The classic Churchill maxim remains as true in 2018 as it was in October 1939. In almost 80 years, Russia has changed but not evolved. It passed through the caldron of World War II with civilian and military casualties over 25 million. By the 1970s, it had achieved “superpower” status with nuclear weapons capable of incinerating the globe—and then it imploded politically with the USSR disintegrating into shard states in 1989-91.
It is obvious from his rule that Putin seeks to reassemble as much of the old USSR as is possible, if not physically reincorporating now-independent states, putting them under implicit Russian domination.
Without specifically saying so, Putin’s implicit motto is “Make Russia Great Again.” The question becomes how far and where Putin will push toward achieving his goal. Does he have a time table or are his actions extempore and opportunistic?
And with this backdrop, President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki on 16 July.
While most agree that a Trump-Putin meeting will be worthwhile, it has been almost as much a surprise as was the surprise meeting between Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-Un.
Today’s concern is reinforced by Trump’s ambivalent response to intelligence studies that Moscow attempted to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election—to damage Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and, implicitly at least, benefit then-Republican candidate Donald Trump. For his part, Trump says he has twice broached the interference issue with Putin who predictably denied it. Indeed, to expect a former KGB colonel to admit such would be to bet on Satan ice skating in Hades.
Nevertheless, despite repeated failures to reach agreements with Moscow on neuralgic topics ranging from its incorporation of Crimea and attempts to destabilize Ukraine to coddling Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, there are a wide variety of issues on which Washington can seek meaningful Moscow cooperation. After all, U.S. astronauts have flown to the space station on Russian rockets since 2011. And Moscow did nothing to interfere with U.S. equipment withdrawals from Afghanistan through central Asia.
Consequently, there are areas for possible cooperation/problem management.
And there are other secondary/tertiary confidence building areas for potential agreement: rebuilding our decimated diplomatic staffs, respectively in Washington/Moscow; joint observers for military exercises (or even reducing exercise personnel/equipment slightly); reviewing the point-counterpoint claims of violations of arms control agreements, particularly the INF Treaty which appears to be on increasingly shaky ground; and expanding information sharing on terrorist threats.
None of these moves would shatter the earth; rather simply provide management options to improve marginally a currently fraught bilateral relationship. We should not fear that Trump will “sell the farm” (plus farm house and subterranean mineral rights). More likely it will be a session for taking each other’s “measure” to determine the limits of the possible.
