China and Russia may have been the starred adversaries in U.S. congressional defense budget hearings and, China may be the “pacing” military challenge for the United States, however, a brewing confrontation with Iran could test an evolving strategy in Pentagon deployments and responses to military confrontations.
Twenty-man detachments of U.S. Marines may, or may not, be providing security for foreign-flagged oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz against Iranians brandishing heavy-caliber automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades aboard swarms of circling speedboats.
If no one shoots, analysts say, it is a win for an evolving “more dynamic and flexible approach” to deterrence strategies in the Middle East, especially in dealing with provocations by Iran in the vital waterway where 20 percent of the world’s crude oil leaves the Persian Gulf.
If someone shoots, then that, too, is a win for deterrence because, they say, no one knows if a ship is manned only by merchant seamen or has U.S. Marines aboard, making piracy, hijacking, and hostage-taking a lethal lottery for bad actors such the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN).
Since early July, the Pentagon has steadfastly declined to confirm or deny plans to deploy put 15- to 20-man Marine detachments to foreign-flagged commercial ships in the Arabian Sea, citing its standard statement of “no comment on future/ongoing operations.”
It also hasn’t confirmed or denied repeated requests for clarification that Marines have, indeed, already ridden several ships through the Hormuz Strait and could currently be doing so.
The Pentagon has acknowledged, however, the July arrival of additional forces in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, including a Navy amphibious assault force with 3,000 Marines, in response to a spate of attacks on commercial shipping in the strait by Iran’s IRIN this spring and early summer.
In repeated comments, the Tampa, Florida-based U.S. Central Command (CentCom), the Pentagon’s Middle East combatant command, has also dodged directly confirming if Marine detachments are riding shotgun aboard tankers and container ships in the Arabian Sea.
At least 100 Marines of the 26th Marines Expeditionary Unit (MEU) have been trained since mid-July in Bahrain on how to defend and board merchant ships at sea, according to an Aug. 11 United States Naval Institute (USNI) report.
The USNI report, later confirmed by unidentified Pentagon officials to The Associated Press, said the training began before the unit arrived in Bahrain aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan and dock landing ship USS Carter Hall.
That likely means training continues for security detachments not just for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, but also the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Somalia’s Horn of Africa coast.
Iranian Provocations
Fast-attack watercraft manned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) units and IRNI corvettes have attacked, seized, or attempted to seize almost 20 internationally flagged merchant vessels in the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and the southern Persian Gulf since 2021, CentCom states.That harassment ratcheted up between April and mid-July after a U.S. court-ordered confiscation of Iranian oil from a Greek-managed tanker, Suez Rajan, on April 22. The confiscation was the latest in a five-year pattern of seizures and counterseizures of ships by the United States, its allies, and Iran.
On April 27, IRIN impounded the U.S.-bound, Chinese-owned, Turkish-operated Advantage Sweet as it transited the strait. On May 3, Iranians in small craft seized the Greek-owned Niovi in the strait.
On July 5, IRIN attempted to seize two oil tankers moving through the Gulf of Oman. The Marshall Islands-flagged, Singapore-owned, Hong Kong-managed chemical/oil carrier TRF Moss had just left Jubail, Saudi Arabia, for China, and Richmond Voyager, a Bahamas-flagged, Greek-owned, U.S.-managed tanker, was transporting crude oil from Saudi Arabia’s Ras al-Juayma to Singapore, when attacked near the strait.
According to the Richmond Voyager crew, they were fired upon by an IRNI corvette with armor-piercing 40 mm rounds after refusing orders to stop.
Richmond Voyager distress calls drew U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft, an MQ-9 Reaper drone, and the guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul to the scene, prompting the Iranian corvette to flee.
According to Iranian state media, the Richmond Voyager had collided with an Iranian ship, injuring five members of the crew. Iran said it had a court order to seize the ship. Richmond Voyager crew maintains that no such collision occurred and there was no mention of a court order when they came under fire from the Iranian ship.
Also the next day, an IRGC unit seized the Egyptian-flagged tanker NADA 2 in the Persian Gulf, claiming it was smuggling oil. The IRIN, IRGC, and Iranian Air Force all produced statements that they had repelled an “assertive U.S. military effort” to stop the seizure.
CentCom maintains it didn’t intervene in the seizure because Iran was correct—NADA 2 was smuggling oil and is well known in the region for doing so.
On July 11, Indonesia detained the Iranian supertanker Arman 114—a ship with a colorful history—after allegedly conducting an unlicensed oil transfer to another supertanker, S Tinos, off the Southeast Asia nation’s northern coast.
The United States’ Response
In response to what it calls provocations, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in early July ordered the USS Bataan amphibious group and an additional guided-missile cruiser into the Arabian Sea where they joined U.S. Navy forces, usually led by an aircraft carrier battle group, already on rotational station there.Mr. Austin also ordered the Air Force to deploy additional F-35s, A-10s, and F-16s to the region.
“U.S. Central Command is committed to defending freedom of navigation within our area of responsibility, which includes some of the most important waterways in the world,” CentCom Commander Gen. Erik Kurilla said.
“These additional forces provide unique capabilities, which alongside our partner nations in the region, further safeguard the free flow of international commerce, uphold the rules-based international order, and deter Iranian destabilizing activities in the region.”
But none of the public announcements and statements addressed plans to put Marine detachments aboard foreign-flagged ships, which the Navy didn’t do during the 1980s “Tanker War,” when Iran attacked more than 160 commercial ships.
On Aug. 4, unidentified Pentagon officials confirmed to various media outlets that the United States was considering multiple options in deterring the IRNI and IRGC units from harassing ships.
They said the Navy was offering Marine detachments to ships that are U.S.-flagged, carrying crews that include U.S. citizens, or bringing cargo to or from the United States.
Pentagon officials said the commercial shipping companies must contact the U.S. Navy to request protection. No official authorization had been issued for Marines to actually deploy aboard commercial ships of as early August, they said.
There is an episodic nature to Iran disrupting traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and while the INRO and IRCG units have harassed certain ships, Iran has no national economic incentive in impeding commerce for sustained periods in the strait because it benefits from the imports and exports that come in and out of the Persian Gulf.
According to Kpler, Iran’s crude oil exports to China in the first seven months of 2023 averaged around 917,000 bpd.
Rewards And Risks
Putting Marines and armed sailors on commercial ships is nothing new with the U.S. Navy.The Navy’s Armed Guard deployed on commercial ships in World War II, even before the United States was officially at war, especially in the Atlantic.
Washington Institute Senior Fellow Farzin Nadimi, an analyst specializing in Iran and Persian Gulf security and defense affairs, said in an Aug. 8 column that how the United States responded to the most recent Iranian provocation could demonstrate a change in strategies for the Middle East.
“The United States has had to significantly adjust its defense posture in the Middle East through new concepts and procedures to safeguard collective security interests,” he writes, calling the targeted deployments “the beginning of a more dynamic and flexible approach to military deployment in the US Central Command’s area of responsibility.”
Rather than “emphasizing large and permanent basing, the United States will surge assets and resources from other locations depending on threats and needs,” he said, to support regular deployments of Navy carrier battlegroups to “Gonzo” station in the Arabian Sea.
The supplemental amphibious group deployment reflected the projected need—Marines—with additional F-16s and F-35s from U.S. Air Force bases in Aviano, Italy, and the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron from Hill Air Force Base in Utah.
A consistent presence—the 7th Fleet carrier rotation—still needs to be maintained, Mr. Nadimi said.
“To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theater to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” he said.
Mr. Nadimi said the larger the United States fixed presence is in the Middle East, the greater the tension in achieving the Pentagon’s three policy objectives—deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.
“While security cooperation certainly does not need a large U.S. footprint, it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else,” Mr. Nadimi writes, noting the question now is “just how much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions?”
For now, maybe or maybe not, United States Marines are aboard ships in the Strait of Hormuz and their presence as deterrent comes with risk.
One thing for sure, no intruding force is going to seize a ship in the Strait of Hormuz—and none have in a month—if it believes U.S. Marines are on board, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Dave Beydler said during the same discussion.
“You will not get on a commercial vessel that has a contingent of Marines on board,” he said, noting the Marines have machine guns, counter-drone, and counter-air capabilities “while being in direct contact with converging surface ships and jets from in-theater aircraft battle groups.”
But could they actually provoke an attack or inadvertently broaden the Navy’s rules of engagement with a trip-wire presence of Marines who may or may not be staring down Iranians in swarms of circling speedboats brandishing heavy-caliber automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades right this instant?
“Achieving deterrence is one of those mission outcomes that’s tough to define at times,” Beydler said. “How do you know that you’re being successful in deterring big events, small events, and so forth?”
