The decision came as a shock, in spite of it being a near certainty.
On Sept. 23, an application challenging Western University’s COVID-19 vaccine booster policy was dismissed by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The lawyers for the applicants (five Western students) argued that the vaccine booster itself isn’t a “lawfully authorized activity,” that the collection of personal medical information required by it isn’t necessary for the proper administration of Western’s educational services, and, thus, that the university’s conduct is contrary to the privacy protections established by Freedom of Information and Protection of the Privacy Act (FIPPA).
“I do not agree with the applicants’ characterization of the Policy as being ‘coercive’ in nature. ... The Policy forces individuals to choose between two alternatives, even if they like neither option. The choice is the individual’s to make. Each choice comes with its own consequences. That is the nature of choices.”
Tranquilli’s reasoning seems to be that whenever it’s possible to select from more than one option, there’s choice, and whenever there’s choice, coercion is, in principle, impossible. But the problem with this view is that it defines coercion out of existence by closing the gap between physical force and free, autonomous choice.
If someone who’s stronger than you takes your hand and uses it to slap someone else, you were literally unable to do otherwise. You weren’t coerced. There was no process of deliberation, no psychological pressure to do one thing over another. There was simply no choice at all. In the medical context, a patient who’s anesthetized and wheeled into surgery for an operation to which she wouldn’t have consented isn’t coerced; it’s strictly impossible for her to refuse.
Coercion doesn’t imply a lack of choice; on the contrary, it can only exist where there’s choice.
American philosopher Robert Nozick put it well when he said, “Coercion exists only when there are proposals (e.g. conditional threats), and excludes direct uses of force or violence.” Most of us know what this normative gradation of choice feels like “from the inside”; which choices are free, meaningful, and supported; and which are framed by an atmosphere of duress.
What Tranquilli perhaps meant to say—or needed to say to allow for coercion to exist at all (to be able to acknowledge cases of sexual coercion, for example)—is that Western’s mandate is coercive but coercion is sometimes justified. But that isn’t what she said.
The upshot of mandating compliance at a university, of all places, is that it selects for inclusion those who choose to alter their behavior on account of it, not on account of rational persuasion. And it excludes those who practice precisely the principles that their university is supposed to be teaching: critical thinking, autonomy, reflection and deliberation, respect, integrity, and, of course, courage.
“Without collecting Proof of Vaccination, we would have no ability to identify and exclude non-compliant individuals.”
Is Tranquilli’s description of coercion consistent with the educational mandate of the university’s booster policy that she defends? This isn’t a rhetorical question. It’s the question that should be on the minds of every person affected by Western’s policy.
