Will More Boots and Fewer Boats Deter a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?

Tourists visiting the anti-landing spikes on the coast of Kinmen, the front-line islands of Taiwan, on Oct. 20, 2020. Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

U.S. Army Special Forces—and possibly other units—will be deployed on Taiwan’s Kinmen islands, about two miles off the coast of mainland China.

Why are American soldiers now positioned so close to the Chinese mainland?

US Deepens Commitment to Taiwan’s Defense

One reason that U.S. defense officials give is that U.S. military personnel are there as consultants to the Taiwanese military. But there’s much more to it than that. In fact, this latest development is just one more in a series of recent policy shifts that, at least on the face of it, appear to deepen the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security.

The U.S. military commitment includes forces “permanently” stationed in Taiwan since 2021—the first time that has happened in four decades. The objective was and is the integration of U.S. Green Berets with Taiwan’s specialized amphibious reconnaissance units to improve the island’s defensive readiness against an invasion. Evidently, that readiness goes beyond training Taiwanese troops to use advanced U.S. military equipment; it includes close coordination between U.S. and Taiwanese military forces.

New Money, Weapons for Taipei

In fact, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has gone beyond selling Taipei warplanes and anti-aircraft batteries or troop coordination. The Biden administration signed off on the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which included, for the first time, $2 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds for Taiwan. FMF is a State Department plan that gives foreign governments the money to buy U.S. military equipment. The State Department also allocated $80 million to Taiwan in the FMF program.

That’s a new level of involvement for the United States in Taiwan’s defense. In the past, FMF was usually given to sovereign nations, except for the African Union’s 55 member states, and the United States hasn’t recognized Taiwan as a sovereign nation since 1979.

With all of these policies and funding, it certainly seems that the Biden administration is doubling down on its commitment to defend Taiwan against any planned invasion by China’s communist regime and, by extension, enhancing its commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific region.

Putting U.S. troops on Kinmen and giving Taiwan money to buy U.S. weapons are provocative policies no matter how you look at it—and they aren’t the first provocative move by the United States and Taiwan. Every sale of military equipment is provocative to Beijing.

Make no mistake: Defending Taiwan against a possible invasion by China is the right thing to do.

But is putting boots on the ground on Kinmen the best, most effective way to do it?

What Are the Advantages of Kinmen?

One potential advantage is that the posture allows for the defense of Taiwan roughly two miles off the coast of China. It’s better to battle a Chinese invasion force on the beaches of Kinmen rather than in Taiwan, right?

Another advantage of advanced force integration is that U.S. and Taiwanese forces already know how to work together, use the same military hardware, and (presumably) have the same preapproved battle plans. Combining combat strength makes sense, especially if China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intended to take Kinmen at the beginning of hostilities.

A third advantage is that Kinmen’s proximity to China would enable deeper penetration into the mainland by U.S. and Taiwan missile systems if such missiles were positioned there. But how much would that matter from a military or deterrence standpoint?

The FMF program will allow Taiwan to buy advanced U.S. weaponry. How much those weapons will deter China is unknown at this time. The program is in addition to the unprecedented $345 million military package to Taiwan, which the Biden administration approved in 2023 through the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the same channels used to fund Ukraine military aid.

More Weapons on Land

On the other hand, why wouldn’t a Chinese invasion force that’s targeting Taiwan simply avoid Kinmen altogether?

That strategy, known as “island-hopping,” worked well for the U.S. Navy in the Pacific against the Japanese during World War II. Instead of fighting for every fortified island, the U.S. Navy just skipped many of them.

Speaking of the U.S. Navy, it is apparent that the Biden administration does not believe that the Navy is a deterrent to Chinese aggression. If that were not the case, why would the administration purposely degrade our naval strength to its weakest ever?

Many defense analysts believe that the U.S. Navy’s decreasing ship count—which will shrink to 280 ships by 2027 from about 300—is out of touch with strategic reality. So, too, is the Biden administration’s decision to retire all EA-18G Growlers, the Navy’s electronic warfare (EW) wing, that supports U.S. Air Force and Navy shore-based activities.

In the meantime, China is enhancing its EW capabilities, giving it greater advantages in disrupting U.S. command, communications, and coordination in the region. What’s more, China may have superiority in submarine warfare and hypersonic anti-ship missiles and could dominate the Taiwan Strait, as well as push outward and northward to the Philippines.

Preparing for a US Defeat?

Are the “advantages” of putting U.S. forces on Kinmen worth the risk to our soldiers’ lives?

What about the risk of proximity potentially provoking a war rather than deterring it?

Surely, the U.S. military can train Taiwan soldiers in battle tactics, the use of advanced military hardware, and other military necessities somewhere much less provocative than roughly two miles off the coast of mainland China. How about Guam or even Hawaii?

Or worse, does weakening our naval forces in the area while increasing our ground forces set up the United States for defeat against Chinese military forces?

The greatest deterrence is, or used to be, the U.S. ability to project power via its unchallenged naval forces. Those days are rapidly slipping away. It’s difficult to imagine how, in the face of deconstructing our strategic maritime warfare capabilities, Kinmen might tip the strategic balance back in the United States’s favor.

One can imagine the conversation in Beijing’s defense planning meetings. On the one hand, incredulity at the U.S. position on Kinmen, but on the other, the military planners might have smiles on their faces.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.