200 Chinese Students Bused-In for Han Dong: New Details Emerge on Beijing Interference

Han Dong appears as a witness at the Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions in Ottawa on April 2, 2024. (Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press)

The committee of parliamentarians in charge of reviewing security matters has released additional details about Beijing interference in the nomination of MP Han Dong, including the number of Chinese students who potentially fraudulently voted for him.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) released its “Special Report on Foreign Interference“ on June 3. The report, based on approximately 4,000 documents from relevant departments, mentions how some officials have ”wittingly” assisted foreign states after getting elected.

Mr. Dong is not mentioned in that context, but the report devotes a section to his Liberal Party nomination win in the Don Valley North (DVN) riding of Toronto in 2019. Mr. Dong won the nomination in a closely disputed race.

The case study says that according to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “had a significant impact in getting Han Dong nominated.”

The report adds that “Many of Mr. Dong’s supporters arrived in buses [redacted] supported by the PRC: between 175 and 200 international Chinese students arrived in several buses.”

It also says the Chinese consulate in Toronto “knowingly broke” the Liberal Party rules that voters in nomination contests must live in the riding. The rules allow non-Canadians over 14 to vote.

A summary of a redaction applied to the case study says the students reportedly “lived outside of the riding; were provided with fraudulent residency paper work; and sought to physically intimidate voters and distribute pro-Dong materials, contrary to Party rules.”

Mr. Dong has not been responding to inquiries from The Epoch Times. The MP, now sitting as an Independent, told the Foreign Interference Commission a few weeks back that he was unaware of the irregularities.

In supplemental evidence provided to the inquiry, Mr. Dong said he “does not know whether all those students voted for him, but believes it is likely most did because he visited the school as part of his nomination campaign and encouraged students to support his candidacy by volunteering and/or registering as Liberal party members if they were eligible.”

Scrutiny

The DVN nomination case came under intense scrutiny during the public hearings of the commission, but such details as revealed by NSICOP did not surface.

The assessment that CSIS saw Beijing have a “significant impact” in the contest was not communicated, nor were the number of alleged Chinese students involved or that they sought to physically intimidate voters.

Classified information held by CSIS was made public to the commission in the form of a summary of intelligence with details and identifiers removed.

The language used is more reserved, saying that “irregularities in the nomination [...] may have included activities undertaken by individuals close to PRC Officials.” The summary adds that Chinese students had been provided with fake documents to vote and that the Consulate threatened to cancel their student visas if they didn’t support Mr. Dong.

The commission, which has access to unredacted documents like NSICOP, also heard from different stakeholders involved in the nomination contest and related events, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

Mr. Trudeau was briefed about the intelligence on DVN irregularities before the 2019 election but chose to keep Mr. Dong as a federal candidate. He told the commission on April 10 the information was not sufficient to overturn a democratic event.

Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue wrote in her May 3 interim report that it is not the inquiry’s mandate to determine what actually happened in DVN in 2019, and that she “would not be able to do so on the record before me in any event.”

Ms. Hogue did remark, however, that the “incident” is a prime example of how nomination contests can be “gateways for foreign states who wish to interfere in our democratic processes.”

Nominations

NSICOP came to a similar conclusion in its report, which Mr. Trudeau had commissioned in March 2023. He was at the time under fire following multiple intelligence leaks in the media depicting widespread interference by Beijing. The committee reports to the prime minister and not to Parliament.

NSICOP says that foreign actors exploited the vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration during the period under review. Not only was there interference in nomination races, but there were attempts to influence or control riding associations.

The review committee says that CSIS views the nomination processes as a “soft target” for foreign states. With some ridings considered “safe seats,” a foreign actor can essentially help elect an official without having to interfere in the electoral vote. The nomination races are also not overseen by enforcement bodies, hence detecting interference activities is difficult. And since breaking party rules is not illegal, there is no real penalty for getting caught.

One of NSICOP’s recommendations for the government is to create a legal framework to reduce vulnerabilities in political nomination processes.

Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc said his government welcomes the NSICOP report in a June 3 statement.

“We will consider the Committee’s recommendations as part of our work to continuously refine and adapt our measures to counter foreign interference,” he said.

Mr. LeBlanc noted, however, that his government disagrees with some elements of the report, such as how intelligence reports were interpreted.

The minister recently tabled Bill C-70 to increase resilience against foreign interference, including by creating a foreign influence registry. The legislation would also create an offence for interfering in political processes such as party nomination races.