Wagner Group’s resurgence in Africa poses a significant challenge to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) interests in the region, potentially straining the “unlimited friendship” between China and Russia. The Kremlin’s apparent loss of control over Wagner’s private military force has revealed divisions within Moscow’s leadership, indicating a potential power struggle.
These statements echo those made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who asserted that Wagner Group and Russia would persist in their presence in Africa despite recent events.
With Yevgeny Prigozhin exiled to Belarus, a significant portion of Wagner Group’s 25,000-strong army is expected to reinforce operations in Africa under new leadership. This prospect poses a potential disaster for the CCP’s interests in Africa. The presence of Wagner’s private military force could destabilize the security environment and put the CCP at a disadvantage in the region. In any conflict with Wagner’s forces, the CCP may face significant challenges and risks.
During the Aspen Security Forum, Western officials suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin faced criticism from Russia’s elite following the Wagner-led armed rebellion. On July 20, CIA Director William Burns stated that the rebellion triggered deeper questions about Putin’s judgment, his relative detachment from events, and his perceived indecisiveness. He emphasized that Putin is known for his tendency to hold a grudge. “I would be surprised if Prigozhin escapes further retribution for this,” said Burns.
Just before the deadly 36-hour armed rebellion, Prigozhin mentioned on his Telegram channel that once his work in Ukraine was done, he would retire and head to Africa. Now, it seems this might have been his best escape plan, as Wagner’s forces are providing security protection to various regimes in Africa, such as Mali and the Central African Republic, where they feel at ease and gain control over valuable resources.
The case of Sudan illustrates how Wagner Group offered security and logistical support to former President Omar al-Bashir in 2017 in exchange for diamond mining concessions. Now as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, Wagner’s presence in Darfur continues, with the group relying on mining concessions as a source of income.
In the Central African Republic, Russia’s military advisors and Wagner mercenaries have taken control of significant diamond and gold deposits, allowing them to sustain their operations in the region. Similar business models were employed in Mozambique and Mali, where Wagner provided support to local forces in exchange for resource mining rights and cooperation in combating extremist groups.
Simultaneously, no matter how much Putin may desire to eliminate Prigozhin, he is constrained from acting against him if Prigozhin maintains control over Wagner’s forces in Africa. Putin cannot risk confronting Wagner and jeopardizing Russia’s access to Africa’s valuable resources and influence, especially in the Middle East, notably Iran. Moscow must uphold the perception of Wagner Group’s allegiance and ensure seamless communication channels. The African region remains crucial for Moscow’s projection of power and economic gains from its abundant natural resources, and it is unlikely to forfeit the opportunity to wield geopolitical influence.
Clearly, the CCP’s interests in Africa are facing security challenges. The return of Prigozhin and his private army to Africa, along with the intricate relationship between Putin and Wagner, exacerbates these issues. As several Russian private military companies explore opportunities to provide armed services for China’s overseas assets, numerous problems need to be addressed. Securing Wagner’s armed services for the CCP partly depends on their ability to navigate the complexities of relations between China, Russia, and Wagner and have opportunities for direct negotiations. However, Prigozhin’s rebellion may have severed any potential future collaboration opportunities with Chinese companies.
The CCP fears losing its monopoly on violence and the threat it poses to its regime. Consequently, the CCP restricts private security companies from acquiring arms, leaving them reliant on local or international institutions for armed guards. This essentially hinders their capabilities, and subjectively, Chinese security firms are also reluctant to engage in real military operations involving live ammunition.
Given the CCP’s mentality and caution, the emergence of a Wagner-style private armed force in China is unlikely. Especially with Wagner’s rebellion further validating the CCP’s concerns, such a possibility becomes even more implausible.
However, it is not impossible for the CCP’s military to be repackaged as pseudo-private military companies to expand its footprint overseas. Nonetheless, such CCP-state-owned or party-controlled pseudo-private military companies would encounter challenges in navigating the diplomatic and political landscape involving the CCP, making their operation impractical.