US–China Rivalry in Burma

US–China Rivalry in Burma
Members of the ethnic minority armed group Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) standing guard in a temple area of a hill camp seized from Burma's military in Namhsan Township, in Burma's northern Shan State, on Dec. 13, 2023. STR/AFP via Getty Images
Antonio Graceffo
Updated:
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Commentary

The United States and China are at odds in Burma (Myanmar), where Beijing funds both the government and some resistance forces in order to secure its investments and guarantee unrestricted access to resources, while Washington supports the democratic movement.

The battle between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spans the military, diplomatic, and economic domains and across continents, the Arctic, space, and the ocean.
Burma has been embroiled in civil war since 1948 and now serves as another front where the United States promotes democracy as an alternative to the profit-driven influence of the CCP, which seeks to co-opt the faltering state and pull it into Beijing’s axis.
The conflict in Burma is complex, but at its core is a war between the State Administrative Council (SAC), which seized power in a 2021 military coup, and various pro-democracy militias. The SAC is the latest in a long line of military juntas. In earlier periods, resistance came mainly from ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), groups formed among Burma’s 135 ethnic minorities to fight the military government. Since the coup ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, the resistance has expanded from the jungles to the cities. Now, the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), composed of both the Burman majority and city dwellers, fight alongside ethnic rebels to defeat the junta forces, known as the Tatmadaw. Most PDF and ethnic armed groups now support the National Unity Government (NUG), an exile government that, for the first time, includes ethnic minority participation.
The war’s trajectory is increasingly shaped by the competing influences of the CCP and the United States, leading to divisions within the opposition. Burma’s economy is in steep decline after years of conflict, while resistance forces now control most of the country’s territory, possibly as much as 80 percent. Despite this, the Tatmadaw continued to fight, bolstered by diplomatic support, money, and weapons from the CCP.
The United States, largely staying clear of the conflict aside from imposing sanctions on the regime, has begun tentatively engaging with the National Unity Government (NUG) in hopes of fostering democracy. In contrast, China has urged ethnic armed groups not to cooperate with the NUG. Groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of the most powerful and closest to China, remain in a ceasefire with the government at Beijing’s request.
Bordering China, the UWSA is among the wealthiest and best-armed militias, benefiting from direct trade with China. Ironically, while sitting out the war, the UWSA manufactures weapons for many ethnic rebel armies fighting the government. This aligns with China’s interests, as Beijing doesn’t favor any side winning but prefers stability in areas surrounding its investments and trade routes.
Most UWSA soldiers have Chinese names and speak both Wa and Chinese. Other ethnic groups are frustrated by the UWSA’s refusal to fight, as their involvement could help turn the tide against the Tatmadaw. However, this would go against China’s interests. Another powerful group, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), is part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, along with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). Beijing has urged the MNDAA to stop supporting the NUG due to the latter’s Western alignment, which threatens China’s strategic position in Burma.
China’s special envoy, Deng Xijun, has reportedly urged ethnic militias like the UWSA to avoid supporting the MNDAA. In an August meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined “three bottom lines“ to Burma’s junta and ethnic leaders: avoid civil strife, remain part of ASEAN, and prevent external interference—referring to the democratic government in exile. In September, the MNDAA announced it would no longer work with the NUG and canceled its planned operation to capture Mandalay, one of the government’s last strongholds.
While China prioritizes advancing its economic and strategic interests, the United States has historically supported democratic forces and imposed sanctions on Burma’s military regimes. The United States allowed the NUG to open a liaison office in Washington but has not yet fully recognized the NUG as Burma’s legitimate government. The NUG continues to receive backing from Western nations, including financial support from the United States and Europe, although this support has been limited to non-lethal aid.
The CCP’s co-opting of Burma into its sphere of influence poses a serious threat to U.S. national security by weakening American influence in the region, disrupting efforts to promote democracy, and bolstering China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific, which challenges U.S. interests and alliances. The China–Burma Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of the Belt and Road Initiative, is still under construction but will grant China direct access to the Indian Ocean once it is completed. This raises significant security concerns for both the United States and India, a key regional ally. CMEC includes a rail link from China’s Yunnan Province to a Chinese-built port on Burma’s Bay of Bengal, potentially allowing the Chinese navy to disrupt vital oil shipping routes from the Middle East to the rest of the world.
Beijing’s involvement in Burma’s peace process and efforts to broker ceasefire agreements are driven by self-interest, primarily aimed at stabilizing the situation to protect China’s economic interests. The junta has announced plans for democratic elections in 2025, which China supports. However, this is likely posturing and virtue signaling, as Western observers expect the elections to be illegitimate. Key opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy, which won both previous democratic elections, have been forcibly dissolved and disqualified from participating.
If the war ever ends, the resilience of EAOs may hinder the country from having a unified foreign policy, as some EAOs could continue engaging directly with China. The completion of the CMEC and ongoing Chinese dominance could turn Burma into a vassal state of China, further aligning it with the CCP-led anti-U.S. axis that already includes Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
Author
Antonio Graceffo, PhD, is a China economic analyst who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. Mr. Graceffo is a graduate of the Shanghai University of Sport, holds a China-MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and currently studies national defense at American Military University. He is the author of “Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s Global Economic Expansion” (2019).