The Western press is highly excited about the prospects of a counteroffensive against Russian forces occupying Ukraine.
“Ukraine faces a ticking clock,” blared a New York Times headline. “It is now battered Ukraine’s turn for an offensive,” cheered the Financial Times. “The coming battle should aim to persuade Moscow of the futility of its aggression and attempted land grabs.”
CNN headlined, “As Ukraine prepares counteroffensive, Russia appears in disarray.” The author could have been duped into repeating Kremlin propaganda, but no matter. War with Russia is an unending cascade of smoke and mirrors.
After months of buildup, in which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy obtained some, but not all, of the military materiel Kyiv needs for the campaign, there is increased Ukrainian activity on the frontlines, and Russian troops are evacuating civilians while feverishly preparing defensive and fallback positions.
All that is needed, according to the narrative, are quick wins by Ukraine to redraw the frontlines on media maps so the American and European public can keep the momentum of arms and consequent victories flowing until all of Ukraine is liberated.
The West should indeed accelerate the arming of Ukraine for its defense and turn toward offensives to retake Ukrainian territory where possible.
Lack of help to Ukraine would mean the ossification of current frontlines and a Western loss used by not only Moscow but also by Beijing to make more gains at the expense of our democratic allies, ultimately using their ill-gotten gains to threaten the United States itself as we become increasingly isolated.
But military support to Ukraine should never be predicated on costly wins for the cameras that have little strategic purpose. There is now talk of the risk of Ukrainian arms and soldiers squandered in an attempt to appeal to the cameras for easy wins that turn to Pyrrhic defeats.
Russia’s offensive in February 2022, which enjoyed overwhelming military power relative to the Ukrainians, including, of surprise, bogged down within three days. In its offensive to take Bakhmut, a strategically worthless city, Russia lost seven soldiers for every Ukrainian killed, according to the chief of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council in March.
The Russian offensive in Bakhmut was more a cynical meat grinder for Russia’s Wagner Group to execute its own criminals and weaken Ukrainians in the process. It did the former but only resolved Ukrainians and reinscribed a lesson: the defense has thus far had the advantage in this war.
Rather than push Ukrainian commanders into hasty and ill-considered counteroffensives, then, we should encourage them to carefully decide when and if they want a large counteroffensive, or whether their ultimate goals are better served with their current strategy of slowly bleeding the Russian army, but this time with better arms at their disposal to both hold back any further Russian offenses, keep them guessing about offensives and therefore off-balance, and make inroads against their territorial gains where offensives can yield gains without inordinate losses.
These are tactical questions best left to commanders on the battlefield, not the public and media commentators thirsty for flashy victories to justify further arms appropriations.
Leaked U.S. intelligence acknowledges Ukrainian “deficiencies in training and munitions” that could impede Ukraine’s planned offensives in the spring.
After months of talking up the counteroffensive to pry as many weapons as possible from U.S. and European allies, Ukrainian officials are now wisely shifting to manage expectations.
“The expectation from our counteroffensive campaign is overestimated in the world,” Ukraine’s defense minister told the Post last week. “Most people are … waiting for something huge,” which could lead to “emotional disappointment.”
Zelenskyy has pleaded for F-16 fighter jets, long-range strike missiles and artillery, and more Patriot missile defenses that Washington and Brussels have refused to provide due to worries about Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory that could escalate or broaden the war. The imbalance in long-range strike capabilities gives Russia a major advantage in unilateral strikes in Ukraine’s rear. More missile defense for Ukraine could mean stripping U.S. systems.
Just over a week ago, according to The Guardian, Pavel met Zelenskyy and appealed to Ukrainian officials not to be “pushed into a faster pace before they are fully prepared” and warned of “terrible losses” on the Ukrainian side no matter how strong its forces.
Pavel noted the “extremely demanding” tactical and supply requirements of “putting together personnel equipment, ammunition logistics, fuel financing.”
He said, “Because it might be a temptation to push them, for some, to demonstrate some results … it will be extremely harmful to Ukraine if this counteroffensive fails because they will not have another chance, at least not this year.”
Yes, we should arm Ukraine with the best weapons systems and an abundant ammunition supply so field commanders are ready to take opportunities as they arise. But we should leave open the option of victory by slowly pressuring Russia by draining it of blood and treasure until Moscow has no choice but to retreat from occupied territories.
Washington, Brussels, and the punditry can help by not pressuring Ukraine into hasty counteroffensives that could fail, be an inefficient use of materiel, or lead to inordinate casualties on the Ukrainian side for territory that lacks strategic value.
Given Russia’s far larger army, not to mention the low morale and human costs of failed counteroffensives, let’s cheer the Ukrainians for having the fortitude and wisdom to ignore the pundits and political pressure by demonstrating strategic patience and conservation of forces on their road to ultimate victory.
