Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping may now feel that his only window to conquer Taiwan and remain in office lies in defying overwhelming odds and attempting the conquest before the U.S. presidential election in November.
Many of his bitter opponents in the CCP may now, reluctantly, agree with him.
That logic could be understood by China watchers even with little understanding of how Xi functions. The buildup of factors arguing against a delay in the attack seems overwhelming. Taiwan’s armed forces are improving daily, and its allies are firming up their resolve and capabilities to resist a Beijing war against Taiwan.
The longer Xi delays conquering Taiwan, the more difficult it becomes, and his domestic situation becomes more precarious as his economy collapses. But most importantly, the U.S. election on Nov. 5 could well bring back former President Donald Trump, a committed rival of communist China.
Taiwan’s inauguration of a new president, William Lai (Lai Ching-te), on May 20 was meant to be another deadline by which Xi would react to punish the Taiwanese voters for electing a president who was committed to resisting the country’s incorporation into mainland China. Indeed, the CCP has been stepping up military provocations against the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan’s official name) since the election.
However, a military invasion of the ROC by the Chinese regime remains an extremely high-risk option. For Xi to persist in considering it as his only way to retain power reflects the fact that he has consolidated strategic decision-making into his own hands since eliminating the collective leadership approach in the CCP that had prevailed from the death of Mao Zedong in 1974 until arguably, 2022.
There is no doubt that Taiwan, Japan, the United States, India, and other states concerned about the possible CCP action must prepare to face and over-match Chinese military capabilities at any time, and there is little doubt that they could do this. So there are seemingly overwhelming reasons for Beijing to abandon its goal of absorbing Taiwan.
The goals of Xi (Maoism for China and survival in power for himself) are not necessarily the goals or priorities of his opponents within the public and the CCP, and intelligence must now focus on discerning the divisions between Xi and other power camps, and the extent to which either can control the initiation of military action.
However, Xi may have shown his CCP opponents that the party would not survive if he did not prevail.
Many things stand in the way of Xi initiating a decisive military action against Taiwan in 2024, and even more obstacles stand in the way of completing it successfully. Xi, however, has been extremely active since the CCP’s 20th Congress (Oct. 16–24, 2022) in purging or suppressing his opponents. This became urgent in the face of mounting criticism of Xi’s policies, which had led to the virtual bankrupting of the mainland Chinese economy, the collapse of his Belt and Road Initiative, and the increasing collapse of Chinese trade around the world.
It is clear that Xi’s interpretation of risk and reward must be the paramount consideration rather than what is rationally considered an acceptable risk in the eyes of other Chinese or foreign observers. Xi has vigorously continued his purge of opponents during the first half of 2024, and the key opposition blocs within the CCP seem unable to regroup. Having said that, any conspiracies against Xi would be deeply buried and unknown to outsiders, so a putsch would, if it were to occur, take place suddenly. So Xi must maintain offensive, unpredictable behavior to destabilize his opponents.
As a result, it is logical that 2024 must be the year of “strategic messaging” or indirect signaling between the CCP/Xi and their opponents, particularly the United States. This is well underway.
The targets of Xi’s strategic messaging are primarily within the CCP leadership and the Chinese population and, secondarily, the United States. Xi needs to distract from the real crises facing the mainland Chinese people in ways that ensure that the CCP opponents cannot gain traction at this time. That means escalating the perception of a foreign threat, particularly from the United States.
In February, Xi’s team leaked a claim that the United States was preparing to deploy an armada of five U.S. Navy carrier strike groups off the Chinese and Korean coasts. This would be unprecedented in modern times.
It was also untrue.
Retired U.S. Navy Capt. James Fanell, former U.S. Navy intelligence chief for the U.S. Seventh Fleet, seemed to indicate that the messaging was designed to legitimize CCP actions in the buildup to the May 20 inauguration of the Taiwanese president. He also pointed out that it had been more than a decade since the United States deployed a carrier—let alone five—west of the longitude 125E line. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has begun its first sea trials of its third (and most advanced) carrier, the 80,000-ton displacement Fujian, which is a show of strength but not necessarily a meaningful one if Xi intended to launch military operations against Taiwan in 2024.
A CCP-initiated conflict against Taiwan in 2024 would conceivably cause an immediate broader response, including Japan and the United States (not to mention the players emerging on China’s flanks, such as Vietnam and India), and this would likely see Fujian targeted to ensure that it would never reach commissioning into the PLAN fleet.
That is not to express too much confidence in the United States or Allied naval and air capabilities but rather to note that the response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan from a range of opposing nations would be overwhelming. Again, this does not address the unknown but considerable capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) overall.
Clearly, the PLA’s capabilities and loyalties remain an open question, both to CCP officials and to foreign analysts.
Even so, what options remain for Xi?
Indeed, even among Xi’s detractors within the CCP elders, are there some who feel that unless the Chinese regime moves now against Taiwan—and, by default, against the United States—it may never have another opportunity? That, absent risky action, the future of the nation is lost?
This view begins to parallel the process that led the Japanese government to undertake the (known) high-risk attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. And this is the very mistake that many PLA and CCP officials vowed not to repeat. For that reason, among others, Xi’s actions for the past decade have been aimed at weakening the economic, political, and military cohesiveness of the United States.
So would a PLA direct military attack on Taiwan inexorably lead to the need for Xi to commit to a strategic series of strikes against targets in Japan, the Central Pacific (particularly Guam), and even the U.S. mainland?
It is an open question, but parallels must be seen to other ideologically committed leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, who enjoyed absolute command.
It is standard operating practice to consider that a U.S. presidential election year means that the United States either ignores the rest of the world or acts internationally in ways to protect and project the interests of an incumbent president seeking reelection. As a result, Beijing must consider not only the possible adverse strategic ramifications of the election of President Trump but also the probability that the incumbent Biden administration would need—for its own political survival, as well as for U.S. strategic interests—to react strongly against a CCP threat to Taiwan.
Thus, despite how angry Xi’s CCP opponents may be that he has brought communist China to this collapse and return to doctrinaire Maoism, they may feel that they are now fated to support a “toss of the dice” to undertake a military action to save the regime and the CCP itself from being destroyed. The questions remain, however, whether the PLA itself would essentially risk mass suicide to engage in such a war or whether the PLA has the training and technology to perform well.
