Burma (also known as Myanmar) is in the news for many reasons these days, and China runs like an underlying thread through almost all of them: its intensifying civil war, the mediation process, or more broadly, the politics, foreign policy, trade, defense or the neighbors of the southeast Asian country.
Burma has been engulfed in civil war since a junta led by army general Min Aung Hlaing ousted the elected government in February 2021, resisted by a loosely organized group of rebels. Since last October, when three of the armed groups allied, the junta has seen increasing losses.
In a report released May 30, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) described the course of conflict over the past two years as “expanding resistance control versus corresponding military junta losses.”
Despite the ongoing conflict, China continues to pursue its interests and investments in Burma.
In a recent development, on May 23, amidst escalating fighting on the border, Burma’s ministry of information announced the creation of a new leadership committee to push forward the construction of the huge, Beijing-backed Myitsone Dam.
The hydropower project on the Irrawaddy River in Burma’s northern state of Kachin has been halted for over a decade due to massive public protests. Not even the 2020 visit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping to the country could revive the project.
Environmentalists said the dam would disrupt villages in the region and upset the ecology of the river, one of the country’s most vital water resources. Other opponents questioned an arrangement in which China would take 90 percent of the dam’s power.
The information ministry notice said the group would handle public relations for the project in collaboration with the leadership of China’s SPIC Yunnan International Power Investment company.
The Epoch Times spoke with southeast Asian analyst Shristi Pukhrem about China’s stake in Burma, how its footprint in the nation impacts regional geo-politics, and how it is being countered by the United States and others, including India and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. Ms. Pukhrem is deputy director of academics and research at the New Delhi-based India Foundation.
Ms. Pukhrem has also served as a visiting scholar at the ASEAN Studies Centre, Chulalongkorn University at Bangkok. She’s also currently a QUAD Fellow and Alumni in the International Visitor Leadership Program of the US State Department on “Enhancing Regional Maritime Goverance and Cooperation in the QUAD.
She said, “China’s stakes in Myanmar’s civil war are significant, driven by economic, strategic, and security interests. Economically, China has invested heavily in Myanmar through the Belt and Road Initiative, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and pipelines critical for energy security and regional trade.”
The $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project is essential to the implementation of Xi’s China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is part of BRI, according the expert.
In Burma, BRI—also called the Yunnan-Rakhine Corridor or the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—first connects Yunnan with Mandalay in central Burma, then southward to Yangon and finally southwest to Burma’s Rakhine state. It’s the second economic corridor China is developing with a single country under BRI, the first being the China-Pakistan economic corridor.
Rakhine extends along Burma’s west coast, facing the Andaman Sea. It has become the host of China’s two largest investment projects in the country: the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines.
The ownership agreement for the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port was signed by Xi Jinping just before the COVID-19 pandemic began in January 2020.
The Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, meanwhile, has been operational since May 2013. It is considered China’s fourth-largest energy transportation route after central Asian pipelines, maritime transport, and Sino-Russia pipelines. The new route was built to bypass the pirate-infested Malacca straits and shortens by 700 miles the distance oil must travel by sea to reach China.
Ms. Pukhrem called China “an opportunist” and said that despite the conflict and the impending crisis, particularly in the north, Burma’s natural resources continue to be vital for Chinese industries. They represent key economic interests while geopolitically, China seeks to counterbalance India’s influence in southeast Asia by maintaining its stability initiatives in Burma.
“Security concerns are paramount due to the shared border. Instability can lead to refugee flows and cross-border crime, potentially destabilizing China’s border regions. Additionally, several ethnic armed groups in Myanmar have historical ties with China, which Beijing manages to prevent excessive destabilization and to use as leverage over Myanmar’s government,” she said.
Operation 1027
Operation 1027 was a coordinated operation between three resistance forces, dubbed the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. It was launched on Oct. 27, 2023 against the military junta and its State Administration Council in Burma’s northern Shan State, along the Chinese border.The two-month long coordinated operation launched concurrent attacks against the Burmese Army, police force, and other military installations along the border with China, capturing significant territory. Junta spokesman Zaw Min Tun accepted his military’s defeat in several sectors in the Shan state, including the crucial border town of Chinshwehaw, on Nov. 1, 2023.
Operation 1027 has exacerbated instability, Ms. Pukhrem said, leading to potential refugee influxes into Yunnan province, straining local resources and security. However there are other angles to the situation. If China wanted to stop the crisis, it would have done so initially, but it let it happen because of its own frustration with the military junta.
“Cross-border trade disruptions harm economic interests, including Chinese investments in infrastructure and natural resource extraction. Additionally, increased military activity and conflict near the border pose risks of spillover violence, affecting China’s border security,” she said, adding that it is obvious that China wants to protects its investments.
Beijing wants to ensure that Burma remains a cooperative neighbor that supports China’s regional initiatives like BRI. China’s ideological stance of pragmatism is also influenced by its relationships with both the Burmese military (the Tatmadaw) and various ethnic armed groups, she said.
“It is also part of the large 105-mile Trade Zone used by Myanmar to export its agricultural produce to China. Following the takeover of the Kyin San Kyawt border gate, the rebels burnt 120 trucks out of the 258-vehicle convoy bringing goods from China,” Mr. Jyoti wrote.
“The above instances might create a picture that Operation 1027 has been detrimental to Chinese interests in Myanmar, but there is another angle to it. China has been known to exert significant influence over the insurgent groups operating along the borders,” he added.“Despite that, China did not wield that influence during the initial stages of the ongoing crisis, because China was frustrated with the Junta’s Border Guard Forces (BGF) and its inability to crack down on the illegal telecom fraudsters and gambling organisations operating along the border, scamming thousands of Chinese nationals.”
At the onset of Operation 1027, Mr. Jyoti said, the 3BTA justified its onslaught by saying that one of its prime objectives was to shut down BGF-supported scammers—which they called Min Aung Hlaing’s “drug army”—in the border region.
“These incidents led to an impression among the Junta loyalists that China had tacitly supported the insurgency in the North, leading to widespread anti-China protests in Yangon and Naypyidaw,” he said.
Brokering a Ceasefire
China brokered an “immediate ceasefire” between the Burmese military junta and the 3BTA during two-day talks in January. The talks took place in the Chinese city of Kunming, the capital of China’s southwestern Yunnan province, which borders Burma.“The two sides agreed to implement the ceasefire immediately, the military personnel will disengage and the two sides will address relevant disputes and concerns through peaceful negotiation. The two sides promised not to undermine the safety of Chinese people living in the border area and Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar,” she said in reply to a question.
The ceasefire brought a near end to the fighting in Shan state.
Ms. Pukhrem said China holds significant leverage over Myanmar’s economy and its role as a mediator in the peace process was highlighted by its brokering a ceasefire deal.
China has maintained relationships with both the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) and various ethnic armed groups by offering support and mediation. This dual engagement strategy ensures that China retains influence regardless of which faction holds power.
“By positioning itself as a neutral arbiter, China strengthens its diplomatic influence and ensures that it remains a key player in Myanmar’s political landscape,” she said.
The “opportunist” Chinese regime thus ensures its interest irrespective of the situation and irrespective of who rules Myanmar while it continues to expand its investments in the conflic-torn country’s infrastructure and natural resources.
“Ultimately, China seeks to solidify its position as the most influential external stakeholder in Myanmar, using a combination of economic leverage, diplomatic mediation, and strategic partnerships to shape the country’s political and economic trajectory,” said Ms. Pukhrem.
The analyst said because of China’s proximity and substantial investments, it has more leverage in Burma than other geopolitical players in southeast Asia, such as the ASEAN countries.
“ASEAN countries, while important, do not match China’s level of economic engagement in Myanmar,” she said. “ASEAN, despite its regional mandate, struggles with internal divisions and a lack of cohesive policy, which weakens its diplomatic influence. ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making can hinder decisive action.”
The leaders of nine ASEAN member states and Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing agreed to a “five point consensus” on April 24, 2021. The consensus included the appointment of a special envoy and his visit to Burma to meet with all parties.
Ms. Pukhrem said ASEAN can play a complementary role in the mediation process. However, it can’t overcome Chinese influence and one of the best paths forward for it may involve collaborating with India.
