First, Washington is continuing to apply pressure on Beijing where it counts—by blocking its access to the most advanced global semiconductor technologies. Beijing is responding by trying to control rare minerals used in tech processes. The minerals and semiconductors that each attempts to deny the other are critical for military production.
If China can manage to take over Taiwan without its semiconductor factories getting destroyed in the process (a tall order, given reports that they can be remotely disabled by the United States and the Netherlands), Beijing could reap a tech bonanza.
Both countries are trying to control international cloud computing and undersea internet cables while bypassing each other’s networks. Analysts assume that both Beijing and Washington spy on whatever international internet traffic they can access and, in the case of Beijing, the domestic traffic as well. The regime uses its unfettered cyber espionage for not only traditional purposes but also industrial secrets that could be shared with multiple Chinese firms at a time. The country’s technical sophistication on a wide range of products, up to and including U.S. spacecraft and aircraft carriers, now seems to be just a few steps behind the biggest democratic countries at any given time.
Meanwhile, federal legislation requires TikTok’s Beijing-based parent company, ByteDance, to sell TikTok by April 2025, or the app will be banned. The state cases will likely decrease the company’s monetary value. All in all, the various measures against TikTok appear to be a strategy of “death by a thousand cuts.”
Key members of the Biden administration are deeply involved in the more general tech war against the CCP.
Sullivan is coordinating with Japan and the Netherlands on targeted export controls that prevent the export of the most advanced semiconductor designs and production processes to China. He also wants to maintain other less strategic forms of trade with China and uses the metaphor of a “small yard and high fence” to describe the strategy. (It should be admitted that any trade with China that enriches the country increases the tax revenue that the CCP can and is using to build up its military.)
The United States, Japan, and the Netherlands are particularly important to his approach, as they all produce critical semiconductor designs and manufacturing equipment that cannot be obtained elsewhere. When united, these three countries have a near-monopoly on the most advanced semiconductors.
In a Wired Magazine report published on Oct. 10, Sullivan said the U.S.–China tech competition is personal to him:
“If technology is being used more for ill than for good, if the rules of the road are being set by authoritarian competitors, if the technologies of the future are invented elsewhere and not here, that’s going to mean less security, less jobs, and less productivity in the United States. I don’t want to see that world.”
As should be clear by now, the tech war is difficult, and by no means is it certain it will be won. Beijing is rapidly adapting to U.S. tech controls by stockpiling materials and equipment and developing its own science and technology innovation ecosystem. As the United States and its allies increase tech controls on China, Beijing is fighting back with its own controls, shifting supply chains to authoritarian partners like Russia, Iran, and Arab countries and attempting to influence the political process in democracies, even as we soften our approach.
To win the tech war, we will have to do the opposite: act with greater alacrity and purpose than we have up until now. War of any kind, including the tech war, is not for the timid. Our policymakers must get tougher.