Commentary
U.S. defense supply chain dependence on the Chinese regime poses a serious national security concern, and efforts to remove this dependency will take decades, leaving the United States vulnerable in the interim.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the vulnerability of global supply chains, particularly their dependence on China, which accounts for 35 percent of global manufacturing output. While some experts consider the United States to be the world’s only military superpower and China the sole manufacturing superpower, the United States remains the most powerful military despite the rapid expansion and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. However, China’s involvement in U.S. defense supply chains poses significant risks and dependencies, threatening national security.
The world has seen how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can leverage its control over supply chains to coerce other nations into compliance. If the United States were to go to war with China, such disruptions would be more intense and likely, particularly in the defense sector. The quickest way to disarm an enemy is to stop manufacturing that enemy’s weapons.
Today, even when a product is stamped “Made in America” or “Made in” elsewhere, it is likely assembled from components manufactured in multiple countries to meet qualification standards. In 2022, the Pentagon halted F-35 fighter jet deliveries after discovering that some engine starter/generator magnets were made in China. Small magnets, essential in electronics and motors, rely on rare earth minerals sourced or processed in China.
Rare earth elements (REEs) are central to U.S. dependence on China. These 17 metals are crucial for high-tech military components such as precision-guided munitions, lasers, and radar systems. China controls about 85 percent of the global REE supply, making it an indispensable player. This reliance makes the U.S. military vulnerable to potential supply disruptions from the CCP.
The U.S. defense industry heavily relies on Chinese manufacturing and assembly for components such as electronic parts and semiconductors. Incorporating Chinese-made components into defense systems poses substantial cybersecurity risks, including hidden vulnerabilities or backdoors susceptible to cyber espionage or sabotage. This reliance also raises quality control issues and the potential for intellectual property theft and supply chain disruptions. Additionally, China produces dual-use technologies, such as telecommunications equipment and software, which the military may purchase without the same monitoring or regulation as purely military technology.
Some Chinese companies often conceal their country of origin, claiming to be 100 percent American firms qualified to work for the Pentagon. This practice poses a national security risk and gives these companies an unfair advantage over genuine American companies by using subsidized parts and components from the Chinese regime. Over time, the lower prices from CCP-affiliated firms are driving American companies out of business, forcing the Pentagon to purchase Chinese-made goods.
The U.S. government has taken some steps to reduce dependence on CCP supply chains, but these measures are limited and often do not specifically target defense-related industries. Both President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden invoked the Defense Production Act to bolster the domestic industrial base, aiming for a more secure and resilient supply chain. However, this was largely used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to target personal protective equipment, masks, and other medical devices during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy addresses supply chain security and identifies communist China as a threat, but it does not significantly address the specific threat China poses to U.S. defense supply chains. There has also been no comprehensive move to replace all CCP-controlled companies in U.S. defense supply chains.
This year, Biden issued Executive Order 14117 to prevent countries of concern from accessing Americans’ sensitive personal data and U.S. government-related data. This move addresses the risk posed by U.S. dependence on Chinese services and technology, which could expose such data. However, it does not reduce overall reliance on China.
The CHIPS and Science Act is a significant step aimed at strengthening the U.S. semiconductor industry by promoting domestic production and reducing reliance on foreign sources, particularly China. This act enhances the resilience and security of critical defense technology components by addressing vulnerabilities in the supply chain.
Another important initiative is the Defense Industrial Base, which aims to strengthen the resilience of the U.S. defense supply chain through strategic partnerships and investment in domestic capabilities. However, China remains a part of the U.S. defense supply chain.
The mantra “de-risking but not decoupling,” repeated by the White House, G7, and European Union, is insufficient. National security adviser Jake Sullivan told the Council on Foreign Relations in January that the United States had essentially given up hope that the CCP would reform and join the rules-based order. Instead, the United States developed a new approach—“invest, align, compete”—under Secretary of State Antony Blinken, which “sought to strengthen our competitive position and secure our interests and values while carefully managing this vital relationship.” However, this approach benefits the CCP by relying on half measures and weak, gradual actions masked as careful management of the relationship.
Unfortunately, U.S. corporations support these half measures because they benefit from cheap inputs from China, and Wall Street profits from financing these ventures and conducting IPOs for China-linked and even blacklisted Chinese companies.
The Pentagon’s Industrial Strategy calls for a “generational” change, meaning that it could take decades to remove China from U.S. defense supply lines. However, every second that the Chinese regime remains in the national defense supply chain is another second that the United States is at risk. Securing the Pentagon’s supply chain and completely decoupling it from China should be an immediate priority.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
