Ukraine’s Escalation Calculation

Without acceding to Russia’s neutrality demands, widening the war may be the only path to victory for Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Escalation Calculation
An assault unit commander from the 3rd Assault Brigade runs to his position at the frontline in Andriivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine, on Sept. 16, 2023. (Alex Babenko/AP Photo)
James Gorrie
Updated:
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Commentary

Without acceding to Russia’s neutrality demands, widening the war may be the only path to victory for Ukraine.

No matter how you look at it, Ukraine isn’t winning its war against Russian aggression. Even though they may be fighting the Russians to more or less a stalemate in terms of territorial gains, that makes little difference in the bigger picture. Even with massive financial and military assistance from the United States and Europe, Ukraine is, in fact, losing the war.

And they know it. They also know that their field of options is narrowing.

Russian Demands for Neutrality, or More?

The Russians have made clear their desire for Ukrainian neutrality. But demands for Ukrainian “neutrality” as a condition for a ceasefire can and should be considered to be fraught with risk. Neutrality for Russian President Vladimir Putin will mean more than just that Ukraine will not become a part of NATO or a proxy for the United States.

A cynical view, or perhaps just a realistic one, may well think that Russia’s demand for Ukraine’s neutrality means not just non-alignment with respect to NATO and the United States, but total disarmament. An unarmed Ukraine would leave it open to further Russian territorial designs or aggression in the future. It may also encourage Russia to pursue further western expansion in a bid to revivify the old Soviet bloc of nations under Moscow’s control.

From a Russian perspective, given the recent history of a deep U.S. presence and influence in Ukraine, neutralizing Ukraine is understandable. But so is Ukraine’s desire to be free of Russian intimidation. However, the former is realistic; the latter is not. The reality of proximity makes it an impossibility. Both nations are neighbors and have swapped territory back and forth over the centuries, and even in the 21st century with Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014.
In short, Ukraine is trapped simply by bordering a great power like Russia.

Territory Gains Have Minimal Impact in a War of Attrition

Even though Ukraine has made some territorial gains in its various counteroffensives, the overall impact of those gains on the war has been minimal at best. The tenor of the war has certainly not changed, and every “gain” Ukraine has made has been very costly, with high losses of men and military equipment. In a war of attrition such as this one, territory won back by Ukraine may be temporary. Russian forces enjoy roughly a 3:1 advantage over Ukraine, with a much larger military-industrial complex and a larger population from which to draw soldiers.

Ukraine Casualties Rapidly Mounting

In terms of casualties, both the Russians and the Ukrainians realize that the longer the war lasts, the weaker Ukraine becomes. The figures are grim.
According to recent estimates, Ukraine has suffered 70,000 killed and up to 120,000 wounded. But given the Ukraine government’s censorship surrounding casualties, those numbers may be below the actual number of casualties. Deaths on both sides are said to be at least 500,000. As Ukraine’s fighting capabilities diminish, casualty rates could be expected to rise.

Ukraine Losing the Battle of Men and Morale

Two of the biggest indicators of fighting capabilities are men and morale. The simple fact is that the Ukrainian army is running out of men willing to fight for their country. The problem isn’t a numerical one per se. With a population of about 39 million and a military conscription age range of 18 to 60 years of age, there are plenty of men in Ukraine to continue the fight.
Rather, the problem is one of morale. Thousands of Ukrainian men are leaving the country by bribery or stealth, or both, to avoid military service.
The numbers tell the story. As of September of this year, there were 14,000 Ukrainian men of military age registered as refugees in Austria alone. In Poland, authorities estimate that up to 80,000 Ukrainian men of military age have come to Poland since the war began, while that number in Germany exceeds 200,000. Even more telling, according to Eurostat, of the 4 million Ukrainians who have been granted temporary protection in the European Union (EU) since the start of the war, 17.9 percent, or more than 700,000, are men aged 18 to 64.
As bad as that is, those countries sheltering Ukrainians are refusing demands to extradite military-aged refugees back to their home country. As the war at home effort continues to deteriorate, such non-extradition policies will likely encourage more men of military age to flee Ukraine.

Flagging Support at Home and Abroad Means Desperation in Kyiv

Finally, as the war drags on, support among the United States and NATO nations in Europe is falling. In the United States, there’s rising political opposition against continued funding for Ukraine, especially among Republicans, who have a majority in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, a majority of Americans oppose sending more money to Ukraine.
In Europe, support for giving Ukraine military aid is also “plummeting,” falling from 67 percent in April 2022 to 48 percent in August 2023.
Russia sees this as being in its favor and appears to be biding its time. This reality, along with the factors mentioned above, puts the government of Ukraine in a position of growing desperation. There’s no indication that Ukraine will be in a better position tomorrow than it is today.

Escalation for Survival

Perhaps, from the Ukrainian perspective, their only path to avoid losing the war is to widen it. Deepening U.S. involvement, or NATO’s, may do the job.

But how might that happen?

Consider, for example, that Russia tires of Ukraine attacking Russian territory with U.S.-made missiles. Therefore, Moscow decides to attack the United States directly by way of taking out U.S.-supplied, Ukraine-bound weapons or other military systems in a NATO country, or at least outside of Ukraine. Such a defensive act might trigger a broader response from the United States or the NATO ally that suffered the attack. Targeting U.S. communications systems or other critical infrastructure may also suffice.

This is speculative, of course. But then, so is the identity of the perpetrator who blew up Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines. Some say it was the United States, others say it was Ukraine. If Ukraine had the motivation to do it, it has even more motivation today to escalate the war any way it can.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
James R. Gorrie is the author of “The China Crisis” (Wiley, 2013) and writes on his blog, TheBananaRepublican.com. He is based in Southern California.
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