RRM was scanning for threats pertaining to three bylections scheduled for June 2023.

Concurrently, intelligence leaks about Beijing meddling were appearing in the media, including one report in The Globe and Mail on May 1, 2023, about Chong being a target of the Chinese regime. This led GAC to expel a Chinese diplomat reportedly involved in the scheme a week later.

The RRM said the WeChat information operation against Chong had taken place between May 4 and May 13, 2023, and coincided with the expulsion of the Chinese diplomat.

Fraser Harland, counsel for MP Chong at the inquiry, asked Wettlaufer whether the only way to detect such disinformation campaigns is to conduct consistent monitoring of domestic social media at all times.

“I think there’s recognition that it is something that collectively as the Government of Canada we would like to be doing,” said Wettlaufer, mentioning there are broader discussions taking place on the issue.

Wettlaufer said the RRM is monitoring WeChat outside Canada on an ongoing basis. She also said that if a major disinformation campaign were to take place during the next election, the RRM would likely be able to detect it.

WeChat is a social media platform widely used by the Chinese community. The app also allows for instant messaging and mobile payment.

WeChat Campaigns

A joint intelligence assessment by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Privy Council Office on Beijing’s hold on Chinese-language media in Canada, says that WeChat is one of the top online news providers in the Chinese language.

The assessment, dated July 2023 and entered as evidence at the inquiry, says news content on WeChat is censored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) according to domestic standards. It mentions open-source estimates suggesting there are over one million WeChat users in Canada.

This widespread use facilitates CCP “surveillance, repression, and influence over overseas Chinese,” says the assessment. WeChat’s platform design can also “exacerbate the spread of [redacted] disinformation and misinformation that serves” CCP interests.

Wettlaufer said the RRM has not witnessed WeChat disinformation campaigns in byelections since the 2021 general election.

A CSIS representative testifying anonymously at the inquiry on the same panel as Wettlaufer, said there had not been a “heavy Chinese footprint” in the demographic makeup of the ridings that held byelections in recent years.

The impact of disinformation shared on WeChat in the 2021 election was tackled during the previous public hearings phase of the commission. The cases of former Tory leader Erin O'Toole and former Tory MP Kenny Chiu were reviewed, as both were targeted by social media campaigns for their stances on China.

The federal election security task force SITE said in a post-election report it had observed online activities aimed at discouraging Chinese Canadians from supporting O'Toole and Chiu.

SITE said that while it didn’t have clear evidence the online activity was a foreign interference campaign directed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it had “observed indicators of potential coordination between various Canada-based Chinese language news outlets as well as PRC and CCP news outlets.”

Meanwhile, a 2023 CSIS written briefing destined for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said the particularities of the campaign “all suggest that these efforts were orchestrated or directed by the PRC.”

The commission is slated to conclude its current hearing phase on Oct. 16, with Trudeau testifying that day. The commission’s final report must be provided to the government before the end of the year.