There are times when major events happen in such a truncated time. Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin purportedly said in 1917, when he was still in exile in Zurich, “There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.”
First, Xi proclaimed that the CCP is working to achieve the second centenary goal of building China into a modern socialist country in all respects and advancing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The implications of this are that Xi is satisfied to convey to international audiences that the CCP will reach its ambitious aims of replacing the United States and the liberal international order with the CCP’s global leadership and an international order that reflects its totalitarianism.
Second, Xi is a steadfast communist, and the ideology of the CCP remains firmly anchored in Marxism and its guiding role for the Party. He wants to ensure the ideological purity of the CCP while strengthening its control over China and its influence worldwide.
Third, belligerence was the order of the day in Xi’s speech. Its aggressive language was pointed at the United States with its denunciations of hegemonism and implicitly its allies, like Japan, and partners, like India. Most explicitly, Xi’s aggressive intent was focused on Taiwan. The implication is that coercive measures against Taiwan in the near term are likely.
Congress needs to work with the administration to have an adequate conventional and nuclear force structure to meet its national security interests, including commitments to allies and partners. To that end, working with the Biden administration, Congress should conduct a modern version of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s 1993 “Bottom-Up Review” to gauge the ability of the services to identify their missions against China, to meet those missions, and to ensure that the domestic industries, including shipbuilding and aircraft, and supply chains are sufficient to support the services in a war of attrition against the Chinese regime. Moreover, they must guarantee that these supply chains are completely free from China’s intelligence collection and physical or cyber penetration.
Beyond the major steps that Congress can take, at the Bali G20, Biden must do what he has been reluctant thus far to state—he must declare the United States understands that the Chinese regime is an immediate and potent enemy of the United States, its allies and partners, the liberal order, and of freedom-loving people around the world. A forthright and direct address that contrasts the world that Xi is seeking to create with the present one is necessary, and the G20, itself a product of the international order created by the United States, provides the perfect opportunity. Biden then could work with the new Congress to advance the agenda necessary to defeat the Chinese regime.
During Xi’s “100 days,” his aggressive statements must be checked so as not to embolden him, allow any misperception that he has a window of opportunity to act, or that the United States will not stand with its allies like Australia and Japan or key partners like India and Taiwan. Biden needs to act as rapidly and forcefully as Truman did in the spring of 1947. Starting at the G20, Biden needs his own “100 days” to enact with Congress, as Truman did, bold policy changes that will define the U.S. response to Xi’s ambition and aggression.