Why Did Australia Refuse to Send a Single Ship to the Red Sea?

President Joe Biden’s surrogates asked for just one ship—not an unprecedented request. Why did we refuse?
Why Did Australia Refuse to Send a Single Ship to the Red Sea?
A Yemeni coastguard member loyal to the internationally-recognised government rides in a patrol boat in the Red Sea off of the government-held town of Mokha in the western Taiz province, close to the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, on Dec. 12, 2023. Khaled Ziad/AFP via Getty Images
Graham Young
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News the U.S. Navy killed 10 Houthi pirates in the Bab el-Mandeb underlines the embarrassment in the Albanese Labor government only sending 11 military personnel rather than the requested warship to assist the American operation in the area.

The stated reason was that our priority is the Pacific, and surely it should be.

But you can’t ignore the route through which 20 percent of your seaborne trade travels (pdf). Nor can you ignore your defence insurance policy—the United States.

As the recent non-release of cabinet documents relating to our decision to join the United States in Iraq reminds us, no Australian government has ever ignored serious requests from Uncle Sam since World War II.

Australia has never been capable of defending itself alone and has always relied on the patronage of a large ally.

Originally this was the British Empire, and then after WWII, it was the United States. We always paid our “insurance premiums” as they became “due.”

Our latest premium became due when President Joe Biden’s surrogates asked for just one ship—not an unprecedented request as we’ve sent more than one in the past to the same area of the world.

Why did we refuse?

There are three possible explanations and the answer is probably a mixture of all three.

1. Showing ‘Independence’ From Our Major Ally

There’s international politics.

The Albanese government prides itself on being more independent from the United States than its predecessor. So this could be signalling to Beijing, as part of an effort to retain access to Chinese markets for key exporters.

That would be consistent with the subservient tone Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has adopted in his meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping and other CCP officials.

Then there’s positioning on the war in Gaza.

Mr. Albanese broke with the United States and other key allies to back a ceasefire resolution in the U.N.—another demonstration of independence and a departure from bipartisan policy stances going back more than 80 years.

2. Politics

The next explanation is domestic politics, and it intersects with international politics.

Australia has two populations that are broadly anti-American and pro-Palestinian. One is ethnic—Australian Muslims—and the other political—Australian Greens voters.

And there is another population influenced by relations with China—expat-Chinese.

Of the 12 electoral seats with Muslim populations over 5 percent, 10 are Labor-held (centre-left), one is Liberal (centre-right), and the other is held by a Liberal-leaning independent.

Of the 15 seats where the Greens win more than 20 percent of the first preference vote—which under Australia’s preferential system, can put you on the path to winning over time—the Greens have five, Labor holds nine, and the Teals (an alliance of centre-left independents) holds one.

Pro-Palestinian protesters hold signs outside the office of federal Member for Wills Peter Khalil in Melbourne, Australia, on Dec. 2, 2023. (Diego Fedele/Getty Images)
Pro-Palestinian protesters hold signs outside the office of federal Member for Wills Peter Khalil in Melbourne, Australia, on Dec. 2, 2023. Diego Fedele/Getty Images

Three seats have significant Chinese populations, and these are all currently held by Labor, but are generally marginal and not safe for whichever party holds them.

So Labor has a lot hanging on finessing relations with these communities, although why they would overly worry about the Islamic vote is a mystery to me as these voters have never shown any inclination to vote for the centre-right Coalition.

3. Military Not Up to Task

The last explanation is that the Australian Navy is just not up to the task.

It appears that the only vessel capable of doing duty in the Red Sea would be one of our three missile destroyers. Two of those are out of action, and the third has just returned from a tour of duty.

Plus, somewhat incredibly to those of us who’ve been watching the Ukraine war now for the last two years, none of our ships can defend against drones, outside of their ultra-expensive missiles.

This points to another factor—the relentless degradation of our military forces by both sides of politics.

Somewhere around 2 percent of GDP is generally accepted as a reasonable figure to spend on defence. It’s the standard expenditure NATO members promise.

We’ve rarely met that figure outside of wartime. In 2007, at the end of the Howard Liberal government, we spent 1.56 percent of GDP on defence.

There was a slight decline over the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd Labor governments to 1.51 percent, and then an increase to around 1.98 percent of GDP under the Abbott-Turnbull-Morrison Coalition governments, which it appears Labor is going to maintain.

So Australia has decades of underspending—probably not wise when the world average is 2.2 percent and we live in such an isolated part of the world.

Australian Army soldiers from 10th Force Support Battalion's Amphibious Beaching Team await the arrival of troops on an Lighter Landing Craft during Exercise Trident 2022 near Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland. (Australian Defence Force)
Australian Army soldiers from 10th Force Support Battalion's Amphibious Beaching Team await the arrival of troops on an Lighter Landing Craft during Exercise Trident 2022 near Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland. Australian Defence Force
The United States spends 3.5 percent of GDP, Russia 4.1 percent, Israel 4.5 percent, South Korea 2.7 percent, and India 2.4 percent.

The size of population, and size of territory also matter.

Singapore, which is a tiny island, spends 2.8 percent of GDP, while China, with a huge landmass, but also a huge population spends only 1.6 percent.

In absolute numbers, Singapore is spending US$11.7 billion, while Beijing spends US$292 billion. The United States spends US$877 billion.

Efficiency of spending also counts. Manufacturing in the United States is a lot more expensive than manufacturing in China, so it’s quite possible China is getting a much better bang for its buck than the United States and is therefore in a more competitive position than the figures might suggest.

And then there is the size of the defence effort you are trying to maintain.

The United States is the world’s policeman, so it is spread out around the world, while the Chinese, despite having an international operation, are more concentrated on just their territory.

Australia’s spend is US$32.3 billion (A$50 billion). That makes us the 13th largest military spender.

However, contrast that to France’s US$53.6 billion with a much smaller territory, including a coastline, to defend, and surrounded by NATO allies, it doesn’t look so impressive.

Failing to Hit the Mark on Several Fronts

I did some historical research on the Australian Navy.

In colonial times we had a total of 31 commissioned vessels for a population of 5.5 million. Today, we have a total of 40 for a population of 26.6 million.

Even in those days, we were asked to be part of multinational coalitions, with a naval brigade composed of ships from New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia sailing to China in 1900 to support troops during the Boxer Rebellion.

Comparing numbers of vessels is of historical interest, but comparisons can’t be direct. Ships come in different sizes and with differing capabilities, over time much of the reconnaissance work once done by navies is carried out by radar and satellite.

An Australian HMAS Navy ship (R) monitoring a Chinese spy ship (L) in August 2021. (Australian Defence Force)
An Australian HMAS Navy ship (R) monitoring a Chinese spy ship (L) in August 2021. Australian Defence Force

Yet, if we don’t have a ship to spare to help protect a vital sea lane, then you know that our capacity is insufficient.

With the eighth longest coastline in the world, and as an island nation, our navy should be the most important wing of our armed forces.

While nuclear submarines are a vital addition, they are not sufficient. They will also put extreme pressure on defence budgets.

The Australian Defence Strategic Review 2023 identifies five tasks for our defence forces:
  1. Defend Australia and our immediate region;
  2. Deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
  3. Protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
  4. Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
  5. Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
It seems we have just failed at points three, four, and five, and it’s not obvious how the submarines actually help on those points either.

The Strategic Review is to be funded by reallocations of existing funds. Looking at the numbers and existing capacities it looks like significant additional funding is required.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Graham Young
Graham Young
Author
Graham Young is the executive director of the Australian Institute for Progress. He is the editor and founder of OnlineOpinion.com.au and has conducted qualitative polling on Australian politics since 2001. Mr. Young has contributed to The Australian newspaper, The Australian Financial Review, and is a regular on ABC Radio Brisbane.
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