As Foreign Interference Concerns Grow, CSIS Seeks to Share Intel With Domestic Partners Beyond Feds

A sign for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service building in Ottawa, in a file photo. Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is seeking authority to disclose sensitive information to domestic entities outside the federal government in order to enhance protection for provinces, cities, and universities, among others. The move comes amid growing concerns over the potential misuse of advanced technologies for espionage and foreign interference.

In a recent public consultation paper, CSIS invited input on proposed changes to the CSIS Act, which outlines the mandates and powers of the federal intelligence agency. The paper addresses increasing concerns about threats posed by foreign actors exploiting technologies beyond Canadian borders. Foreign actors are increasingly targeting human rights activists, dissidents, and other sectors of Canadian civil society, which the agency said have limited access to federal intelligence assessments.

“Today, foreign interference impacts every level of government and all sectors of society, including Canadian communities, academia, the media, and private enterprises. CSIS' expertise and intelligence are increasingly relevant to those outside of the federal government, and these partners turn to CSIS more than ever for information,” the paper states.

“While national security remains a federal responsibility, it is clear that countering foreign interference requires a whole-of-society effort.”

The intelligence agency highlighted constraints in sharing assessments with domestic partners due to limitations outlined in the CSIS Act. The agency notes that the act was written in the early 1980s “when national security was strictly the purview of the federal government,” and that the use of digital technologies that enable and enhance threats from foreign interests was not foreseeable.

“The CSIS Act does not provide CSIS with sufficient authority to disclose classified intelligence to domestic partners outside the Government of Canada,” the consultation paper stated.

“This means that CSIS generally cannot share relevant information with provinces, territories, Indigenous governments, or municipalities, except in limited situations, such as for the purposes of law enforcement or when they can take action that would reduce a specific threat further to CSIS' threat reduction mandate.”

The paper added that prohibitions on disclosure “also limit how CSIS can share relevant information with private sector and academic institutions.”

Increasing Concerns

In a public appearance alongside his fellow Five Eyes counterparts in October, CSIS Director David Vigneault cautioned about threats to Canadian innovation, intellectual property, and academic institutions posed by state actors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

“We see the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party passing legislation to force any person of Chinese origin anywhere in the world to support their intelligence service,” he said. “It means they have ways of [coercing] people here, in each of our countries, anywhere, to essentially tell them and give them the secrets that you know.”

In October, Global Affairs Canada reported a “spamouflage campaign” targeting Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, ConservativeLeader Pierre Poilievre, and dozens of MPs. The campaign used networks of recently created or compromised social media accounts to disseminate and amplify propaganda messages across various platforms.

In January 2022, CSIS told The Globe and Mail that agency officials were briefing parliamentarians “to promote awareness of foreign interference” and “to strengthen individual security practices.” A senior government official also told the media outlet that CSIS has a list of MPs and senators it believes should be aware of Chinese influence activities.

The agency expressed increasing concern over efforts by Beijing and its agents to cultivate ties with elected Canadian officials, with the aim of influencing parliamentary debates and government decision-making, the Globe article said.

Vancouver NDP MP Jenny Kwan told the media outlet at the time that CSIS briefed her both before and after the 2021 federal election and that the main focus was China. Ms. Kwan is a vocal critic of Beijing’s human rights abuses.

A public inquiry into foreign interference in Canada’s federal elections is scheduled to begin hearings on Jan. 29, 2024. The public inquiry follows widespread reports of China’s alleged meddling in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Collect Information Outside Canada

In addition to sharing intelligence with domestic partners, CSIS is seeking the power to collect, from within Canada, information about foreign states, and foreign persons residing in Canada, when that information is located outside the country.

As outlined in Section 16 of the CSIS Act, the agency is authorized to collect intelligence only specifically “within Canada” relating to foreign states and foreign individuals in Canada who CSIS suspects may be involved in foreign interference activities.

But technological advances have prevented the agency from being able to access some of this information. For example, if a foreigner in Canada being tracked by CSIS uses voicemail or e-mail services, such as Google’s Gmail, where data is stored on servers outside the country, CSIS is currently barred from collecting that information, The Globe and Mail reported on Dec. 28.

Section 16 does have provisions that allow CSIS, at the request of the foreign affairs minister or defence minister, to launch probes that can examine any foreigner, foreign corporation, or foreign state “within Canada.” However, a 2018 Federal Court ruling said that the “within Canada” wording means CSIS cannot pursue digital evidence outside Canada in these cases, according to the Globe article.