Lawmakers, cybersecurity officials, and expert panelists warned the public years ago of the vulnerabilities of America’s election infrastructure, as well as threats of foreign and domestic interference in U.S. elections.
The lawmakers said three vendors—Election Systems & Software, Dominion Voting Systems, and Hart InterCivics—“collectively distribute voting machines and software that facilitate voting for over 90% of all eligible voters in the United States.”
The private equity firms reportedly own or control each of the vendors, the lawmakers noted.
“We are particularly concerned that secretive and ’trouble-plagued companies,‘ owned by private equity firms and responsible for manufacturing and maintaining voting machines and other election administration equipment, ’have long skimped on security in favor of convenience,‘ leaving voting systems across the country ’prone to security problems’” the lawmakers collectively wrote in the letters.
The vendors barely make public information on matters pertaining to their annual profits, executive compensation, or on how much they spend on the maintenance of their voting systems, they said.
More broadly, the lawmakers also had concerns about the spread and effect of private equity investments in the election technology industry and other sectors of the economy and that these issues “threaten the integrity of our elections.”
In a recent press conference, lawyer Sidney Powell alleged a transnational conspiracy involving the “influence of communist money” from countries including Cuba, Venezuela, and “likely China” to overturn the presidential race via election software.
Beijing Threat
William Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, said in an August statement that the U.S. government is “primarily concerned about the ongoing and potential activity by China, Russia, and Iran” when it comes to election interference.
Evanina said the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been “expanding its influence efforts” before the November election in order to “shape the policy environment in the United States, pressure political figures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deflect and counter criticism of China.”
America’s election infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to efforts by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to Mills.
“I think the Chinese MSS/PLA would look at the Election Management Services environment as a strong return-on-investment opportunity for influence operations in the United States,” Mills told The Epoch Times.
“The mysterious nature of the algorithms, control measures, and processing of the data are a screaming target for the cyber warrior of the MSS/PLA looking for effects-based influence operations.”
Mills said he has looked through some of the testing standards and procedures and potentially there are performance characteristics that may not be included in an individual test plan, resulting in it “essentially [becoming] ’self-certified,' which means the State/Federal Government is accepting the word of the vendor.”
“This is a very complex topic and the control measures to ensure conformance across the State/Federal environment are hard to document and cross reference,” he said. “These are high-value targets for MSS/PLA cyber operations and the ability for these operations to be conducted with or without the cooperation of the voting machine company itself is highly likely.”
The study also found that 59 percent of companies “within the first three tiers of the machine’s supply chain had locations in China, Russia, or [both] China and Russia.”
Before Poulos could move on, Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) questioned what exactly the components from China were.
Vulnerable
Lawson also noted that they learned from a top-secret NSA report “that the identity of a company providing voter registration support services in several states was compromised.”
Another panel, expert Michael Haas, then the Midwest regional representative at the National Association of State Election Directors, said the 2016 presidential election taught them that “the potential for disrupting election processes and technology by foreign or domestic actors is a serious and increasing concern.”