What Tools Are Needed to Curb CCP Influence Efforts in Canada?

A protester holds a sign that reads "No CCP interference in Canada" at a rally outside of the Wenzhou Friendship Society in Richmond, B.C., on Feb. 25, 2023. Vivian Yu/NTD

News Analysis

Fifty years ago, amid an escalating organized crime problem in the United States, it took the creation of specialized teams and an innovative law, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, to deal a serious blow to mob operations.

Today, facing an ever-growing influence and subversion operation by China’s communist regime targeting countries like Canada, what key tools can be developed to help ward off activities that are clearly against Canada’s interests yet our security apparatus and justice system seem helpless to counter?

The answer is more complex when it involves a sophisticated state actor with boundless resources dedicated to exploiting gaps in democratic countries. Former intelligence and law enforcement officials and other experts suggest a number of reforms and new approaches, with some emphasizing that there needs to be political will to make real change happen.

“We need to have this broader look at what China is trying to do,” Christian Leuprecht, a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, told a House of Commons committee last month.

This examination should be beyond looking at just isolated issues such as unofficial Chinese police stations or some cases of election interference, he said, but should be looking at the big picture. This includes, an interpreter quoted him as saying in French, the “asymmetrical hybrid warfare conducted by China through diplomatic, economic, military, defence, cyber, social, and education efforts.”

“The Chinese regime operates with impunity, and Canada has not made any efforts to deter it,” he said.

Front-Line Investigators

Calvin Chrustie, a former senior operations officer with the RCMP who was involved in major transnational organized crime investigations, lists a number of items that can be undertaken to curb Beijing’s influence activities in Canada.

First, he says, there should be a review—and reform where needed—of “the criminal laws that are negatively impacting our ability to fight foreign threats.”

“Engage in a review and study contemporary, highly experienced investigators involved in global operations,” Chrustie, now a senior partner with the Critical Risk Team consulting firm, said in an interview.

The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa in a file photo. Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press

An area in need of major reform, he said, are the laws related to disclosure of evidence in court cases. Currently, Canada’s allies can’t freely share intelligence with Canadian law enforcement out of concern that the information could be publicly exposed in court if a criminal proceeding eventuates as part of the case, Chrustie explained.

“Our disclosure laws preclude us from working with the international community in an effective and efficient way,” he says.

The 1991 landmark case of R v. Stinchcombe requires that the Crown release all evidence as part of court proceedings.

“There are exemptions in the law under the Canada Evidence Act where you can exclude the information from the court process, but the only one who has the ability to protect it is a judge. But the judge is only involved at the end of the case, and that’s too late,” Chrustie says.

“You can’t tell the FBI, ‘give us that information and we can protect it,’ because any smart FBI agent would know that the [Canadian] police and prosecutors have no power to protect the information [in a court case].”

Another important initiative he recommends is the creation of a foreign agent registry in Canada. Under such legislation, which already exists in the United States and Australia, individuals and organizations working to advance the interests of a foreign entity would have to declare their activities to the government to improve transparency.

Former Conservative MP Kenny Chiu introduced a private member’s bill on this initiative in the last Parliament, but it didn’t become law before an election was called. Conservative Sen. Leo Housakos introduced a similar bill in the current session of Parliament, but so far it has not received government support. After the latest series of intelligence leaks in the media about Beijing’s election interference in Canada, Ottawa said it will ponder the creation of a foreign agent registry, and announced last month that it will hold public consultations on it.

Another initiative Chrustie recommends is the creation of tools such as intelligence data banks and artificial intelligence systems for use by businesses, universities, and other organizations so that they are better equipped to deal with the threat of foreign influence. This could include, as an example, tools that Canadian organizations can use to run background checks on organizations they have dealings with.

He also recommends something similar to the proposed “unexplained wealth order” legislation in B.C., which would put the onus on individuals and organizations to explain how they acquired their assets if there is suspicion of unlawful activity.

The proposed legislation was a recommendation from the public inquiry into money laundering in the province, where police insiders have long lamented that gangs and triads, often with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) links, are getting away with criminal acts.

As the pending legislation is based on laws governing civil cases, no criminal conviction is required for the confiscation of assets by the state if the suspects fail to prove that they acquired the assets legitimately.

Scott McGregor, a former RCMP intelligence adviser and former military intelligence operator, agrees that bolstering these civil forfeiture provisions would be helpful, but says they would have to be upheld by the courts. Already, civil rights organizations have challenged the proposed legislation citing charter rights.

When it comes to criminal laws, McGregor, who was involved in investigating money laundering cases in B.C., says updates are needed to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. He also says there should be a change in police-prosecution structure in some jurisdictions.

“In B.C., police should be able to charge people, not just recommend charges to the Crown council,” he told The Epoch Times.

Laws and Governments

Michel Juneau-Katsuya, former chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), made a number of recommendations on how to curb CCP influence at a House of Commons committee meeting on March 31.

One item involves introducing a criminal law specifically on foreign interference, covering activities that would be illegal and the penalties they would incur, he said.

Referring to the government’s recent announcement that it would establish a new office to coordinate efforts to fight foreign interference across different government departments and agencies, Juneau-Katsuya said it’s a good move, but the office shouldn’t be reporting to cabinet.

Former CSIS chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit Michel Juneau-Katsuya (L) and former Conservative MP Kenny Chiu appear before a House of Commons committee in Ottawa on March 31, 2023. Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press

“All past and present governments have been part of the problem, not the solution. All have been warned [about CCP interference] and ignored [it],” he was quoted as saying by an interpreter translating from French.

“For this new body to report to a minister who repeats the same pattern of failure and political interference–this office must be independent, separate from CSIS and the RCMP, and it needs to report directly to the House of Commons.”

He said the new office, dubbed the National Counter-Foreign Interference Office, must have the ability to investigate, search, make arrests, prosecute cases, and inform the public without political interference. He noted that the $13.5 million allocated over five years in the 2023 budget isn’t enough for the broad scope the office would need.

Juneau-Katsuya also recommended that election candidates and political staffers and volunteers be required to sign forms declaring that they are not under the influence of a foreign entity, and that those who are found to have been deceptive should face criminal procedures. As well, he said, foreigners should be forbidden from voting in party nomination contests.

Cabinet members and senior public servants should also be barred from taking on any positions related to their government role after leaving public office for a period of three to five years, he added as another suggestion.

Security of Information Act

During the same committee meeting, Dan Stanton, a former executive manager with CSIS, said that while some have suggested there is currently no “legislative hammer” to tackle foreign interference like there is with espionage and terrorism, he begs to differ.

“These offences easily are captured by the Security of Information Act,” he told MPs.

Section 3 of the act says in part: “For the purposes of this Act, a purpose is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State if a person (a) commits, in Canada, an offence against the laws of Canada or a province that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of two years or more in order to advance a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause or to benefit a foreign entity or terrorist group.”

And Section 20 of the act say in part: “Every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by threat, accusation, menace or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done (a) that is for the purpose of increasing the capacity of a foreign entity or a terrorist group to harm Canadian interests; or (b) that is reasonably likely to harm Canadian interests.”

Stanton said that in the last three decades, foreign interference has “eclipsed classical espionage” as the primary national security threat for Canada, and that China is the “A Team” when it comes to this.

“Why risk stealing another state’s secrets when you can influence and manipulate the targeted countries’ policy-makers?” he asked. “When you can influence and manipulate the targeted countries’ policy-makers, you can get close to what we consider the soft underbelly of the state through our democratic institutions.”

Stanton said the government should avoid delaying the creation of the foreign agent registration law, and that there is no need to hold extensive public consultations.

He also said the government shouldn’t just earmark money for the RCMP without a strategy.

The RCMP logo is seen outside Royal Canadian Mounted Police "E" Division Headquarters, in Surrey, B.C., on April 13, 2018. The Canadian Press/Darryl Dyck

“Every time we’ve had a crisis, every time we’ve had an incident, that’s what the government’s done: ‘We‘ll throw money at the RCMP, we’ll say you folks, you’ve got to sort that out.’ And I don’t think that’s really an appropriate response,” he said.

The 2023 budget has allocated $49 million to the RCMP to protect “diaspora communities and all Canadians from foreign interference.”

Stanton also said Canada needs a new national security policy, one that considers all new threats that have emerged, such as challenges posed with new AI tools.

“We haven’t had a national security policy renewed since 2004. That’s the first time we ever had a national security policy written. The threat landscape in this country has changed enormously in the last 20 years,” he said.

Political Will and Resources

Phil Gurski, a veteran of CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment, also thinks there are existing laws in the books to allow the government to counter the issue of CCP interference, similar to how terrorism and espionage can be tackled. For him, it comes down to political will and resources.

“We have a history of government on both sides, not just the Liberals, but the Conservatives, choosing to ignore the importance of this,” he said in an interview.

He argues against the idea of creating a new organization to deal with the issue of foreign interference.

“Creating a whole new organization, which takes time and resources, won’t be effective for a whole long period of time,” he said. “Secondly, it’s just waving your hands and saying, ‘yeah, we’re doing something,’ when in fact I’m not sure they’re doing anything different.”

Instead, he says, that money should be spent on CSIS and the RCMP in an effective way so that they have the resources they need to do a thorough job.

Another important issue, Gurski says, is making it mandatory for government officials to receive CSIS and RCMP briefings, and to ensure that information reaches the highest levels of the government, so that the prime minister can’t deny having been briefed about it.

As well, he says, if CCP diplomats are found to be involved in activities that undermine the national security of Canada, they should be expelled.

US Initiatives

The United States has in recent years introduced a number of initiatives to curb the CCP’s influence. FBI Director Chris Wray said in 2020 that the bureau had more than 2,000 active investigations connected with the CCP, and that the bureau launched a new investigation related to the issue every 10 hours.

Besides creating foreign agent registration legislation, the United States has labelled the CCP’s Confucius Institutes and more than a dozen Chinese state-owned media outlets as foreign missions, something the Chinese and Hong Kong diaspora are asking Canada to do as well.

Washington has also created export rules to prevent efforts by entities in China to acquire U.S. technology that could aid the Chinese military, and barred members of the CCP or any other totalitarian entity from immigrating to the country.

People move trash bags from the Chinese consulate in Houston on July 24, 2020, after the U.S. State Department ordered China to close the consulate. Mark Felix/AFP via Getty Images

The United States has also imposed sanctions on CCP officials involved in rights abuses, something that Canada has yet to do under its Magnitsky Law, which has been used for officials in countries like Russia and Sudan.

The country is also part of new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including the the trilateral AUKUS, together with the UK and Australia, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with India, Japan, and Australia, neither of which Canada is a party to.

Government Considering New Tools?

A recent article by The Globe and Mail cited unnamed government officials as saying that besides pondering a foreign registration act, Ottawa is also considering three other initiatives that it hasn’t yet moved ahead on.

These include changing the Criminal Code to make foreign interference an offence, modernizing the CSIS Act to allow the agency to share more information on foreign interference activities, and revisiting the Security of Information Act, the article says. It added that, regarding the last item, the sources were unable to provide more details on what the proposed revisions are.

The Epoch Times contacted the office of the Public Safety Minister to verify these claims but didn’t hear back.

Interim RCMP Commissioner Michael Duheme told CTV that there should be legislative changes such that the police can use CSIS intelligence as evidence. He said he believes there are efforts to make those legislative changes, but said “we have to take it one step further.”

After the latest intelligence leaks in the media about the CCP’s election interference efforts, the Liberal government announced that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the watchdog National Security and Intelligence Review Agency will be studying the issue.

It also announced the appointment of former governor general David Johnston as a special rapporteur to examine the issue. The opposition parties have said that what is really needed is an independent public inquiry, which the Liberals have rejected.