DA Willis Says Meadows’s Attempt to Thwart Arrest Is ‘Baseless’

Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis speaks during a news conference at the Fulton County Government building in Atlanta on Aug. 14, 2023. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

A Georgia prosecutor opposes an emergency motion by Mark Meadows that seeks to prevent the arrest of the former chief of staff to former President Donald Trump in Georgia, where President Trump, Mr. Meadows, and others face charges for attempts to contest the results of the 2020 presidential election.

Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis, in a court filing on Aug. 23, called the motion “baseless and in direct contravention with the requirements of the law.”

She asserted that the emergency motion is “in essence” a plea to prevent arrest “on the charges lawfully brought by the State of Georgia,” despite characterizing the request as a “temporary pause.”

“Such a request is improper,” she argued.

Ms. Willis also filed a similar response in opposition to a request for a pause made by defendant Jeffrey Clark, a former Justice Department official. Mr. Clark sought a stay from the court while his request to move the case to federal court is pending, and Ms. Willis is urging the judge to deny both requests.

Following Ms. Willis’s response, U.S. District Judge Steve Jones denied both Mr. Meadows’s and Mr. Clark’s emergency motions to pause proceedings. The order on Mr. Clark’s request was a brief paragraph, but the order on Mr. Meadows’s request was six pages, citing a scheduled upcoming hearing as rationale. In both cases, the court refrained from commenting on the removal itself, ruling only on the defendants’ ability to avoid arrest while their notice of removals are pending.

On the day of the indictment, Ms. Willis set a deadline of noon on Aug. 25 for the 19 defendants to surrender voluntarily or face arrest.

Emergency Motion

A day after the Aug. 14 indictment, Mr. Meadows filed a notice of removal, which would have moved the case to federal court, based on his status as a federal officer—chief of staff to the president of the United States. Other defendants followed with similar notices over the next week.

The court had set an Aug. 28 evidentiary hearing between the prosecution, Ms. Willis, and Mr. Meadows’s attorneys, but Mr. Meadows’s attorneys argue that under his constitutional federal officer immunity, he’s also immune to arrest and other court actions in state jurisdiction.

They pushed for an earlier hearing or a ruling without hearing after having sent multiple requests to Ms. Willis’s office to set up a meeting before noon on Aug. 25 or otherwise extend the deadline.

Ms. Willis declined, responding that “your client is no different than any other criminal defendant in this jurisdiction. Two weeks was a tremendous courtesy. At 12:30, I shall file warrants in the system.”

The court then gave Ms. Willis a 3 p.m. deadline on Aug. 23 deadline to respond to Mr. Meadows’s emergency motion.

“The State respectfully asks that this Court dismiss or deny the Emergency Motion, as appropriate,” the response reads.

DA Response

“The defendant’s contention the case should be immediately removed on the papers is meritless,” Ms. Willis argued, pointing to Code 1445, which prevents conviction in a case being removed, but not other proceedings. Mr. Meadows’s lawyers had argued that the supremacy clause prevents federal officers from being arrested and brought to trial in state court, pointing to an 1879 case.

Ms. Willis further argued that an evidentiary hearing was required, even if the notice of removal is pending in federal court.

“The defendant’s request to immediately remove the case is a not so subtle request to invite the Court to improperly prevent the State from proceeding against the defendant pending the Court’s ruling on the notice of removal,” she wrote on Aug. 23, asking the court to dismiss or deny the emergency motion.

She argued that the possibility that Mr. Meadows may need to defend himself first in state court and then later in federal court didn’t “constitute irreparable injury.”

“In fact, federal courts have repeatedly denied requests to interfere in state criminal prosecutions,” especially when the state cases are brought “in good faith,” she argued.

“Here, the defendant does not allege that his prosecution is taken in bad faith, that there is no hope of obtaining a valid conviction, or that it is being taken to harass the defendant. The defendant is simply requesting that this Court prevent him from being lawfully arrested as any criminal defendant would be after indictment on felony charges by a grand jury.

“The defendant’s claim that his status as a former federal officer somehow heightens this routine procedure to the level of irreparable injury to the defendant is baseless.”

Ms. Willis argued that Mr. Meadows would face the same charges even in federal court, and that other co-defendants who were also federal officers have already voluntarily surrendered.

“The defendant’s arrest will not preclude the defendant from asserting any State or federal defenses he may have,” the response reads.

Ms. Willis’s office cited standard Georgia criminal procedure.

Mr. Meadows’s defense has thus far been that as a federal officer with supremacy clause immunity, he isn’t subject to state court proceedings.

While Mr. Meadows has requested the charges against him be moved to federal court, Mr. Clark’s notice of removal includes the special purpose grand jury that heard testimony from more than 70 witnesses; that jury didn’t vote an indictment, although the report produced was used in the current case. He is arguing that those are civil proceedings and not criminal.