Underestimating China’s Airpower Threat Again

Underestimating China’s Airpower Threat Again
A Chinese J-20 stealth fighter performs at the Airshow China 2018 in Zhuhai, south China's Guangdong Province, on Nov. 6, 2018. (Wang Zhao/AFP/Getty Images)
Rick Fisher
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Commentary

Americans are united in their desire to deter war. As the United States Air Force (USAF) makes crucial decisions regarding its sixth-generation air superiority combat aircraft, it is essential not to repeat past mistakes that could lock the United States into inferiority, increasing the chances of war.

In 2009, the Obama administration underestimated China’s air power potential in order to justify terminating production of the world’s best heavy air superiority fighter—the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor twin-turbofan fifth-generation fighter—at 187 aircraft.

Such a fighter is defined by its ability to supercruise or fly supersonically without afterburners, achieve supermaneuvrability with thrust vectored engines, perform sensor fusion to speed pilot decisions, and have advanced stealth to reduce radar detection.

In July 2009, the Obama administration projected for the mid-2020s: “The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth-generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese.”

That mistake is now undermining deterrence in Asia. According to a June 13 article in Jane’s Defence Weekly, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) may have up to 195 of its Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) J-20 twin-turbofan, supercruising, supermaneuverable, stealthy, and long-range fifth-generation heavy air superiority fighter.

Other observers estimate the PLAAF may have closer to 300 J-20s, producing up to 100 a year.

Jane’s counts about 12 J-20 units, with about six near Taiwan that could eventually deploy about 144 J-20s for immediate operations over the democratic island.

Now, in 2024, the United States has to achieve air superiority to deter a wider Russian war in Europe, an Iranian-funded war against Israel, and the Chinese regime’s aggression against U.S. allies in Asia, with only about 130 deployable F-22As and 630 (out of an eventual 2,400) smaller, shorter-range Lockheed Martin F-35 fifth-generation fighters with the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

With the PLAAF’s 120- to 190-mile-range PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles (AAM) that may out-range most U.S. AIM-120 AAMs in service, the J-20 has the range and reach to threaten USAF combat aircraft, electronic support, and tanker support aircraft crucial to U.S. combat success.

An American inability to achieve air superiority only increases temptations for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to attack Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines or to more intensively support Russian, North Korean, and Iranian aggression.

But as the United States struggles to sustain its ability to achieve air superiority to deter the new “Axis of Dictatorships,” it’s now in a race with China to develop, produce, and deploy the next generation, or the sixth generation of air superiority.

The U.S. sixth-generation fighter development effort to succeed the F-22A, now called Next Generation Air Defense (NGAD), dates back at least to 2014, while China’s earliest sixth-generation development efforts likely date back slightly before, around the time the J-20 entered production.

The U.S. and Chinese sixth-generation programs are characterized by intense secrecy with minimal revelations of data intended to shape adversary perceptions.

For the United States, a sixth-generation NGAD is the absolute key to securing a next-generation level of air superiority to ensure the survival of the USAF’s next-generation bombers, like the B-21, and then older fifth-generation F-35s and their large electronic support and tanker support fleets.

The U.S. sixth-generation NGAD fighter should have far greater stealth, much greater range to combat China over the Pacific, higher supercruising speeds, longer-range sensors, and directed-energy weapons like lasers to take out attacking AAMs and eventually attack enemy satellites in low Earth orbit from very high “near space” altitudes.

It should also employ greater artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled computers to process vast databases on enemy systems and actions, manage connections to a “Combat Cloud” of offboard sensors and networks, and manage more capable defensive and offensive electronic warfare systems, all to enable better-informed and faster pilot combat decisions.

Just as important, the U.S. concept for sixth-generation air superiority will also include advances in AI-enabled computers teaming with AI-enabled unmanned combat aircraft, called Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), that could perform advanced surveillance, suppress enemy air defenses, or perform aerial escort/combat and ground attack missions.

In March 2023, U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall revealed that the Air Force would only purchase 200 NGAD fighters.

In September 2020, very likely to China’s great surprise, then Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition William Roper announced that a full-scale U.S. NGAD technology demonstrator aircraft had flown. However, he did not reveal its performance data, any images, or who made the prototype.

This declaration of a U.S. “lead” in sixth-generation combat aircraft development likely prompted China to redouble its own sixth-generation program while intensifying its focus on gathering data about the U.S. program to define better and inform its own.

For example, citing numerous U.S. government sources, an article in the Number 6, 2022 issue of the Chinese journal Modern Defense Technology titled, “Analysis of the Development and Combat Concepts of Foreign Sixth-Generation Aircraft,” states:

“According to the development plans of various countries, around 2030, the world’s first sixth-generation aircraft will make its maiden flight and form initial combat capabilities. …The sixth-generation aircraft will develop in the direction of full-frequency and omnidirectional stealth. Stealth manned/unmanned cluster combat in a cloud network environment will become a typical combat style, and directed energy killing may become its subversive attack method.”

China’s sixth-generation signaling has included using the November 2021 Zhuhai Airshow to produce a TV show with J-20 chief designer Yang Wei, who is likely now leading their sixth-generation program, shown viewing a video from the Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) illustrating sixth-generation fighter concepts.

That 2021 Zhuhai show also featured a near fighter-size model of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) FH-97A, a twin-engine stealthy unmanned “CCA” that could already be flying in prototype form.

Pilots of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation's J-10 for the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) march after performing a flight demonstration program at the 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, in southern China's Guangdong Province, on Sept. 28, 2021. (Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images)
Pilots of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation's J-10 for the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) march after performing a flight demonstration program at the 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, in southern China's Guangdong Province, on Sept. 28, 2021. (Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images)

In short, China’s sixth-generation combat aircraft program can be expected to mirror the U.S. program in developing a new fighter far more capable than its fifth-generation J-20. This fighter will also likely employ energy weapons and exploit AI to enable greater “cloud” connectivity to manage new CCA unmanned combat aircraft formations with AI-enabled autonomy and to assist pilot decisions.

But at a time when the United States is clearly in a race with China to produce better sixth-generation combat aircraft and supporting air combat systems and faces a growing threat of wars with multiple dictatorships, the U.S. Air Force is responding to U.S. defense budget constraints and competing USAF program demands by contemplating a reduction in NGAD program funding or even a redesign that could result in a less capable NGAD fighter.

In an interview published on July 1, 2024, Secretary Kendall, responding to budgetary pressures, told Defense News, “We’re looking at whether we can do something that’s less expensive and do some trade-offs there.”

An NGAD-lite or just 200 sixth-generation fighters may not be enough to meet the Chinese regime’s rapidly expanding fifth-generation fighter and emerging sixth-generation fighter challenges, which embolden the CCP to lead multiple or coordinated wars, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran, against the United States and its allies.

It is also clear that producing more F-35s will not be enough to meet the challenge of China’s sixth-generation fighter supporting its expanded fleet of fifth-generation and future CCA combat aircraft.

A program dating back to the 1980s, the F-35 was designed to be the less expensive multirole complement to the F-22A, more affordable by U.S. allies, and not the premier U.S. air superiority fighter.

The most numerous F-35A only has a 679-mile combat radius compared to an estimated 1,200-mile combat radius for the J-20, cannot “supercruise” like the J-20, and does not yet have a possible 190-mile range AAM like the PL-15, as does the J-20.

Both the F-35A and the J-20 employ stealth shaping and stealth materials, but the Chinese regime gained insights into the F-35’s early stealth capabilities through a successful 2007 cyber espionage operation that targeted Lockheed Martin.

This same Chinese cyber espionage operation also stole data on the F-35s and then novel long-range electro-optical surveillance systems, which likely explains why the J-20’s electro-optical systems look like the F-35’s.

America and its allies face existential threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which soon could be engaging in nuclear coercive—or even nuclear strike—warfare. This demands that the United States provide sufficient leadership to deter these dictatorships, beginning with setting the example of sufficient defense spending.

The U.S. Air Force should not have to choose between the most capable fleet of NGAD sixth-generation fighters and other essential programs like the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the B-21 strategic bomber.

If America cannot deter wars by demonstrating the ability to achieve air superiority, its enemies will force the United States to fight to achieve it, which in World War II and in Korea proved expensive in aircraft and lives.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Rick Fisher is a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center.