Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) and Rep. Carlos Giménez (R-Fla.) have asked the Biden administration for the progress on a report that addresses the national security risk posed by China-manufactured cranes at U.S. ports.
“This surreptitiously installed communication equipment potentially jeopardizes critical U.S. infrastructure and presents a serious threat to national security,” the letter reads. “Safeguarding critical infrastructure from threats posed by foreign adversaries and securing the nation’s supply chains are of the utmost importance.”
The report, mandated by the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, was due to Congress in December 2023 but hasn’t been received as of May 31.
In February, the chairpersons of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent a letter to the president and chairman of ZPMC, demanding to know the purpose of the cellular modems discovered on crane components and in a U.S. seaport’s server room that houses firewall and networking equipment.
In the letter, Rep. Mark Green (R.-Tenn.) and then-Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) said the committees discovered that many cranes at U.S. ports were built at ZPMC’s manufacturing facility, adjacent to a major shipyard where the CCP’s navy is building its third modern aircraft carrier and advanced warships and houses intelligence agencies.
After an eight-month joint investigation, the committees concluded that “ZPMC installed certain components onto the U.S.-bound STS cranes and onshore maritime infrastructure that are outside of any existing contract between ZPMC and U.S. maritime ports.”
They found that “these components do not appear in any way to contribute to the operation of the STS cranes or onshore infrastructure, raising significant questions as to their intended applications.”
The discovery comes amid an ongoing congressional investigation into the operation of cranes manufactured in China and operating at U.S. ports.
In 2021, the FBI found intelligence-gathering equipment on a cargo ship delivering ZPMC cranes to the Baltimore port.
“Those container cranes are not cranes,” Col. Mills said. “They’re IP endpoints on a worldwide intelligence collection system.”
“The Volt Typhoon malware allowed China to hide, among other things, pre-operational reconnaissance and network exploitation against critical infrastructure like our communications, energy, transportation, [and] water sectors,” Mr. Wray said.